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Abstract 
Background: In acute-care settings interruptions and workload increase medication 
administration errors (MAEs). However, MAEs are studied less within mental-health 
settings, where nursing staff specialise in psychiatric therapeutics and the mode of 
administration is different; e.g. in psychiatry, patients are not necessarily resting in 
hospital beds making bedside administration redundant.  Existing research in psychiatry 
suggests MAEs are linked to morning rounds associated with more interruptions, 
medicines to administer, activities and staff shortages.  An audit at the current Trust in 
2014 found 13−52% of patients had at least one ‘blank box’ on their drug chart in the 
preceding seven days on seven mental-health wards necessitating further research.  In 
addition, the Trust spans mental-health (psychiatric) and community wards (some with 
patient lockers for medication administration), providing an opportunity to examine 
differences across therapeutic areas and modes of administration. 
 
Aim: The study aims to document the rate of MAEs across all inpatient wards at 
Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust (BHFT) psychiatric and community 
hospital wards, and to investigate the interrelationship between error rates and a range 
of possible contributing factors as well as the causes behind the MAEs. The aim 
eventually is to produce recommendations for improving medication administration 
practices in this type of setting.  
 
Methodology: This research used a mixed-method approach by adopting direct 
observation and semi-structured interviews to examine in depth the rate and causes of 
MAEs within mental-health and community hospital wards. The researcher visited all 
19 wards (9 community hospital wards, 10 psychiatric wards) between July and 
October 2015 making 65 separate observations in total. Different modes of 
administration were noted alongside any interruptions and other potential contributing 
factors. The different modes of administration observed included administering at the 
patient ‘bedside’ prepared in clinic room (applied to psychiatric wards only), using 
patient lockers (applied to community hospital wards only) or a drug trolley (applied to 
community hospital wards only), or via a ‘queue’ where by patients were called to wait 
outside the clinic room (applied to psychiatric wards only) or  a ‘mixed’ mode whereby 
medicines were given at the bedside or via a queue with the medication prepared in 
clinic room (applied to psychiatric wards only). In this research, data were entered into 
SPSS (v21) and analysed descriptively and using the Poisson Regression Model. These 
findings were discussed in structured interviews with nurses, pharmacists and compared 
with the researcher’s own notes to describe the causes of errors using the organisational 
accident causation model as a theoretical framework, which were then triangulated with 
the quantitative findings. 
 
 
 xv 
 
Findings: In total 2237 opportunities for error were observed with 367 MAEs, resulting 
in a total error rate of 16.4%, 2.4% of which were wrong time errors. When the number 
of MAEs was separated to procedural errors versus clinical errors, the clinical error rate 
was 7.7%. The most frequent type of MAE was expiry errors (32% - a type of 
procedural error) followed by omissions (23% - a type of clinical error). Two modes of 
administration (‘bedside-prepared in clinic room’ and using ‘bedside-patient locker’) 
and the non-psychiatric drug group increased the risk of procedural errors.  Two 
administration times (08:00 and 12:00 only), nurse grade (band-5 nurses) and two 
modes of administration (using ‘bedside-patient locker’ and ‘mixed’) increased the risk 
of clinical errors. Twelve interviews were completed with eight nurses and four 
pharmacists. The main active failure category for clinical errors was understood to be 
‘lapses’, the main error-producing condition ‘staff workload’ and the main latent 
condition ‘safety culture and priorities’. The main active failure category for procedural 
errors was judged to be ‘situational violations’ by the researcher but this was not the 
view of nurses and pharmacists who painted a more blameless picture of the workplace. 
 
Conclusion: The findings show that expiry errors, a major component of procedural 
errors, take place across both psychiatric and community hospital ward types 
specifically when medication is given at the patient bedside and is prepared either in the 
clinic room or given via patient lockers, and that this is likely because of staff workload 
and/or lack of staff knowledge. The findings also suggest that omissions, a major 
component of clinical errors, were associated with the mixed mode of administration on 
psychiatric wards and the 12:00 administration time, and occurred because of a range of 
reasons that included workload, miscommunication and staff-related factors. Another 
type of clinical error was the wrong time error which was associated mainly with the 
patient lockers and the 08:00 administration time, mainly because of the high staff 
workload. The results suggest that patient lockers are not as safe as perceived because 
they are implicated in both clinical and procedural errors. In addition, the distinct 
contributing factors identified in this study can provide a means through which the 
occurrence of MAEs can be addressed. This mixed-method study makes a novel 
contribution to knowledge as the first study to compare mental-health and community 
hospital wards using the direct observation method, researching different modes of 
administration, and then comparing and contrasting the perceptions of the researcher 
with nurse and pharmacist opinions for causes of MAEs.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Medication administration errors (MAEs) on inpatient hospital wards are a known 
problem within healthcare. Although well-researched in the acute-care setting, the 
prevalence of medication administration errors is less well studied within mental-health 
settings, where nursing staff specialise in psychiatric therapeutics rather than physical 
health conditions. At Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust (BHFT), ten 
psychiatric wards (PWs) provide five specialist psychiatric care; Adult mental-health, 
learning disability, older adult mental-health and intensive care units; the Trust also 
includes the Berkshire Adolescent Unit, which looks after younger patients. All 
psychiatric wards include mixed gender (male and female) patients that are located in 
separate rooms. The type of medication used in all mental-health wards is mostly 
psychotropic medications and antidepressants. Some of patients in adult psychiatric 
wards use other non-psychotropic medications for example, insulin, pain-killers etc. 
Most of the patients in older adults’ wards usually have a lot of non-psychotropic 
medications besides their psychiatric medications. These medications are administered 
to patients through different modes of administration (queue mode, bedside-prepared in 
clinic room mode or mixed between queue mode and bedside-prepared in clinic room 
modes of administration). These modes of administration are detailed in full in Chapter 
2 (Section 2.3.1) of this thesis. In addition, the Trust also includes nine community 
hospital wards (CHWs), which are used for ‘rehabilitation’ (occupational therapy, 
physiotherapy, needing mobility, chest rehab or elderly rehabilitation) in the transition 
of patients from acute-care settings before going back to their homes. In these wards, 
most of the patients were in different age groups, and had various medical problems. 
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The community hospital wards include both male and female patients located in 
separate rooms or in bays. Moreover, the type of medication used is mostly non-
psychotropic medication except in the patients with dementia. The majority of the 
community hospital wards at BHFT provide a traditional medication administration 
service, involving nurses in selecting medicines for administration to patients from a 
general trolley. Some of the community wards provide a ‘one-stop’ service, which 
relies on using individually-labelled medicines stored in bedside-patient lockers; more 
description of medicines administration practices at BHFT is located in Chapter 2 
(Section 2.3.1). Moreover, both psychiatric wards and community hospital wards at 
BHFT used paper drug charts that contain the patient medication which is screened by 
clinical pharmacists to ensure it is legally and clinically appropriate. Each psychiatric 
ward receives visits by a clinical pharmacist around 2-4 times weekly to review the 
medication and the pharmacist visits at least one ward round. Each community ward is 
visited by a clinical pharmacist three times weekly to review the medications, perform 
medicine reconciliations, and discuss therapy with patients and prescribers. The 
pharmacy medicines management technicians visit the wards once a week to complete a 
full top-up of stocks and non-stocks items. Table  1.1 shows more detailed description of 
the wards at BHFT.  
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Table ‎1.1: Detailed description of the wards at BHFT 
Wards type Wards  Wards speciality Mode of 
administration  
Bed numbers  Patients age range  
Psychiatric 
Wards (PWs) 
PW1 Younger  mental-
health  
Bedside-prepared in 
clinic room 
12 Between 12-17 
years old 
PW2 Adult mental-health  Queue or mixed  26 Between 18-65 
years old 
PW3 Learning disability  Bedside-prepared in 
clinic room 
9  Between 18-65 
years old 
PW4 Adult mental-health Queue 23 Between 18-65 
years old 
PW5 Learning disability Bedside-prepared in 
clinic room 
9  Between 18-65 
years old 
PW6 Older adult mental-
health 
Bedside-prepared in 
clinic room or mixed 
20 65 years old and 
over 
PW7 Adult mental-health Queue 22 Between 18-65 
years old 
PW8 Older adult mental-
health (dementia)  
Bedside-prepared in 
clinic room 
20 65 years old and 
over 
PW9 Adult mental-health Queue 27 Between 18-65 
years old 
PW10 Intensive care unit Bedside-prepared in 
clinic room 
14 Between 18-65 
years old 
Community 
Hospital Wards 
(CHWs) 
CHW1 
Rehabilitation 
(occupational therapy, 
physiotherapy, 
needing mobility, 
chest rehab or elderly 
rehabilitation) 
Bedside-patient 
locker 
20 
from 18 and older 
than 65 years old 
CHW2 Bedside-patient 
locker 
12 
CHW3 Bedside-trolley 30 
CHW4 Bedside-patient 
lockers 
12 
CHW5 Bedside-trolley 24 
CHW6 Bedside-trolley 29 
CHW7 Bedside-trolley  22 
CHW8 Bedside-patient 
lockers 
12 
CHW9 Bedside-patient 
lockers 
28 
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It is not known whether the type and frequency of medication administration errors 
differ across the different care settings at the Trust, nor indeed whether such errors 
mimic national and international averages determined in published studies.  
An audit of ‘blank boxes’ (where the drug chart is not signed to indicate dose given, 
detailed later in this thesis) completed by the pharmacy department at BHFT in 2014 
across seven mental-health wards and seven community hospital wards at the Trust 
retrospectively, examined all in-patient drug charts over a 7-day period to determine the 
number of medication administration records. 13-52% of patients had at least one blank 
box, and there appeared to be a higher percentage of patient charts with blank boxes in 
the mental-health wards compared to the community wards, as might be anticipated due 
to the fact that patients on mental-health wards are not bed-bound, may be more likely 
to refuse their medication and could reasonably be expected to be off the ward. 
However, the audit did not set out to use detailed inferential statistics for making any 
such comparisons. What the audit and subsequent improvement work did instead was to 
show that targeted interventions on one ward led to a reduction in the number of blank 
boxes, with a recommendation that this should be spread to other inpatient areas. 
The Trust has a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for ‘Administration of medicines’ 
as well as one for ‘Omitted, refused or wasted medicines’. Before the current study, the 
extent and nature of the range of MAEs across the wards at the Trust were not known, 
nor the range of reasons for errors, including omissions and blank boxes. 
This study examines firstly the rates and types of MAEs, including omissions and blank 
boxes, on all wards at the Trust using the direct observation method. One of the 
objectives of the study is to record all potential contributing factors as well as the 
apparent reason for any MAEs including omissions and blank boxes observed to take 
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place. In addition, relevant healthcare staff were interviewed in order to gain a more in-
depth understanding about the perceived reasons for MAEs, and the other deviations 
from practice guidelines including omissions and blank boxes. The ultimate objective of 
this thesis is to make evidence-based recommendations for improving medication 
administration practices at the Trust and in other similar settings.   
This thesis describes a mixed-method study that examined in depth the rate and causes 
of MAEs within a mental-health and community hospital Trust. The ward settings were 
vastly different in that some used a standard trolley system, some a queuing method and 
some a patient locker system. This introduction chapter therefore focuses on 
introducing the concept of MAEs within a healthcare domain, the difference between 
the modes of medication administration rounds, the different research methodologies 
that have been adopted for recording MAEs, the rates of MAEs reported in the 
literature, type of MAEs, the potential for harm from MAEs, contributing factors and 
causes linked to MAEs and suggested interventions to reduce MAEs. 
1.1 Medication safety in hospital settings 
Safety in healthcare settings including medication safety is considered an important and 
under-researched area around the world and the UK in particular. The NHS Department 
of Health (2000) set up a comprehensive programme ‘An Organisation with a Memory’ 
to learn from incidents and service failures and more effectively from adverse events 
and near misses. The aim was to reduce the risk of failures such as medication errors as 
well as to provide recommendations that could be taken to help ensure that similar 
events can be avoided in the future (Donaldson, 2002). 
In addition, ‘To Err is Human’ is a report produced by the quality of healthcare in an 
American project. The report lays out an inclusive strategy to address serious healthcare 
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problems and to point out a list of recommendations for safe medication practices and 
to improve awareness of the problem by the health professionals (Donaldson et al., 
2000). Studying MAEs is part of a more global approach towards safer medicines 
management processes. One of the key documents published in relation to medicines 
safety in the UK highlighted that the most serious incidents were caused by errors in 
medicines administration (NPSA, 2007). Prior to that, the Audit Commission’s (2001) 
report “A Spoonful of Sugar – Medicines Management in NHS Hospitals” had 
emphasised ways in which processes relating to medicines could be optimised in 
secondary care exactly to prevent such issues. It is important to briefly examine where 
medication errors can occur within the medication flow system.  
As shown in Figure  1.1 the first step in the medication flow procedure is the prescribing 
of the drug, followed by its dispensing, then administration and finally the monitoring 
of its effects and side-effects. Accordingly, medication errors can occur at any of these 
stages. Therefore, medication errors can be conceptualised in terms of the stage at 
which they occur (Franklin, 2010).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎1.1: A simplistic classification of the medication flow stages where a medication error 
could take place at each of these stages (adapted from Franklin, 2010) 
 
For completeness, according to the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory 
Agency (MHRA), a medicinal product is defined as: 
“Any substance or combination of substances presented as having properties for 
treating or preventing disease in human beings. Any substance or combination of 
substances which may be used in, or administered to, human beings, either with a view 
Prescribe 
medication 
Dispense or 
supply 
medication 
Administer 
medication 
Monitor 
effects 
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to restoring, correcting or modifying physiological functions by exerting a 
pharmacological, immunological or metabolic action, or to making a medical 
diagnosis” (MHRA, 2016). 
There is a whole range of products that might be prescribed and then administered to 
patients during a medication administration round. This point becomes important later 
in this thesis when examining the different types of products that were observed to be 
administered to patients during ward rounds at the hospital Trust that was the research 
base for this work. 
Certainly, physicians, pharmacists, technicians, nurses and even patients could all be 
involved in making medication-related mistakes (Clark, 2004). The medication 
administration step is associated with a significant proportion of all identified errors 
overall; for example, 44% of medication errors are thought to relate to MAEs (Leape et 
al., 1995). Maidment et al. (2008) found that MAEs in older patient psychiatric wards 
had the highest rate compared to other medication errors. To explain further, MAEs are 
defined as “any dose of medication administered (or omitted) that deviated from the 
written medication order” (Allan and Barker, 1990). Using this definition, omitting or 
delaying to give or take a drug is also considered as a type of MAE (Franklin, 2010). A 
National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) (2010) report indicated that 27 deaths, 68 
severe harms and nearly 21,000 other patient safety incidents were associated with 
omissions or delays in medicine administrations in the three years of data analysed. It 
can be seen therefore that MAEs including omissions or delays in medication 
administration are not inconsequential making them worthy of further research. 
As well as missed and delayed doses, MAEs can include administering the wrong drug 
or dose which can of course also have serious consequences for patients. According to 
the NPSA, the most commonly reported type of MAE involves the wrong dose being 
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administered, for example the incorrect strength being given or at the wrong frequency 
(NPSA, 2007). In formal secondary-care settings, MAEs relate in the main to the 
activities carried out by ward nurses. In fact, one of the main duties of nurses in 
hospitals is to take responsibility for selecting and administering medicines to patients 
during medication rounds or at other intervals (Greengold et al., 2003).  
The traditional ward round involves nurses administering medicines to patients at 
regular times using a drug trolley and against a paper or electronic prescription. 
Medicine administration can take about 30–50% of nurses’ time in hospitals and it is 
considered one of the tasks most associated with risk in terms of nurses’ overall duties 
(Pepper, 1995, Armitage and Knapman, 2003). The next section provides an overview 
of the traditional as well as other modes of drug administration on wards relevant to the 
current study. 
1.2 Different modes of drug administration on wards 
Before examining different ways in which medication administration rounds take place 
on hospital wards, it is worth explaining some key activities underpinning the 
administration process. The prescribing process is normally initiated on a hospital ward 
when doctors write on a paper or electronic drug chart. The paper drug chart is the more 
traditional means for prescribing medication, and it is important to clarify that the 
hospital Trust which is the focus of the current study used only paper drug charts. 
Hence, the electronic prescribing process is covered in this thesis in reference to other 
studies, and is itself not the subject of the current work. The paper drug chart then 
contains the set of instructions that nurses follow when completing a medication 
administration round. As well as being signed to authorise nurses’ work, where there is 
a ward pharmacy service, the drug chart is also screened by clinical pharmacists to 
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ensure it is legally and clinically appropriate. The specific setting of the wards and the 
medication administration processes at the hospital Trust where this work was 
completed are covered in much more detail in subsequent chapters. 
The other system underpinning the medication administration process in general is the 
supply and maintenance of medication to the ward. This system is in the main the 
responsibility of the pharmacy department within most UK hospitals. For example, 
where the service exists, a designated pharmacy technician will visit the ward on a 
regular basis to maintain stocks and non-stock items for individual patients via a 
pharmacy distribution service. Briefly, this ‘top-up’ visit to the ward is to record the 
level of stock items on a minimum stock list and non-stock items on a pharmacy non-
stock drug request sheet so that items can be replenished as needed- i.e. the aim is to 
monitor the stock level and then re-order if necessary. Once the pharmacy department 
receives this list or sheet the suitable supply will be accordingly dispensed and sent 
up/across to the ward.  
Items sent up to the ward thus enable reloading of stock and non-stock items into 
appropriate storage spaces upon receipt via a distribution box. On the ward, medication 
is stored securely in stock cupboards, drug refrigerators, the drug trolley or bedside-
patient lockers, which are the storage spaces on wards, and the master key for these 
storage spaces is kept by the ward nurse in charge (NHS Professionals, 2010). The 
availability of prescribed medication items at ward level underpins the medication 
administration process, whereby nurses select and administer prescribed medication at 
scheduled times to patients.  
In most UK hospital wards, medication administration rounds are scheduled to take 
place four times a day. This is to cater for most dosage schedules of drugs – for 
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example, some drugs are prescribed for once daily administration whereas others can be 
given four times a day. Normally either one or two nurses take charge of the medication 
administration round. There are different modes for drug administration, and these are 
described below in more detail, but regardless of these differences, where a paper drug 
chart is used, the round begins usually with the nurse examining the drug chart for each 
patient in turn. The drug chart is thus picked up by a nurse and each medication order 
scanned in order to establish whether a dose is due for the patient on that round.   
The medication due is then selected from the appropriate storage environment (stock 
cupboards, drug refrigerators, drug trolley or bedside-patient locker) before being given 
to the patient. Official guidelines do exist for nurses undertaking medication 
administration on hospital wards as shown in Table  1.2. In the UK, a range of 
medication administration processes exist, each focusing on a specific medication 
storage environment. Although, according to Jevon et al. (2010, p. 104) medication can 
be administered from a drug trolley, the bedside-patient locker and the stock cupboard 
and this very much depends on what the overall process is. For example, with one-stop 
dispensing schemes where patients’ own drugs (PODs) are used, the main storage 
environment for the medication becomes the patient’s bedside locker. In contrast, with a 
traditional ward round that uses a drug trolley, medication can be obtained from the 
drug trolley, the stock cupboard and the bedside locker if this exists. The hospital Trust 
which was the base for this research included 19 different wards that used a range of 
medication storage environments as described below from which medication could be 
selected during the administration round. 
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Table  1.2: Recommend guidelines for nurses during the medication administration round 
(adapted from NMC, 2015) 
Medication administration guidelines 
 Check the identity of the patient and be sure to give the right medicine to the right patient 
 Check that the patient is not allergic to the medicine before administering it 
 Know the therapeutic uses of the medicine to be administered (normal dosage, side 
effects, precautions and contra-indications) 
 Be aware of the patient’s plan of care  
 Check that the prescription or the label on medicine dispensed is clearly written and 
unambiguous 
 Check the expiry date  
 Considered the dosage, weight where appropriate, method of administration, route and 
timing 
 Administer or withhold medication in the context of the patient’s condition 
 Contact the prescriber or another authorised prescriber without delay where contra-
indications to the prescribed medicine are discovered 
 Make a clear, accurate and immediate record of all medicine administered, intentionally 
withheld or refused by the patient, ensuring the signature is clear and legible  
 
1.2.1 Medication administration from a drug trolley 
The drug trolley is a wheeled, contained trolley that remains on the ward and is 
lockable. On the inside, this is normally divided into several internal shelves, including 
shelving on the inside of the door where appropriate. A drug trolley is also normally 
fitted with a push handle and a heavy-duty lock that allows it to be always locked to the 
wall unless being used for the medication administration round. The stock items and big 
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bottles of liquid medication were observed to be stored in the door shelving in the drug 
trolleys in this study. Moreover, other shelves included named-patient medications 
where each patient’s medication was placed together in one container organised by their 
name and each container itself was labelled with the patient’s information e.g. name, 
NHS number, date of birth, etc. It is important to highlight that most UK general 
hospital wards use a drug trolley as part of (if not the main) the mode of administration 
(McLeod et al., 2014), and this is considered to be the traditional way of medication 
administration. During the medication administration round, the nurse releases and 
unlocks the drug trolley from the wall and moves the trolley from bedside to bedside as 
part of the work process.  
The drug administration round normally starts from one end of the ward and continues 
in sequence focusing on one patient at a time and ends with the last patient on the ward. 
In some cases, where the ward is large, the round might be split into two with two 
trolleys being used at the same time. For example, here is an illustration of one ward 
which has 28 beds. The beds are arranged in this order: beds A1A6 (in ‘A bay’), 
B1B6 (in ‘B bay’), C, D (side rooms), E1E6 (in ‘E bay’), F1F6 (in the ‘F bay’), and 
G, H (side rooms). 'A' and 'B bay' were male-only and 'E' and 'F bay' were female-only. 
The side rooms were used for isolated patients. In this case, two half drug rounds took 
place at the same time, to serve each of two sides of the ward (bays A-B with C, D side 
rooms and bays E-F with G, H side rooms) and two drug trolleys existed for this 
purpose, enabling simultaneous drug administration on the ward by two different 
nurses.  
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1.2.2 Medication administration from a bedside locker  
The bedside locker is a wooden or metal locker locked by a key and positioned on the 
wall beside a patient’s bed. This bedside locker can be divided into two shelves and is 
designed to keep the patient’s medication safe, secure, and close to their bed. The 
locker includes only that patient’s medication supply as written on their drug chart. This 
medication supply could be dispensed directly from the pharmacy department or from 
POD – i.e. where patients admitted to the hospital ward bring their medications with 
them and this is allowed to be used on the ward.  
The Nursing and Midwifery College (NMC) (2015) has indicated that nurse registrants 
may use patients’ own medicines in accordance with hospital guidance. Also, the nurse 
registrant is required to take responsibility to check the POD. First, their suitability 
should be checked and whether they are prescribed for the patient, and if they meet 
criteria for use. Second, nurses must explain to the patient how and why medication 
could or could not be used. Finally, the approved POD should be labelled and kept safe 
in a bedside locker. At the hospital where this research was based, pharmacy staff were 
predominantly responsible for checking patient’s POD.  
Medication administration from a bedside locker has been used in some UK general 
hospital wards and is not a new concept. During the medication administration round 
the nurse administers the medication to the patient from their locker after checking 
against the drug chart. The medication administration process here is almost similar to 
the process using a drug trolley explained above, where the round starts in sequence 
from one end of the ward focusing on one patient and ends with the last patient on the 
ward; the only difference is that the medications are administered from the bedside 
locker instead of the drug trolley. As well as medication administration from a bedside 
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locker, occasionally the nurse can use the drug trolley to administer stock items. For 
example, this occurs when some medication is not available in the patient locker (e.g. 
has been prescribed since admission) or large bottles of medication that cannot fit into 
the locker.  
On wards that used the bedside locker at the Trust there were two types of rooms. There 
were single-bed rooms and also multi-bed rooms which were divided into bays and 
beds as mentioned previously. Also, when the ward was large, the two half drug rounds 
took place at the same time with one nurse in charge of each half.  
Some UK hospital wards using this mode of administration (i.e. patient lockers) do this 
as part of a one-stop dispensing system which is “combining inpatient and discharge 
dispensing medication into a single 28-day supply, labelled for discharge”. This means 
that when a patient is discharged, the medication should be ready for discharge meaning 
that no item need to be dispensed and speeding up the discharge process (Hospital 
Pharmacist Group, 2002).   
Moreover, the National Prescribing Centre (NPC) (2007, 2008), indicates that an 
important element of one-stop dispensing is the use of individual lockers where all of 
one patient’s medicines are stored during their hospital stay; patients can either use their 
own medicines brought from home, or receive a month’s supply from the pharmacy.  
1.2.3 Medication administration from the clinic room   
Another mode of medication administration, which is perhaps unique to the mental-
health setting, is administration from the clinic room. Here, each ward has a stock 
cupboard for storage of regular items as well as larger products. The stock cupboard is 
usually located in each ward in the clinic room. In other wards where the drug trolley is 
used as the main mode of drug administration, the stock cupboard acts merely to hold 
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items for restocking of the trolley; when a stock item is not found in the drug trolley or 
the bedside locker during a medication administration round, the nurse administering 
for that round can obtain the item from the stock cupboard if it is located there. But in 
specific settings medication administration can take place straight from the stock 
cupboard or a locked drug trolley which stays within the clinic room. This was 
particularly applicable for the mental-health (psychiatric) wards within the hospital 
setting of the current study. 
When medication was administered from the clinical room, the nurse responsible for 
the medication administration round firstly checked all of the drug charts on the ward. 
This was in order to identify who is due medication during that particular round. Once 
identified, these patients were called to wait outside the clinic room in order that their 
medication is prepared and given to them. This mode of administration is sometimes 
seen to involve ‘queuing’ which is another given name to describe the process. 
Anecdotally the nurses involved in the current study described this mode as helping 
them control and regulate the process of medication administration. 
1.3 Medication administration errors 
This section focuses on formally defining an MAE, methods used to determine MAEs, 
reporting on rates as well different types of MAEs, potential for harm from MAEs, 
contributing factors that might increase the MAE rate and studies which suggest ideas 
to decrease the occurrence of MAEs.  
1.3.1 Definition of MAEs 
Even before focusing on defining MAEs it is worth highlighting that there are many 
definitions found in the literature for the broader term ‘medication errors’, meaning that 
there is no consensus view about this topic. For example, the National Coordinating 
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Council for Medication Error and Prevention defined a medication error as “any 
preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or patient 
harm, while the medication is in the control of the health care professional, patient, or 
consumer” (NCCMERP, 2016). In a similar vein, Williams (2007), defined medication 
errors as “a miscalculation in the prescriptions, supplying, or administration of a drug”. 
The NPSA (2007) definition is broader and refers to the medication flow process 
“medication errors are any incident where there has been an error in the process of 
prescribing, dispensing, preparing, administering, monitoring or providing medicines 
advice, regardless of whether any harm occurred or was possible”. As already alluded 
to above, MAEs make up a substantial part of all medication errors.  
An MAE has been defined in different ways too. For example it has been defined as: 
“any dose of medication administered (or omitted) that deviated from the written 
medication order” (Allan and Barker, 1990). Similarly, Barker et al. (2002b), defined 
the MAEs as: a ‘‘deviation from a prescriber’s valid prescription or the hospital’s 
policy in relation to drug administration, including failure to correctly record the 
administration of a medication”. The definition used in this thesis is “any dose of 
medication administered (or omitted) that deviated from the written medication order” 
(Allan and Barker, 1990) which is most relevant to this research study and has been 
used in a number of MAE studies (Keers et al., 2013b).  
MAEs have been studied extensively in the UK. According to Dean (1999), the first 
published study on MAEs was in the UK in mid-1960s, where the administration 
system was different than is used nowadays. There was no drug chart to record 
medication administered to the patient and there were only the nurses’ notes. Then the 
administration system was developed step by step according to a recommendation in 
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1958 that medication should be administered from an original drug order. Additionally, 
the study published by Hill and Wigmore (1967 as cited by Dean, 1999) at the London 
Hospital was the first MAEs study published in the UK based on the observational 
method.   
This section provides a concise review of articles published on the rate of medication 
administration errors in different hospital wards in the UK and elsewhere using the 
direct observation method (and a brief look at other methods used to measure MAEs). 
The reviews will also highlight the studies that include the link between contributing 
factors and MAEs as well as the causes behind the MAEs. 
1.3.2 Methods used to determine MAEs  
Internationally MAEs have been measured in a variety of hospital wards. Some of the 
published studies measure the type, frequency and rate of MAEs, the harm that could 
arise from errors found and the contributing factors as well as the causes behind the 
MAEs. There are different methods used to detect MAEs such as chart review, incident 
report and observation. According to Massetti (2011) the technique measuring 
medication errors have various strengths and weaknesses. The study showed that direct 
observation have a higher chance of detecting drug relating problem than both the chart 
reviews and the incident reports. The direct observation method is seen as a gold 
standard and is the method that was adopted in this study. But before explaining how 
the direct observation method determines MAEs in more detail and what the literature 
shows, it is important to briefly explain the other ways e.g. chart review and incident 
report in which MAEs are studied on hospital wards (see Figure  1.2).  
Introduction                                                                                                   Chapter 1 
 
18 
 
 
Figure ‎1.2: Visual representation of methods used to determine MAEs 
 
1.3.2.1 The retrospective chart review  
Chart review is when the researcher detects the MAEs directly from the patient’s drug 
chart after the medication was given in a specific period of time. This method has both 
positive and negative qualities. One of the positives is that it does not take a long time 
to complete a study using this method and there is potential for repeatability in that the 
chart can be reviewed again by another researcher; however, not all of the types of 
MAEs can be detected using this method. For example, only omissions can be detected 
using this method and no other types of MAEs (Grasso et al., 2003, Haw et al., 2007). 
1.3.2.2 The prospective or retrospective incident report 
Another method is self-report where a healthcare practitioner detects then reports any 
errors by him/herself, but this method is not commonly used according to some studies. 
The incident report which includes self-reporting is a system implemented in most 
hospitals. As it is already in place to detect and report any medication error by a staff or 
patients, the researcher could feasibly collect the data from the incident report for the 
purposes of analysis.  
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However, this is not viewed to be a very efficient method because the majority of 
errors, even if detected, are thought not to be reported (Ito and Yamazumi, 2003, Balas 
et al., 2004, Haw et al., 2005, Maidment and Thorn, 2005, Balas et al., 2006, Haw and 
Cahill, 2011). The reason that some participants might not report the incidents in 
psychiatric ward according to Haw et al. (2014) study is the pressured nature of the job 
and the lack of available time to report each incident. For example, some nurses noted 
that reporting incidents was not worthwhile to complete a form which on average will 
take 10–15 minutes and reporting it was too much work. Moreover, some nurses said 
that they would not report the errors because of a lack of knowledge about whether it 
was an error or how to report it, or they were afraid of the consequences of reporting 
these incidents. Another reason by Lee (2017) for not reporting errors in general wards 
was fear of the possible negative impact and action that might follow from reporting the 
error.  
1.3.2.3 The direct observation method 
One of the most common methods adopted to measure MAEs is the direct observation 
method. It is worth clarifying that, as Coolican (2014, p. 138) highlighted, observational 
methods generally carry different meanings in research. It can refer to the technique of 
making observations within an experimental design in order to measure a dependent 
variable. Also, it is quite common in qualitative studies where ‘participant observation’ 
takes place and can be accompanied by interviews and examination of notes relating to 
an organisation (Coolican, 2014, p. 137). Moreover, the observational method is a “way 
of gathering data by watching behaviour, events, or noting physical characteristics in 
their natural setting” (Taylor-Powell and Steele, 1996).   
Using observation as a method to measure MAE is where the researcher observes the 
drug administration round by shadowing the nurses to detect the MAEs and makes 
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notes discretely using a data collection form (Dean and Barber, 2001). The data 
collection form can capture data including the type of error for each drug administration 
round observed.  More detail about this method is provided in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
For now, as Barker et al. (2002b) state, direct observation methods that capture MAEs 
are considered to be the most reliable data collection method.  
1.3.3 The rate of MAEs reported in the literature 
Studies have used different measurement methods to detect MAEs including chart 
reviews, incident reports and direct observation. Also, different denominators have been 
used to calculate the error rate such as the total number of prescriptions written (the 
total opportunity of error OE), the number of medications written per patient, and the 
denominator might be a separate time period such as one month or an identical time 
period e.g. patient-days (Procyshyn et al, 2010). Moreover, numerous studies measuring 
MAEs have been carried out in the UK, USA and some other countries, and most of 
these studies are based on the observational method, considered to be a gold standard, 
and adopted in the current study. One aim of this section is to report on the MAE rates 
found in UK studies using the observational method but it is worth briefly touching on 
studies using other methods to detect and measure MAEs to outline the weaknesses of 
these methods (see Table  1.3). The next few paragraphs illustrate the way in which 
different methodologies used to detect MAEs results in vastly different rates of MAEs 
being reported and how the non-standardised way in which MAEs are reported makes it 
almost impossible to make comparisons or derive a universal MAE rate. After that, 
when the focus returns to measuring MAEs using the observational method, it becomes 
apparent that even using this method and using similar reporting units does not return 
comparable MAE rates. 
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First then, one of the methods used to detect MAEs is the chart review. An example is a 
study by Grasso et al. (2003), based in a psychiatric hospital in the USA. This study 
used retrospective chart reviews to detect MAEs for 31 randomly selected patients and 
compared the data with incident reports (self-report) during 1
st
 June to 15
th
 Oct 2001. 
The study found a higher MAE rate of 6.8% (1443 / 21,033) from chart reviews 
compared with only 9 incident reports. Clearly, the MAE rate found using the chart 
review was higher than could be detected using the incident report in that study. This 
therefore shows the chart review to be better than incident reports at detecting MAEs. 
Another relevant study is by Haw et al. (2007), at two elderly long-stay wards in an 
independent psychiatric hospital. The study provides a comparison of MAE rate from 
three different methods, (1) direct observation of administration rounds, (2) medication 
chart review and (3) incident reports, over a 3-month period. The results yielded 369 
medication administration errors from 1423 items observed which gives a 25.9% MAE 
rate for the observational method. This is compared with only 148 errors detected from 
the chart review and zero error from the incident reports. While both the Grasso et al. 
(2003) and Haw et al. (2007) studies illustrated that chart reviews detect more errors 
than incident reports, still the Haw et al. (2007) study illustrates that the observational 
method detected even a higher MAE rate compared to chart reviews.   
This is backed up by a study by Flynn et al. (2002), comparing the method used to 
detect medication errors rate around 36 hospitals in the USA, which found that the 
observational method showed an 11.7% error rate comparing to a 0.7% error rate from 
chart reviews and a 0.04% error rate from incident reports. They also found that the 
error rate based on the observational method was more accurate than rates based on 
other methods. Another study that has used the direct observation method with chart 
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reviews to detect MAEs was by Agalu et al. (2012), located at the intensive care unit 
(ICU) at the University Specialised Hospital, Ethiopia. However, although the study 
showed a very high MAE rate of 51.8%, it combined the results from both the 
observation and chart review methods and therefore did not clarify whether the chart 
review was inferior to the observational method, or not, at detecting errors.  
There are also researchers that have detected MAEs by examining incident reports 
alone, either prospectively or retrospectively. The incident reports systems according to 
Vincent (2006, p. 82), are standard systems that have basic clinical information and a 
brief description of the incident. Two similar studies using prospective incident reports 
(self-report) over 28-days are reported here. The first study by Balas et al. (2004), was 
located in different hospital wards (medical/surgical and in intensive care units) in the 
USA. This study showed that of the different incident reports, the MAE was 58% of 
(199) total errors reported. The other study was also by Balas et al. (2006), and took 
place at several hospital critical care units in the USA. This study which also measured 
different errors using incident reports found the MAE was 56.7% from the total incident 
reports (224) found. Therefore it seems that when incidents are reported, a large 
proportion of errors appear to be related to MAEs. Of course studies such as these do 
not give any indication of what the incidence of MAEs are as compared to all doses 
given or the total opportunities for error. This means that although incident reporting is 
useful as an indicator of the frequency with which MAEs are reported compared to 
other errors, the method provides no information about MAE rates, because of the 
absence of a denominator. 
There are other studies using prospective incident report methods to identify MAEs in 
mental-health wards over a long duration of time which attempt to give an indication of 
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the rate. A study by Ito and Yamazumi (2003), for example, examined incident reports 
in long-stay wards based in 44 private psychiatric hospitals for a 2-month period in 
Japan. The study detected MAEs and found 221 giving an MAE rate of 0.28/1000 
patient days. A study at a single NHS mental-health Trust in the UK was conducted by 
Maidment and Thorn (2005). The study used similar methods as in the previous study 
by Ito and Yamazumi (2003) but the researchers investigated administration, dispensing 
and prescribing errors in a 12-month period. This study found that the MAEs 
constituted 50 errors from a total of 66 medication errors reported and the MAE 
reporting rate was 4.1/month. It becomes apparent just by looking at these two studies 
that the way in which MAEs measured via incident reports are reported in different 
studies is not standardised making comparisons very difficult. While the Ito and 
Yamazumi (2003) study reported using incidence per 1000 patient days, the Maidment 
and Thorn (2005) used incidence per month. 
Haw and Cahill (2011) conducted another study based at a psychiatric hospital in the 
UK. They investigated administration, dispensing and prescribing errors by using a 
prospective design examining the internal reporting system during a 2-year period. The 
study illustrated that the medication administration errors were 88.8% (424) from a total 
of (446) medication errors found. Again, although this study gives an indication of what 
proportion of all errors were due to MAEs, it does not give an incidence rate using 
standardised units for the purpose of comparison with other studies.  
In addition, a retrospective study was found which was based on examining 
administration errors reported on an incident reporting system over a 42-month period 
by Haw et al. (2005), at a psychiatric hospital in the UK. The main concern was to 
identify the MAEs that had occurred at this hospital. The researchers found 112 
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administration errors had been reported on the incident forms resulting in a reporting 
rate of 2.67 MAEs per month.  
Overall, the number of MAEs found in these studies using the incident report were very 
low compared with the studies using chart review (Grasso et al., 2003, Haw et al., 2007) 
and compared to the studies used the observational method which will be explained 
later. According to Stetina et al. (2005), MAE rates from incident reports are considered 
to generally underestimate the occurrence of actual errors. Another problem is that, as 
alluded to above, incident reports cannot return an overall MAE rate unless a 
denominator is known (i.e. total number of doses given over the period covering 
reporting) and when other non-standardised reporting units are used, comparisons again 
become difficult. This problem is illustrated in a systematic review study by Maidment 
et al. (2008) where the overall error rate could not be calculated due to incident reports 
studies using different denominators. 
Instead, the observational method is considered the most reliable and common method 
for detecting MAEs on different wards and countries, not least of all because it provides 
a way of standardising the error rate. The MAE rate is calculated in these studies by 
dividing the errors found through observation by the total opportunity of error (OE) 
(detailed later in this thesis) before multiplying by 100. The studies using the 
observational method for detecting MAEs can be divided into three main varieties; the 
observational study of non-IV medication, the observational study of only IV 
medication and the observational study of all medications group (McLeod et al., 2013).   
To be relevant to the current research, the focus in this section is on observational 
studies using paper drug charts, starting with a number of studies observing non-IV 
MAEs. A study by Dean et al. (1995), compared the MAE rate of UK and USA 
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hospitals. The study was located in 6 general hospital wards in both countries for a 2-
month duration in the UK and a 1-month duration in the USA. The study showed a 
lower MAE rate in UK of 3% compared with 6.9% in the USA. A similar study 
conducted for a 3-month duration again compared the MAE rate between two countries 
(Taxis et al., 1999). This study found a higher MAE rate in the UK at 8.0% (67/842) 
and lower one in Germany at 5.1% (50/973) when comparing a standard ward setting; 
and 2.4% (32/1318) for a different ward system in Germany. Furthermore, a study by 
Ho et al. (1997), placed in one elderly female care ward in the UK for only 16 days 
duration found the MAE rate to be 5.5% (119/2170). From these studies then, one 
might infer that the observational method returns an MAE rate of between 3% and 8% 
for standard wards (i.e. general acute care hospital wards and not counting IV 
medication).  
The error rate does depend on what is actually counted as an error, however. For 
example, a study by Chua et al. (2010), completed at two paediatric wards in a teaching 
hospital in Malaysia over a 3-month duration measured the MAE rate including wrong-
time errors and reported an error rate of 11.7% (100/857), which was lower at 7.8% 
(67/857) when wrong time errors were not included. The setting of the study also 
matters. For example, a study by Soerensen et al. (2013), conducted at Aalborg 
university hospital, Denmark, on three adult psychiatric wards showed an MAE rate 
that was much higher at 42% (142/340). In contrast, a study by Cottney and Innes 
(2015), completed at one NHS psychiatric hospital, on 43 inpatient wards in the UK 
found that MAE rate was 3.3% (139/4177). Kelly et al. (2011), looked at errors in 
patients with dysphagia in four acute hospitals, and eight wards in the UK and showed a 
very high MAEs rate of 38.4% (817/2129). An observational study by Ridge et al. 
(1995), completed at one general hospital, on six wards in the UK found that MAE rate 
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was 3.5% (115/3312). What becomes apparent from comparing the overall MAE rate 
reported in these studies is that the rate is not the same across different studies. This 
could be due to many reasons relating to the data collection and reporting of the rate, or 
it could genuinely reflect differences in actual practice and errors made. 
On the point about differences being down to actual practice rather than an artefact of 
the research methods, an obvious example to consider relates to IV medication. Studies 
have consistently shown that when IV medications are observed the MAE rate is much 
higher than for non-IV studies. An example is a study by Hartley and Dhillon (1998), 
completed at one hospital, in two surgical and one medical ward, in the UK over 39 
days. This study showed that the MAE rate was 26.9% (86/320). Similarly, there is a 
study by Bruce and Wong (2001), completed at one acute admissions ward in the UK 
for four weeks. This study measured the MAE rate, including wrong time errors, to be 
25.2% (27/107) and 10.3% excluding wrong time errors. Another study by Taxis and 
Barber (2003b), for 7-month duration period at two general hospitals and ten wards in 
the UK, which again focussed on IV medication found a very high MAE rate of 49% 
(212/430). All observational studies mentioned above used the paper drug charts, not 
electronic drug charts. On the other hand, a systematic review study focused in all 
MAEs studies that have used direct observation in different countries by Keers et al. 
(2013b), found that the median of MAEs rate was 19.6% (8.6-28.3%) including wrong 
time errors and 8.0% (5.1-10.9%) without wrong time errors. Also, the median of 
MAEs rate when observing only IVs was 53.3% (26.6-57.9%) excluding wrong time 
errors comparing to 20.1% (9.0-24.6%) when all routes were observed. To summarise 
and reiterate, from the previous studies using the observation method the MAEs rate 
reported is vastly different from one study to another. Focusing on UK hospitals using 
paper drug chart, in adult general hospital wards, the MAE rate in some studies that 
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include non-IV group of medications report a rate between 3% and 8% (Dean et al., 
1995, Ho et al., 1997, Taxis et al., 1999). The study by Kelly et al. (2011), conducted at 
acute hospitals in the East of England showed an MAE rate of 38.4% for patients with 
dysphagia but this could be due to the complexity of the condition. The rate of MAEs in 
the UK studies which observed IV administration was between 10% and 49% (Hartley 
and Dhillon, 1998, Bruce and Wong, 2001, Taxis and Barber, 2003b). Thus the MAE 
rate for IV administration is higher than MAE rate found in non-IV administration, and 
McLeod et al. (2013), estimates the chance of error is five times more likely in IV than 
non-IV doses. Focussing on MAEs using observational studies located in mental-health 
wards in the UK the MAE rate is between 3.3% and 48% (Alshehri et al., 2017). 
However, still there are no studies exist for community hospital wards and this was also 
suggested as area for future work by Maidment et al. (2008).   
1.3.4 Type of MAEs detected in previous studies 
The types of MAEs reported in most of the UK studies observing the administration of 
non-IV medications on wards using paper drug charts are almost similar. Omission is 
the most frequent type of MAE in these studies; however, the second most frequent 
type is different between studies. For example, an observational study by Dean et al. 
(1995), in general hospital wards, found that omission is the most frequent type 
followed by incorrect doses. Another observational study conducted in an elderly care 
ward by Ho et al. (1997), found that omission is the most frequent type of error then 
‘other omission’ is second and incorrect dose third. Also, Taxis et al. (1999), found that 
omission is the highest type followed by incorrect preparation. Also, Kelly et al. (2011) 
found that wrong time error is the most frequent type then wrong preparation. Another 
study placed in psychiatric wards completed by Cottney and Innes (2015), showed that 
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omission was also the highest error type with wrong dose being the second highest type. 
On the other hand, Haw et al. (2007), reported that crushing tablets without 
authorisation was the most frequent type of MAE in their study followed by omissions. 
According to the systematic review study completed by Alshehri et al. (2017) omissions 
and wrong time errors were reported to be the two most frequent MAE types on the 
MAEs studies focused in psychiatric wards. The differences in MAE types of the 
previous studies could be due to the methodological approaches used for classifying and 
recording the error type. In Haw et al. (2007), the researchers classified behaviours such 
as unauthorised crushing of tablets as administration errors, whereas Cottney and Innes 
(2015), suggested that this does not represent as an actual administration error. 
Furthermore, the frequency variation of MAE types in these studies could be because of 
the different type of wards observed in each study (see Table  1.3).   
1.3.5 The potential for harm from MAEs 
The potential for harm which is also called severity of errors has been measured in 
some of the UK studies. Each of these studies has used different methods for rating the 
error severity as well as different techniques for severity judgement. For example, the 
severity of error can be categorised according to four classifications; negligible, minor, 
serious effects, or fatality (Haw et al., 2007). This classification was also adopted in the 
study by Cottney and Innes (2015), where reported errors were individually verified by 
a senior pharmacist to ensure that it had been classified correctly as well as represented 
an accurate administration error. In the study by Haw et al. (2007), the severity of error 
was rated by three researchers.  
Furthermore, in a study by Haw and Cahill (2011), the severity of errors was rated into 
five levels according to the organisation accident and severity scale; level one (near 
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miss), level 2 (minor), level 3 (moderate), level 4 (serious), and level 5 (life 
threatening). One pharmacist and one senior pharmacist rated the severity of errors 
using inter-rater reliability which means that both pharmacists individually rated some 
of the medication errors, and then compared the errors to judge the degree of 
agreement.  
Looking at the actual findings, most previous studies that have observed the 
administration of non-IV medications have categorised the majority of MAEs either as 
minor or negligible in terms of their severity (Haw et al., 2007, Haw and Cahill, 2011, 
Cottney and Innes, 2015). A systematic review study focusing on the MAEs in hospital 
inpatients used observational methods, by Berdot et al. (2013), and found that most 
MAEs in observation studies were classified as minor. Also, Alshehri et al. (2017) in a 
systematic review study showed that the majority of MAEs were classified as minor in 
their severity in psychiatric wards. A study by Taxis and Barber (2003b), observed 
administration of IV medications and used a validated scale between zero (no harm) 
and 10 (death) which mean scores below three were classified as minor, 3-7 scores 
classified as moderate, and above seven as severe. Here, the severity of error was rated 
by one doctor, one nurse and two pharmacists. The study found that most MAEs were 
categorised as potentially moderate followed by potentially minor. This finding would 
have arisen because only the IV route of administration was observed in that study 
compared to the above studies that observed non-IV route of administration. This 
potentially means that not only are there more errors found when IV medication 
administrations are observed, but that MAEs found are also more likely to be judged as 
severe compared to non-IV MAEs. 
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Table ‎1.3: Studies that investigated MAEs in different hospital settings 
Study Study Setting Duration Study design MAE rate  
(Error/OE) 
 
Most frequent 
type of error 
Potential for harm 
or error severity    
Dean et al. (1995)  1 general hospital, 2 
surgical, 2 medical, 2 
elderly care wards, UK 
1 general hospital, 6 
wards, USA 
2-month duration, 
UK 
1-month duration, 
USA 
Observational study 
for non-IV 
medication 
3% of (2756) OE, 
UK 
6.9% of (919) OE, 
USA 
UK, Omission 58%    
Incorrect doses 14% 
USA, Incorrect doses 
30%  
Unordered doses  
25% 
 
Ridge et al. 
(1995) 
1 general hospital, 6 
wards, UK 
1-week for each 
ward 
Observational study 
for (oral, IV, etc.) 
medication 
3.5% (115/3312) Non-available 51% 
Omission 27% 
Wrong dose 17% 
 
Ho et al. (1997) 1 elderly female care 
ward, UK 
16-days duration Observational study 
for non-IV 
medication 
5.5% (119/2170) Omission (drugs not 
available) 26% 
Other omission 24% 
Incorrect dose 16% 
 
Hartley and 
Dhillon (1998) 
1 hospital, 2 surgical 
and 1 medical ward, UK 
39-days duration Observational study 
for IV medication 
26.9% (86/320) Wrong time 52.5% 
Omission 12.5% 
Wrong preparation 
technique 7.2% 
Minor 77.9% 
Moderate 17.3% 
Major 4.7% 
Taxis et al. 
(1999) 
1 general hospital, UK 
1 general hospital, 
Germany 
3-month duration  Observational study 
for non-IV 
medication 
UK 
8.0% (67/842) 
Germany  
5.1% (50/973)  
2.4% (32/1318)  
UK, Omission 
Incorrect preparation  
Germany, Omission  
Most of errors were 
minor  
Bruce and Wong 
(2001) 
1 acute admissions 
ward, UK 
4-week duration Observational study 
for IV medication 
Include wrong time 
error 25.2% 
(27/107) 
Exclude wrong time 
error 10.3% 
 
Wrong time 17% 
Wrong preparation 
technique 5% 
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Study Study Setting Duration Study design MAE rate  
(Error/OE) 
 
Most frequent 
type of error 
Potential for harm 
or error severity      
Taxis and Barber 
(2003) 
2 general hospital, 10 
wards, UK 
7-month duration Observational study 
for IV medication 
49% (212/430) Giving bolus doses 
too quickly 
Mistakes in preparing 
drugs 
 
Potentially minor 
19% 
Potentially moderate 
29% 
Potentially severe 
1% 
Grasso et al. 
(2003) 
1 psychiatric hospital 
ward, USA 
5-month duration  Retrospectively 
chart review for 
random 31 patients 
compare with the 
incident report (self-
report) 
(1443/ 21,033) 
6.8% 
And only 9 incident 
reports 
Scheduled dose is not 
documented as 
administered 61.9% 
Low risk of harm 
19% 
Moderate risk 23% 
High risk 58% 
Ito and 
Yamazumi 
(2003) 
44 private psychiatric 
hospitals, Japan 
2-month duration Prospective incident 
report 
0.28/1000pt.-days 
221 MAEs incident 
report received 
 
Wrong drug 35.7% 
Wrong time 19.9% 
Dose omission 
15.8% 
 
Clinical significant 
57% 
Potential significant 
15 
Potential serious 
29% 
Balas et al. 
(2004) 
Nurses working in 
different hospital units 
(medical/ 
surgical and in intensive 
care units), USA 
28-days duration Prospective incident 
report (self-report) 
56% from 199 
errors related to 
MAEs 
Wrong time errors 
33.6% 
 Wrong dose 24% 
 
Haw et al. (2005) Tertiary private 
psychiatric 
Hospital, UK 
42-month 
duration 
Retrospective 
incident report 
 
2.67/month Improper dose 31% 
Wrong drug 21% 
Omission 17% 
Minimal significance 
77% 
Moderate 
significance 14% 
Potentially serious 
1% 
Fatality 0% 
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Study Study Setting Duration Study design MAE rate  
(Error/OE) 
 
Most frequent 
type of error 
Potential for harm 
or error severity    
Maidment and 
Thorn (2005) 
Single NHS mental-
health trust, UK 
12-month duration Prospective incident 
report 
4.1/month Wrong frequency 
13 
Mismatching 
between patient and 
medicine 12 
Low severity 40  
Moderate 23  
High 3 
Balas et al. (2006) Several hospitals 
critical care units, 
USA 
28-days duration Prospective incident 
report (self-report) 
56.7% (127) Wrong time error 
38% 
Omitted dose 22% 
 
Haw et al. (2007) 2 elderly long-stay 
psychiatric wards, 
UK 
3-month duration Direct observation 
Chart review 
Incident report 
 
25.9% (369/1423) Crushing tablets 
without 
authorisation 28.7% 
Omission 27.1%  
 
Negligible 69.1% 
Minor 7.3% 
Serious 0.3% 
Fatality 0% 
Unrateable 23.3% 
Chua et al. (2010) 1 teaching hospital 
2 paediatric wards, 
Malaysia 
3-month duration Observational study With wrong time 
11.7% 
(100/857) 
Without wrong time 
7.8% (67/857) 
 
Wrong time 28.8% 
Wrong preparation 
26% 
Probably clinically 
insignificant 9.6% 
Minimal clinical 
significance 50% 
Definitely clinically 
significant 40.4%, 
potentially life-
threatening 0 
Haw and Cahill 
(2011) 
Large specialist 
Psychiatric hospital, 
UK 
2-year duration Prospective incident 
report  
88.8% from 446 
errors related to 
MAEs 
Missing signature 
27.8% 
Omission 18.2% 
Wrong dose 12.1% 
Significant 19.7% 
Minor 74.0% 
Moderate 5.4% 
Serious 0.9% 
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Study Study Setting Duration Study design MAE rate 
(Error/OE) 
 
Most frequent 
type of error 
Potential for harm or 
error severity    
Kelly et al. (2011) 4 hospitals, 8 
wards, UK 
4-month duration Observational study 
for non-IV 
medication 
38.4% (817/2129) Wrong time error 
72% 
Wrong preparation 
8% 
 
 
Agalu et al. (2012) 1 Intensive care 
unit (ICU), 
Ethiopia 
47-days duration Direct 
observational 
method with chart 
review 
51.8% (621/1200) 
 
Wrong time error 
30% 
Omission 
29% 
 
 
Soerensen et al. 
(2013) 
3 adult psychiatric 
wards at Aalborg 
university hospital, 
Denmark 
4-month duration Direct 
observational 
method 
 
42% (142/340) Lack of identity 
control 95% 
Wrong time error 
6% 
Nonsignificant 20% 
Significant 27% 
Serious 51% 
Fatal 1% 
Cottney and Innes 
(2015) 
NHS psychiatric 
hospital, 43 
inpatient wards, 
UK 
------- Observational study 
for non-IV 
medication 
3.3% (139/4177) Omission (52/139, 
37%) 
Wrong dose 
(25/139, 18%) 
Wrong form 
(16/139, 12%) 
 
Negligible 19% 
Minor 71% 
Serious 11% 
Fatality 0% 
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1.3.6 Contributing factors and causes linked to MAEs 
There are many papers published on MAEs in different hospital wards around the 
world. However, only some of these studies have looked at the contributing factors 
linked to MAE rates and some viewed the causes behind MAEs. Keers et al. (2013a) 
indicated the causes of MAEs either from the reasons that were described directly from 
the responsible person to the researcher or were provided from the direct observation 
data. On the other hand, the contributing factors are “the factors that influence staff 
performance, and which may precipitate errors and affect patient outcomes” (Taylor-
Adams and Vincent, 2004). The studies that considered the contributing factors for 
example include, a study by Tissot et al. (2003), using observation technique at two 
wards university hospital in France, which identified that nurse workload is one of the 
important risk factors of MAEs. An observational study conducted within two wards at 
teaching hospital in Spain by Rodriguez-Gonzalez et al. (2011) is also relevant. That 
study concluded that the morning medications administration rounds could increase the 
risk of administration errors. Another study by Balas et al. (2006), reported the most 
common reasons of error included simply forgetting or heavy workload and 
interruption. Also, Westbrook et al. (2010), who used direct observation at two major 
teaching hospitals in Sydney, and divided MAEs according to procedural errors and 
clinical errors, showed that interruption increase procedural errors by 12.1% and 
increase the clinical errors by 12.7%.  
In addition, Cottney and Innes (2015), who used the observational method in a mental-
health hospital, found that MAEs were 48% more likely to occur when the nurse 
administering the medication was interrupted; the other contributing factors were the 
number of PRN (when required) doses given which increased the risk of error by 15%, 
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total number of patients on the ward at the time of the medication round which 
increased the risk of error by 6%, and the number of regular doses due which increased 
the risk of error by 2%. Both the Westbrook and Cottney studies used the Generalized 
Linear Model (GzLM) to analyse the statistical relationship between any contributing 
factors and MAEs. The Generalized Linear Model is a statistical model used to analyse 
the combination of predictors (contributing factors) with regard to the occurrence of 
MAEs (Cohen et al., 2013, Hayat and Higgins, 2014). A similar method was used in the 
current study as outlined in Chapter 3. Furthermore, a comprehensive review by 
Procyshyn et al. (2010) found different reasons that increase the risk of MAEs in 
psychiatric wards such as shortage of staff, the ward being busy with other activity, 
noisy work environment, distractions, feeling tired, weak concentration, and weak 
supervision.  
As well as the factors on the ground which increase the risk of MAEs, Keers et al. 
(2013a), through a systematic review study have provided robust data concerning the 
causes of MAEs when analysed using Reason’s model of accident causation. The 
results showed that slips and lapses were the most significant ‘unsafe acts’, followed by 
knowledge-based mistakes and violations. Keers et al. (2015), used a semi-structured 
interviews with nurses in two teaching hospitals in England, identified that slips and 
lapses were the more detected active failure than mistakes and violations. Moreover, 
distractions, workload and poor staffing are considered as the error-producing 
conditions that cause slips and lapses (Keers et al., 2013a). Also, workload is 
commonly a contributing factor to slips and lapses, as well as contributing to violations 
and mistakes (Keers et al., 2015). Also, a study by Keers et al. (2016), used a semi-
structured interviews with nurses in mental-health settings, showing that in psychiatric 
ward workload is the main error-producing condition. Keers et al. (2013a), stated that 
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MAEs are influenced by many system factors; however, further investigations are 
needed because of lack of consistency between the different studies. Reason’s model of 
accident causation classifies the stages of error according to: active failures or unsafe 
acts e.g. (slips, lapses, mistakes and violations), error-producing conditions 
(contributory factors), and latent failures (organisation and management culture) 
(Reason, 1997). This is further explored in Chapter 2. 
1.3.7 Suggested interventions to reduce the MAEs  
It is important to examine studies and suggestions for different medication 
administration systems or other interventions that might help to reduce the occurrence 
of MAEs. One of the suggestions is to replace the traditional practice in general hospital 
wards using a drug trolley with bedside-patient lockers using the ‘one-stop’ dispensing 
system (NPC, 2007, 2008). One-stop dispensing can potentially help to reduce risks 
associated with medicines administration and make better use of nurses’ time (NPC, 
2007, 2008). Many benefits of this set up have been advocated including a reduction in 
pharmacy dispensing times, faster discharge for patients, reduction in medication errors, 
smoother transition to primary care, improved patient compliance, reduction in time 
spent on medication rounds, better drug-history taking, provision of patient information 
leaflets, improved working relationships on the ward, as well as reduced waste and cost 
(NPC, 2007, 2008).   
In reality, there are also published studies examining the impact of one-stop dispensing 
using a number of outcome measures. While on the whole research shows a positive 
impact, one potential difficulty is that different studies have used different outcome 
measures and different designs making it difficult to truly compare the benefits of 
bedside-patient lockers and one-stop dispensing in terms of MAEs. Two studies 
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associate one-stop dispensing with a reduction in the MAE rate. In a before and after 
study, Hogg et al. (2012), reported a reduction of the total MAE rate from 8.3% before 
to 1.3% after the introduction of the patient medication lockers at one research site and 
from 9.9% before and 3.2% after locker introduction in another; the results were 
statistically significant and showed a positive impact in terms of patient safety. Camac 
et al. (1996), used a comparative design with patient lockers versus ward medication 
drawers, finding that (when injections were removed from the sample), significantly 
more medication errors occurred using the ward system, 25 (18%) compared to the 
bedside system, 7 (7%), and these results too were deemed statistically significant. In 
contrast, Dean and Barber (2000), found that there is no difference between the uses of 
bedside medicine cabinets versus the traditional system on the occurrence of MAE rates 
(4.2% vs. 4.3%).  
Also, there is one study that has examined the impact of one-stop dispensing on missed 
doses. Agha et al. (2008), examined the incidence of missed doses in two wards before 
and after the implementation of one-stop dispensing and found a decrease in the number 
of missed doses after one-stop dispensing (80 miss doses after; compared with 216 
before). A dose of a medication can be considered a ‘missed-dose’ for a number of 
reasons relating to a) intention to prescribe but not prescribed; b) medicine not available 
or in fact not found (either during normal working hours or out of hours); c) medicine 
not administered (e.g. patient refused or nurse forget); d) patient not on ward; e) 
unfamiliar preparation, administration, method or device; f) route of administration not 
available; g) medicine administered to wrong patient; h) discharge medicine not 
supplied. Clearly, one-stop dispensing could impact most obviously on reasons (b), (c), 
(g), and (h). However, since there is only one study examining the impact of one-stop 
dispensing on missed doses, and this was reported only as a conference abstract, there is 
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no clear evidence about which types of missed doses are tackled by patient lockers. The 
other point to note is that these studies focused on either acute medical or surgical 
wards. There is no formal assessment of the use of patient lockers on community 
hospital wards in the UK.  
In addition to bedside-patient lockers as a way of reducing MAEs, another suggestion 
by Barber et al. (2003), is the use of technology to control people’s actions. There are 
published articles examining the effect of technology in reducing the MAEs. A study by 
Franklin et al. (2007) is relevant, this was a before and after observational study located 
at a general surgical ward in the UK. The work illustrated the reduction of MAE rates 
from 8.6% to 4.4% after implementing the electronic prescription and barcoding system 
for medication administration purposes. Also, Helmons et al. (2009), using before and 
after observational method in a general hospital in the USA, found that the MAE rate 
reduced by almost 2% after using a barcoding system. Another study was completed by 
Cottney (2014) on a psychiatric ward at East London Foundation Trust. Here, the 
medication administration was observed before and after the implementation of an 
automated dispensing cabinet. The study showed that a reduction in the medication 
administration error rates from 8.9% to 7.2% after using the automated dispensing 
cabinet, and a reduction in the time taken for administering medication from 2.94 to 
2.37 minutes per dose. This reduction might increase the nursing free time by around 66 
minutes per ward per day.  These studies show a positive impact of technology in terms 
of reducing the MAE rate. However, as mentioned before, there are no studies 
comparing mental-health and community hospital wards, using paper drug charts, 
where some of the community wards use bedside-patient lockers for medication 
administration.  
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Moreover, the impact of specific interventions such as the use of technology, training 
and ward system changes to reduce MAEs in hospitals were outlined in a systematic 
review study by Keers et al (2014). The paper showed a reduction in MAE rates being 
reported by technology and education training studies. On the other hand, Berdot et al. 
(2016) found in their systematic review that the overall MAE rate was not different in 
the studies comparing between the intervention and the control groups; however, in the 
before-and-after intervention studies, the MAE rates decreased after the intervention.  
Furthermore, there are other studies that have introduced different interventions 
resulting in reduced MAEs. For example, a study by Cottney (2015) showed a reduction 
in the average missed dose rate on the six wards specialising in the mental healthcare of 
older people in East London Foundation Trust from 1.07% to 0.07%. This study was a 
quality improvement project, where the number of missed doses was ranked for each 
wards and published in a fortnightly league table. Another example is an audit study by 
Dawson (2014) completed at two NHS dementia units by using an intervention. The 
intervention included training sessions for nursing staff encouraging them to report the 
blank boxes as MAEs. The study showed that MAEs on dementia units decreased in 
ward A from 5.3% to 0.8% and ward B from 1.7% to 0.2%. In psychiatric hospital ward 
there is an interview study by Haw et al. (2015) which found that the participant nurses 
need training on medicines management due to a lack of awareness with UK medicines 
management guidance and local policy e.g. (nurses would not report an MAEs or near 
miss medications). These show the importance of nurses’ continuing education and 
training on medication safety and reducing MAEs.  
In addition, another example of what helps to reduce MAEs, a systematic review study 
by Alsulami et al. (2012) found that the double-checking by other nurses reduce the 
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errors in a few studies. Also, the study stated that more investigations need to examine 
the effectiveness of double-checking medicines in decreasing MAEs due to scarcity of 
evidence. However, the double-checking can be by delegating the drug administration 
to other nurses or care workers as shown in observation study in two busy elderly 
psychiatric wards by Dickens et al. (2008). That study illustrated that there were no 
more likely to be errors when care workers administered the medication to the patients. 
Also, care workers administering drugs to disorderly and violent patients were deemed 
to be more possible than registered nurses doing this. The study suggested that on busy 
elderly psychiatric wards delegation of drug administration is a viable option and 
delegated care workers must be trained regularly for the safety aspect. Moreover, a 
study evaluated nurses’ knowledge of double-checking medication administration by 
(Alsulami et al., 2014) finding that the nurses had a lack of awareness and clarity about 
double-checking. The study stated that training might improve nurses’ double-checking 
knowledge and improvements in patient safety. As the interruptions increased the risk 
of MAEs as mentioned earlier, a systematic review by Raban and Westbrook (2013) 
evaluated evidence of the interventions’ efficiency in decreasing the interruptions rate 
during the administration round and MAEs rate. The study found some evidence on 
reduction of the interruption rate after using the interventions and fewer evidence of 
interventions effectiveness to reduce MAEs.  
1.4 Aim 
The overall aim of this study is to examine the rate of MAEs as well as the contributing 
factors and the causes behind the MAEs across all wards at BHFT in order to examine 
whether there are differences between psychiatric and community hospital wards, 
which use different modes of drug administration and also focus on different 
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therapeutic areas. The purpose is also to produce recommendations for improving 
medication administration practices in these types of settings.    
1.5 Objectives  
Two main objectives were considered to achieve the aim of this study:  
1- To identify the rate of MAEs for psychiatric wards and community hospital wards 
through the observational method. The quantitative outcomes being measured are: 
a) The number and type of MAEs.  
b) A range of possible contributing factors including administration times, 
interruptions, staff shortages and medication administration practices. 
This objective included to decipher a formal method for meaningfully analysing the 
quantitative data using inferential statistics.  
2- To examine the perceived causes and wider factors contributing to these errors 
through qualitative methods. The qualitative data collection will involve: 
a) In-depth examination of the researcher’s notes made during the 
observations.  
b) Speaking with relevant healthcare professionals (nurses and pharmacists) in 
semi-structured interviews to gain their opinions and perceptions about the 
MAEs found within the Trust.  
This second objective included to interpret these data using an appropriate error 
causation framework. This study received approval from the University of Reading 
Research Ethics Committee and the Trust Clinical Audit department to proceed.  
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter one has presented an introduction to MAEs, definitions, and methods used to 
determine MAEs. It then reviewed literature about the rate of MAEs and type and 
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frequency of MAEs, potential for harm, contributing factors linked to MAEs and 
interventions to reduce the MAEs. This chapter has also provided an overview of the 
study aim and research objectives and below introduces the outline of the thesis. 
Chapter two describes the research methodology, theoretical framework related to 
medication errors, including human error theory, ‘Swiss Cheese’ model and the 
organisational accident model. It also describes methodology relating to pharmacy 
practice, research design, and techniques employed to meet the research objectives. 
Next, the data collection, including the sample size and recruitment, ethical issues, 
payment and data protection and confidentiality are detailed. The chapter concludes 
with the detail of the methods used for the quantitative and qualitative data analysis.  
Chapter three reports on the quantitative results and findings of this thesis, firstly the 
descriptive data analysis is shown followed by the inferential statistical analysis and 
analysis using the Poisson Regression Model.   
Chapter four reports on the qualitative results and findings of this thesis, including the 
comparison between the observational notes and the interviews completed with the 
healthcare professionals.  
Chapter five focusses on the interpretation of the findings and discusses the 
investigation in relation to the work of other scholars. 
Chapter six summarises the significant research findings, including the limitations of 
the study, contribution to knowledge and presents recommendations as well as 
suggestions for future research work.  
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Chapter 2  Research Methodology 
The previous chapter considered some of the important literature on MAEs detailing 
their rates, type, potential for harm and potential contributing factors. This chapter first 
outlines the theoretical frameworks supporting this study and illustrates the 
methodological approaches and techniques drawn upon in order to answer the research 
objectives. This is followed by the description of the research methods actually used in 
this study to support the data collection (quantitative and qualitative), including the 
study design, sampling and recruitment, and ethical approval. This chapter concludes 
with a detailed description of the data analysis. 
2.1 Theoretical frameworks relating to medication errors 
There are a number of human error frameworks relevant to medication safety which is 
outlined here. First, is a conceptual model of human factors consisting of Software, 
Hardware, Environment, and Liveware (SHEL) has been used in studies of error in 
aviation (Hawkins, 1987). The SHEL model is recommended for analysing human 
factors in the aviation accident investigations and considers both active and latent 
failures (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2012). Moreover, it was used in a particular real-life 
example of medical error in order to examine the human errors. The SHEL model has 
also been used in healthcare e.g. the emergency room or the operating theatre (Molloy 
and O'boyle, 2005).  
In addition, patient safety researchers recognise the need for human factors engineering 
and systems approaches to patient safety research and improvement. The US Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) with the application of systems engineering concepts and human 
factors have designed the Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) 
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model. The SEIPS model has also been used to frame the design and analysis of 
research (Carayon et al., 2006). Also, the model is used in the healthcare domain 
focusing on work systems and its different sociotechnical system models for example, 
to evaluate many health information technologies such as electronic health records, 
smart infusion pumps and bar coded medication administration (Holden et al., 2013). 
However, this model was criticised for having no specific guidance and as such is 
considered as a descriptive model (Carayon et al., 2006). 
On the other hand, the Yorkshire Contributory Factors framework was published in 
2012 (Lawton et al., 2012). This model is more specific to the healthcare domain and it 
is evidence-based. The Yorkshire framework includes 20 contributory factors which 
were identified from several studies. Moreover, the Yorkshire framework allows 
researchers and others to classify contributing factors in a clear way into four main 
categories: active failures, local conditions, situational factors and latent factors. 
However, Franklin and Garfield (2017) have stated that it is slightly more complex than 
the accident causation model.                                                                                                                                        
This section focusses on the theoretical framework supporting this study. James Reason 
developed the ‘Swiss Cheese’ accident causation model (Reason, 1990), which has 
been commonly referred to in healthcare systems when examining human error and its 
management. This has given rise to a whole body of literature on human error inspired 
by the work of Reason, some of which is particularly relevant in terms of this research 
study.  
2.1.1 Human error theory  
This section provides a brief review of the concept of error, error types and human error 
theory in relation to healthcare. The term ‘human error’ describes an action or 
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misconduct by a human who fails to complete or achieve their task as planned, which 
according to Reason can be classified to three levels; conceptual, contextual and 
behavioural by considering origins in human cognition (Reason, 1990, p. 17). Norman 
(1988 as cited by Armitage, 2009), analyses human tasks or cognitive shortcuts as error 
types, which can occur in planning or action-based stages such as slips, lapses and 
mistakes Slips, lapses and mistakes are considered errors types by Reason (1990, p. 9). 
Slips are defined as actions that did not go as planned, whereas lapses involve memory 
failures. Mistakes are failures in judgement to achieve the objectives, which are deemed 
to be very hard to detect. Also, Rasmussen (1983 as cited by Reason, 1990) classifies 
human performance such as mistakes into two levels; rule-based and knowledge-based. 
Furthermore, Reason (2000), states that human error can be seen in two ways: using a 
person approach or a system approach and each has its model of error causation. 
According to Armitage (2009), Reason has created a template of available knowledge 
of individual factors combined with system factors. Parker and Lawton (2003), identify 
this approach as a ‘human error theory’. This theory is founded from results of 
observational studies of error and findings of research in cognitive and social 
psychology laboratories.  
2.1.1.1 Person approach 
Person approach focused on an individual’s errors caused by human who are 
responsible and blamed for their weakness and forgetfulness more than their 
organisations (Franklin and Garfield, 2017). According to Reason (2000), the tradition 
of the person approach is a “focus on the unsafe acts such as slips, lapses, errors and 
procedural violations of people at the sharp end such as nurses. It views these unsafe 
acts as arising primarily from aberrant mental processes such as forgetfulness, 
inattention, poor motivation, carelessness, negligence, and recklessness. The associated 
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countermeasures are directed mainly at reducing unwanted variability in human 
behaviour”. Reason has criticised this approach because it focusses on the individual 
origins of error, and it separates unsafe acts from their system environment. 
2.1.1.2 System approach 
Reason’s system approach is that where humans are involved, in workplaces and 
organisations, errors will occur and “errors can be seen as consequences rather than 
causes”. The assumption of the system approach is that the human condition cannot be 
changed, however, conditions can be reformed under which humans’ work (Reason, 
2000). Also, this approach focuses on the conditions and attempts to build defences; 
“all hazards and technologies have barriers or defences to prevent error, it is important 
not concentrate on who made the error but how and why the defence failed” (Reason, 
2000). 
2.1.2 The‎‘Swiss Cheese’ and the organisational accident model  
The ‘Swiss Cheese’ model in relation to errors was developed by Reason in 1990 and is 
widely used in accidental analysis. Specifically, this model is widely used in examining 
medication errors, such as prescribing, dispensing and administration where there is a 
potential to either make or prevent an error (Sanghera et al., 2007). According to 
Reason (2000), the concept of safety is embodied by layers of ‘Swiss Cheese’ with 
holes in the safety layers corresponding to the deficiencies due to latent errors e.g. 
organisational errors, environment etc. (Figure  2.1). The holes in the defences appear 
for two reasons, active failures and latent conditions, and when the holes in the 
defensive layers align, then the hazard can lead to an accident. Almost all adverse 
events include a combination of two sets of these factors. Active failures; are the 
‘unsafe acts’ committed by people who are in direct contact with the patient or system. 
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They take a variety of forms: slips, lapses, fumbles, mistakes, and procedural violations. 
“Active failures have a direct and usually short-lived effect on the integrity of the 
defences. Latent conditions; are the predictable ‘resident pathogens’ within a system. 
They arise from decisions made by designers, builders, procedure writers, and top level 
management. These decisions may be mistakes but they need not be. All such strategic 
decisions have the potential for introducing pathogens into the system” (Reason, 2000). 
 
Figure  2.1: The Swiss Cheese model (adapted from Reason, 2008) 
According to Ahmad and Pontiggiaa (2015), the main aspect of the organisational 
accident model is that latent conditions interact with the local error-producing 
conditions, and in cases where safety barriers are unavailable, this could lead to an 
accident (Figure  2.2). Thus organisational accidents can result when the latent 
conditions combine with active failures at the ‘sharp end’ – i.e. errors or violations due 
for example to high workload, time pressure and experience and poor equipment with 
local producing factors to break the system defence (Reason, 2008, p. 96). Each 
organisational accident has at least three common features: hazards, failed defence and 
losses (damage to people or environment). The failed defences are more useful for 
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effective prevention; however, no defence is perfect. The gap in the defences can be as 
a result of two reasons; active failure and latent conditions as represented in the ‘Swiss 
Cheese’ model (Reason, 2016) (see Figure 2.1). 
Furthermore, in the ‘lining-up’ of the gap there is a need for making a strong path 
through the defences. In this way, organisational accidents include the improbable 
combination of numerous factors at several levels of the system which breach the many 
defences, barriers and safeguards (Reason, 2016, p. 11). The stages in the development 
of an organisational accident are presented in Figure  2.2 below. This model aims to link 
the several contributing features into a consistent sequence that runs bottom-up in 
‘causation’ and top-down in ‘investigation’. The top block illustrates the main elements 
of an event and the bottom shows the system producing the contributing features, which 
has three stages: the person (unsafe acts), the workplace (error-producing conditions), 
and the (organisation) (Reason, 1997). 
 
Figure ‎2.2: Stages in the development and investigation of an organisational accident (Reason, 
1997) 
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As noted by Franklin and Garfield (2017), this model has been adapted to healthcare 
(Vincent et al., 1998) and it has been used to understand medication errors (Dean et al., 
2002, Taxis and Barber, 2003a). 
2.1.3 The model adopted for this study 
Taylor-Adams and Vincent (2004) developed an ‘adapted’ organisational accident 
causation model based on a framework developed by Vincent et al. (1998), which was 
itself modelled on Reason’s model of organisational accidents (Reason, 1997). This 
adapted model assists the researcher in classifying the stages of error causation: active 
failures which are unsafe acts such as slips, lapses, mistakes and violations, committed 
by humans at the sharp end of operations, with error-producing conditions which are 
contributory factors such as patient factor, task factor, individual factor, team factor, or 
work environment factors, as well as with latent failures which are organisation and 
management culture such as organisational processes and management decisions (see 
Figure  2.3). Using the framework allows an in depth way in which errors can be 
categorised and classified in accordance with the error-producing conditions and latent 
failures so that ultimately one can understand the factors affecting the safety of clinical 
practice (see Table  2.1).  
 
Figure ‎2.3: The organisational accident causation model (adapted from Taylor-Adams and 
Vincent, 2004) 
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Table ‎2.1: Framework of contributory factors influencing clinical practice (Vincent et al., 1998) 
FACTOR TYPES  CONTRIBUTORY INFLUENCING FACTOR 
Patient Factors  Condition (complexity and seriousness) 
Language and communication 
Personality and social factors 
Task and Technology Factors Task design and clarity of structure 
Availability and use of protocols 
Availability and accuracy of test results 
Decision-making aids 
Individual (staff) Factors 
 
Knowledge and skills 
Competence 
Physical and mental health 
Team Factors Verbal communication 
Written communication 
Supervision and seeking help 
Team structure (congruence, consistency, leadership, etc.) 
Work Environmental Factors Staffing levels and skills mix 
Workload and shift patterns 
Design, availability and maintenance of equipment 
Administrative and managerial support 
Environment 
Physical 
Organisational & Management 
Factors 
 
Financial resources and constraints 
Organisational structure 
Policy, standards and goals 
Safety culture and priorities 
Institutional Context Factors  Economic and regulatory context  
National health service executive 
Links with external organisations 
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One of the elements of the current research was to classify errors according to the active 
failure category as well as the contributing factors. But the classification of an error as a 
particular type of active failure is not a straightforward process because the 
characteristics of the error need to be considered in detail and then a judgement needs to 
be made about the failure type the error represents. In view of this, Figure  2.4 and 
Table  2.2 show the active failure types and their definitions according to the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE), which is the national independent watchdog for work-related 
health, safety and illness. These resources were used by the researcher here to identify 
the meaning of these categories when the observation notes and interviews quotes were 
being analysed in order to stipulate the possible cause of the errors observed.  
 
 
Figure ‎2.4: Human failure type (adapted from HSE, 2017) 
  
Active failure 
Error 
Action Error (Action-
not-as-planned) 
Action-Based Slip 
Memory-Based 
Lapse 
Thinking Error 
(Action-as-planned) 
Rule-Based 
Mistake 
Knowledge-
Based Mistake 
Non-compliance 
(violations) 
Routine 
Situational 
Exceptional 
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Table ‎2.2: Human failure type explanation (adapted from HSE, 2017) 
 Characteristics Failure Type Examples Typical Control Measures 
A
c
ti
o
n
 E
rr
o
r 
 
Associated with 
familiar tasks 
that require little 
conscious 
attention. These 
‘skill-based’ 
errors occur if 
attention is 
diverted, even 
momentarily. 
 
Slip 
(Commission) 
 
A simple, frequently-performed physical action goes 
wrong: 
 Flash headlights instead of operating 
windscreen wash/wipe function 
 Move a switch up rather than down (wrong 
action on right object) 
 Take reading from wrong instrument (right 
action on wrong object) 
 Transpose digits during data input into a 
process control interface 
 Human-centred design 
(consistency e.g. up always 
means off; intuitive layout of 
controls and instrumentation; 
level of automation etc.) 
 Checklists and reminders; 
procedures with place 
markers’ (tick off each step) 
 Independent cross-check of 
critical tasks (PTW) 
 Removal of distractions and 
interruptions 
 Sufficient time available to 
complete task 
 Warnings and alarms to help 
detect errors 
 Often made by experienced, 
highly-trained, well-motivated 
staff: additional training not 
valid 
Resulting action 
is not intended: 
‘not doing what 
you meant to 
do’. 
 
Common during 
maintenance 
and repair 
activities. 
Lapse 
(Omission) 
 
Short-term memory lapse; omit to perform a 
required action: 
 Forget to indicate at a road junction 
 Medical implement left in patient after surgery 
 Miss crucial step, or lose place, in a safety-
critical procedure 
 Drive road tanker off before delivery complete 
(hose still connected) 
T
h
in
k
in
g
 E
rr
o
r 
 
Decision-
making failures; 
errors of 
judgement 
(involve mental 
processes linked 
to planning; 
info. gathering; 
communication 
etc.) 
Rule-Based 
Mistake 
 
If behaviour is based on remembered rules and 
procedures, mistake occurs due to mis-application of 
a good rule or application of a bad rule: 
 Misjudge overtaking manoeuvre in unfamiliar, 
under-powered car 
 Assume £20 fuel will last a week but fail to 
account for rising prices 
 Ignore alarm in real emergency, following 
history of spurious alarms 
 Plan for all relevant ‘what ifs’ 
(procedures for upset, 
abnormal and emergency 
scenarios) 
 Regular drills/exercises for 
upsets/emergencies 
 Clear overview / mental 
model (clear displays; system 
feedback; effective shift 
handover etc.) 
 Diagnostic tools and decision-
making aids (flowcharts; 
schematics; job-aids etc.) 
 Competence (knowledge and 
understanding of system; 
training in decision-making 
techniques) 
 Organisational learning 
(capture and share experience 
of unusual events) 
Action is carried 
out, as planned, 
using conscious 
thought 
processes, but 
wrong course of 
action is taken: 
‘do the wrong 
thing believing 
it to be right’ 
Knowledge-
Based 
Mistake 
Individual has no rules or routines available to 
handle an unusual situation: resorts to first 
principles and experience to solve problem: 
 Rely on out-of-date map to plan unfamiliar 
route 
 Misdiagnose process upset and take 
inappropriate corrective action (due to lack of 
experience or insufficient / incorrect 
information etc.) 
N
o
n
-c
o
m
p
li
a
n
c
e 
 
Deliberate 
deviations from 
rules, 
procedures, 
regulations etc. 
Also known as 
‘violations’ 
Routine 
 
Non-compliance becomes the ‘norm’; general 
consensus that rules no longer apply; characterised 
by a lack of meaningful enforcement: 
 High proportion of motorists drive at 80mph 
on the motorway 
 PTWs routinely authorised without physical, 
on-plant checks 
 Improve risk perception; 
promote understanding and 
raise awareness of ‘whys’ & 
consequences (e.g. warnings 
embedded within procedures) 
 Increase likelihood of getting 
caught effective supervision 
 Eliminate reasons to cut 
corners (poor job design; 
inconvenient requirements; 
unnecessary rules; unrealistic 
workload and targets; 
unrealistic procedures; 
adverse environmental 
factors) 
 Improve attitudes / 
organisational culture (active 
workforce involvement; 
encourage reporting of 
violations; make non-
compliance ‘socially’ 
unacceptable e.g. drink-
driving). 
Knowingly take 
short cuts, or 
fail to follow 
procedures, to 
save time or 
effort. 
Situational 
 
Non-compliance dictated by situation specific 
factors (time pressure; workload; unsuitable tools & 
equipment; weather); non-compliance may 
be the only solution to an impossible task: 
 Van driver has no option but to speed to 
complete day’s deliveries 
Usually well-
meaning, but 
misguided 
(often 
exacerbated by 
unwitting 
encouragement 
from 
management for 
‘getting the job 
Exceptional 
 
Person attempts to solve problem in highly unusual 
circumstances (often if something has gone wrong); 
takes a calculated risk in breaking rules: 
 After a puncture, speed excessively to ensure 
not late for meeting 
 Delay ESD during emergency to prevent loss 
of production 
Methodology                                                                                                  Chapter 2 
 
53 
 
2.2 Research methodology relating to pharmacy practice  
2.2.1 Research design  
There are three broad approaches for designing a practice based research study 
investigating healthcare practices; these involve qualitative, quantitative, and mixed 
methods. Therefore while research studies can be divided into either quantitative or 
qualitative studies sometimes both approaches are adopted (mixed-method) for a 
synergistic effect. Each approach is associated with its own data collection methods 
such as observations, interviews or questionnaires but mixed-methods studies 
combining a number of data collection methods (Creswell, 2013). This research study 
adopted the mixed-methods research design (using both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches). The quantitative data was derived from the direct observation of 
medication administration rounds, which was used to detect the rate, type, and 
frequency of MAEs and any contributing factors at all the hospital wards. Qualitative 
data was generated through the analysis of the observational notes and transcripts of 
semi-structured interviews with nurses and pharmacists working at the research site.   
2.2.2 Quantitative approach 
Quantitative research is a scientific and empirical approach that is used to understand a 
phenomenon by examining relationships between variables. It is used in physical 
sciences and originated from the scientific process although it is used within studies 
involving research with humans (Johnson and Christensen, 2014, p. 33).  Furthermore, 
the quantitative approach is a systematic and objective method in which data are 
explained and measured using for example descriptive figures and numerical data to 
produce findings, and these are then tested and examined in relation to a cause-effect 
relationship (Creswell, 2013). The quantitative approach is considered to use more 
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objective measures than the qualitative approach which relies on subjectivity (Donyai, 
2012, p. 43). Using a quantitative approach, the researcher is tasked with providing an 
objective view to understand the facts by using methods that do not require any direct 
interaction with participants e.g. surveys that are self-completed rather than in-depth 
interviews (Denscombe, 2014, p. 166). Another example of the quantitative approach is 
the direct observation when it involves taking objective measurement of a phenomenon 
for example using a data collection form (Bernard, 2011, p. 306). Observation is one of 
the standardised ways in which data is collected when it can be assured that an accurate 
and objective recording can be made by a researcher who acts in an impartial way 
(Donyai, 2012). In this study, quantitative data was collected using the direct 
observation method used by others for measuring MAEs, by shadowing the nurses. This 
is a well-established method of data collection in this field which was first described by 
two pharmacists (Barker and McConnell, 1962 as cited by Barker et al., 2002a). 
2.2.2.1 Observation method 
The observation method is defined as “the systematic description of events, behaviours, 
and artefacts in the social setting chosen for study” (Marshall and Rossman, 2011, p.  
139). According to Kawulich (2005), this method is useful in research studies in several 
ways. For instance, it provides methods to identify participants’ emotional expression, 
communication with others, interaction, and noting the amount of time spent on 
different activities. Also, it can collect information and data of what actually happens in 
real practice. The observational method can be applied to collect qualitative data by 
watching behaviour or causal aspects in the natural setting (Taylor-Powell and Steele, 
1996). It can also be applied to collect quantitative data relating to measuring the 
incidence of a specific phenomenon happening in practice or by developing a 
correlation to a measured variable (Coolican, 2014, p. 139). This method is used in the 
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study of an organisation and delivery of care, such as healthcare settings where it is 
useful to reveal what happens in the study of daily work, for example in hospital wards 
(Pope et al., 2002).  
The structured observation method aims to produce accurate quantitative data on 
particular pre-specified observable behaviours or patterns of interaction (Coolican, 
2014, p. 140). It is a technique in which the observer produces accurate rules (schedule) 
for the observation. Also, it entails the direct recording of behaviour in terms of 
categories that have been devised prior to the start of the data collection (Bryman, 2012, 
p. 272). It is also worth mentioning that quantitative data collection through observation 
is normally through non-participant observation, which is used to define a situation 
where the researcher observes, however, not to participate in what is happening in the 
setting (Bryman, 2012, p. 273).  
In addition, there are two types of observation; disguised and undisguised observation. 
The disguised observation is where the participant is not aware that he/she is being 
observed by the researcher. However, in the undisguised observation, the participants 
know that they being observed (Jackson, 2015). In this research study, the nurses were 
informed that they will be observed by the researcher (undisguised observation), in 
agreement with the ward managers as part of the Trust approval. This method has been 
used in a number of MAEs studies (Taxis et al., 1999, Barker et al., 2002, Tissot et al., 
2003, Chua et al., 2010).  
2.2.2.2 Advantage and disadvantage of the observation method 
Like any other study method there are some advantages and disadvantages of the 
observational method. One of the advantages is collecting data where and when an 
event or activity is occurring in the setting. Another advantage is that observation does 
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not rely on people’s willingness or ability to provide information. Also, observation 
allows the researcher to potentially directly see what people do and feel (Coolican, 
2014, p. 140). Disadvantages include that observation can be very time-consuming 
compared to other data collection methods, and does not always increase the 
understanding of the reasons behind people’s behaviour. Also, it is liable to observer 
bias and that the people’s behaviour can be affected e.g. (usually perform better when 
they know they are being observed) (Coolican, 2014, p. 140). Dean and Barber (2001) 
considered the potential effect of the research on the participants who are being 
observed and associated this with the validity of observational data. Staff might behave 
in a different way when they know that they are being watched or observed. The MAEs 
rate could decrease if nurses are more careful while the researcher is observing; in 
contrast, the error rate might increase if the researcher is interrupted and the nurses will 
become worried. This phenomenon is sometimes called the ‘Hawthorne effect’ 
(Campbell et al., 1995). However, observing nurses in drug administration round does 
not appear to affect the MAE rate (Dean and Barber, 2001). In addition, observation 
methods are considered to be the most reliable data collection method that capture 
MAEs (Barker et al., 2002b). 
2.2.3 Qualitative approach 
The qualitative approach is a naturalistic approach that aims to study things in their 
natural settings as well as attempting to make sense of or understand phenomena in 
terms of how people make sense of the world. Moreover, in the qualitative approach the 
researcher is usually involved to study data in an attempt to understand particular 
experiences of phenomena from the participants’ point of view (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985, Denzin and Lincoln, 2013). Having said that, qualitative research is a wide 
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approach to understand social phenomena which requires an understanding of different 
data collection and interpretation strategies (Creswell, 2013). Qualitative data includes a 
range of data collection methods such as; participants’ observation (fieldwork), 
interviews and focus group. Also, the creation of pharmacy-related qualitative data 
could contain ethnographic methods and discourse analysis of text (Donyai, 2012). 
Marshall and Rossman (2011) state that qualitative research is suitable when the study 
needs deep understanding of the participants’ experiences, hidden beliefs, and to hear 
their silenced voices. Also, qualitative research could be very useful to understand 
participants’ difficult circumstances including cultures instead of testing a hypothesis or 
cause-effect relationship (Savin-Baden and Major, 2013). 
2.2.3.1 Ethnographic research 
Ethnographic research takes place in a culture-sharing environment where the 
researcher studies and tries to understand the consequences of a group of people’s 
behaviours, interactions, values, and perceptions (Creswell and Poth, 2017). Thus, 
ethnographic research commonly involves the observational methods to allow an in-
depth understanding of cultural practices. Also, it involves a long-term engagement in 
fieldwork that the researcher integrates with other interactions with participants for data 
collection through the qualitative method such as participation, observation or 
interviews, which all increase the credibility of the work (Gobo, 2008). The purpose of 
ethnographic research is mainly to recognise and understand the changes to the 
organisation culture and social group (Creswell and Poth, 2017). In addition, 
ethnographic research has been used in studies looking at medication errors by using 
observational methods (Taxis and Barber, 2003b).  
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2.2.3.2 Semi-structured interviews 
The interview method as a qualitative approach is commonly used in healthcare setting 
research (Pope et al., 2002). Interviews are basically a series of conversations between 
the researcher and the participants. On the other hand, interviews could have some 
limitations, where the interviewees can be reluctant to share some information that the 
researcher expects to identify, as well as if only a small number of interviews are 
conducted the findings cannot be generalised (Boyce and Neale, 2006). Interview 
questions can help to extract responses from participants, but they must generally be 
worded carefully in order to avoid leading the interviewees in their answers. Hence, 
interview questions are commonly open-ended, neutral, and clear (Patton, 2002).  There 
are three types of interview methods: structured, semi-structured, and un-structured 
interviews (Holloway and Galvin, 2016, pp. 89-91). In the current research, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with nurses and pharmacists. This type merges 
features of the structured and un-structured interviews DiCicco‐Bloom and Crabtree 
(2006), allowing a more flexible and less formal situation where the researcher can ask 
open-ended questions and it allows the interviewee to express their opinions and beliefs 
freely (Pope et al., 2002). 
2.2.4 Mixed-method approach  
According to Creswell and Clark (2007), a mixed-method study is defined as a 
“methodology which involves the philosophical assumptions that guide the direction of 
the data collection and analysis and the mixture of qualitative and quantitative 
approaches in many phases in the research process”. A mixed-method approach 
involves collecting both quantitative and qualitative data for a specific purpose, usually 
to bring additional meaning that cannot be gained from following one methodological 
approach on its own (Creswell, 2013, p. 11). Moreover, Davis and Hughes (2014), state 
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that quantitative and qualitative approaches have advantages and disadvantages. 
Besides both being different in style, language and objectives, these approaches depend 
on the researcher skills, training and experience (Davies and Hughes, 2014, pp. 9-10). 
Nonetheless, a mixed-method approach can increase the validity of the study findings, 
deliver better data collection and enrich understanding of research results (Tashakkori 
and Teddlie, 2010). As the mixed-method approach has been narrowly applied in 
medication errors e.g. (Tang et al., 2007, Alomari et al., 2017), further mixed-methods 
research is needed to present the whole picture about MAEs in practice. Overall, the use 
of a mixed-method approach within a single study has been supported by many 
researchers, which seek to triangulate quantitative data with qualitative data (Jick, 1979, 
Johnson et al., 2007).  
2.2.5 The approach adopted in this study  
Qualitative and quantitative approaches can legitimately be used in combination with 
each other (Sandelowski, 2000, Morse, 2003, Creswell, 2013). In this study, a mixed-
methods approach was adopted by collecting, analysing, and combining both 
quantitative and qualitative data to provide appropriate answers to the research aim. For 
example, the rate of MAEs from the quantitative method and the cause of MAEs is 
from the qualitative method could be examined together. At the same time this 
approach draws on the strengths and minimising the weaknesses of each research 
approach to strengthen the overall validity of the findings. These mixed-methods were 
used to clarify differences and similarities, and to triangulate the data as a means of 
understanding and achieving the study objectives. For example, the causes and 
contributing factors of MAEs from researcher observation, nurses and pharmacists 
opinion could be brought together. 
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The use of more than one approach in a research study amounts to a form of 
‘triangulation’ which can enhance confidence in the findings of the research (Johnson et 
al., 2007). As a result, both direct observation and interviews were included, with the 
logic of induction and deduction being applied during the interviews and the 
observation. This is one rationale for adopting a mixed-method approach. Another was 
to help increase understanding, overcome bias, and verify the overall meaning of data 
(Golafshani, 2003, Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010).  
2.3 Study setting 
This study was completed at BHFT which as previously described is a mental-health 
and community hospital Trust in the UK. The quantitative work involving the 
observation of the medication administration round was completed with all 19 wards at 
the Trust; 9 community hospital wards (CHWs) and 10 psychiatric wards (PWs) 
starting from 6
th
 July 2015 to 15
th
 October 2015. The interviews were conducted in 
2016-2017 with a total of 12 participants (eight nurses and four pharmacists).  
2.3.1 Descriptive explanation of ward practices   
The following is a description of the normal practice on wards at BHFT, together with 
areas in which variations occur. 
2.3.1.1 Medication administration by nurses 
Four drug rounds normally take place on each ward on each day with scheduled times 
of 08:00, 12:00, 18:00 and 22:00; some wards start the morning and evening rounds at 
07:30 instead of 08:00, 17:00 instead of 18:00. These earlier starts are to accommodate 
for situations when there are patients need multiple medication, thus requiring more 
time for the round. The qualified administering nurse signs the paper medication chart 
each time a medication is administered to the patient. There is an omission code to be 
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used when the nurse cannot administer the medication for any reasons e.g. ‘R’ if the 
patient refuses the medication. During each administration round, the drug chart is 
picked up and each medication order scanned by the nurse to see if a dose is due for that 
patient on that round. The nurse then prepares and administers the medication to the 
patient (see Appendix 1). There are three main ways for drug administration at BHFT: 
administration from a drug trolley (community hospital wards), administration from 
bedside-patient lockers (community hospital wards), and administration from the clinic 
room (psychiatric wards). The medication administration on each ward is undertaken by 
one or two nurses at the same time depending on the wards. 
Wards administering medication from drug trolleys 
In most of the community hospital wards that use the trolley for administration, where 
the ward is large, the round is split into two administration rounds with two trolleys 
being used at the same time to serve each side of the ward. It is normal practice that 
each section has one nurse in charge of administering medication to the patients. The 
trolley always stays locked in the nurse station. At the beginning of each round the 
items in the drug trolleys are refilled from the ward ‘stock cupboard’. Non-stock items 
are dispensed from the pharmacy department when required and ward staff collect from 
pharmacy. During the medication administration round, the nurse releases and unlocks 
the drug trolley from the wall and moves the trolley from bedside to bedside as part of 
the process. The drug administration round starts in sequence from one end of the ward 
focusing on one patient and ends with the last patient on the ward. If the stock item is 
not found in the drug trolley, the nurse gets the drug from the stock cupboard taking 
care to lock the drug trolley.  
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Wards administering medication from bedside-patient lockers 
In the community hospital wards which use patient lockers for medication 
administration, there are two types of patient rooms; single-bed rooms, and multi-bed 
rooms which are divided into bays and beds. Again where relevant two half drug rounds 
take place at the same time with one nurse is in charge of each half. The medication 
administration process is similar to the drug trolley wards mentioned above, however 
the only difference is that the medications are administered directly from the bedside 
locker instead of the drug trolley. Sometimes the nurses use the drug trolley to 
administer stock items which are not available in the patient locker, or when the large 
bottles of medication cannot fit into the locker. The medication supply for these lockers 
is directly dispensed from the pharmacy department or from the POD. Also, these 
medications are a combination of inpatient and one-stop dispensing for a 28-day supply, 
fully labelled with directions for when the patient is ready to leave the hospital.  
Wards administering medication from clinic rooms 
In most of the psychiatric wards only one nurse is in charge of medication 
administration, and in some larger wards two nurses are in charge of administering 
medication to patients from the clinic room. The administration on these wards takes 
place directly from the ‘stock cupboard’ or a locked drug trolley within the clinic room. 
At the beginning of each round when the medication is administered from the clinic 
room, the nurse responsible for the medication administration round firstly checks all of 
the drug charts on the ward. This is in order to identify patients due medication during 
that actual round. Once identified, these patients are called to wait outside the clinic 
room in order that their medication is prepared and given to them. This mode of 
administration is sometimes known as ‘queuing’ to describe this process based on what 
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the patients are in affect asked to do. In some large wards which involve elderly patients 
with special conditions such as dementia, the nurse prepares their medications in the 
clinic room and then gives them to the patient one by one in their rooms, taking care to 
lock the clinic room each time. The following Table  2.3 shows the mode of 
administration used in BHFT wards.  
Table ‎2.3: The mode of administration used in BHFT wards  
Where given Where prepared Where administered 
 
Bedside- 
Clinic room PWs 
Trolley CHWs 
Patient lockers CHWs 
Inside clinic room- Clinic room PWs 
 
2.3.1.2 The drug chart as a record of drug prescribing and administration 
The medication prescribing and administration in this setting are recorded on paper 
drug charts. At BHFT, there are two different drug charts, one for the PWs and one for 
CHWs which are similar. The drug chart used is a piece of card folded once to make 
two A4 segments and four A4 sides for recording information. The first section of the 
chart includes patient details, any allergies and is reserved for prescribing of the stat 
(immediate) doses and regular long-acting injectable medicines in mental health. The 
other three sections are for prescribing and recording administration of other 
medication; two of these prescribing sections for regular prescriptions. And the last 
section for ‘as required’ prescriptions also known as PRN as well as for prescribing 
leave medication for preparation by the pharmacy. Occasionally, in PWs drug charts 
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there is also alcohol detox chart attached. Some wards also use warfarin charts where 
they record the International Normalised Ratio (INR) and the doctor prescribes on a 
daily / frequent basis according to the INR. The drug chart for each patient is placed 
either at the end of their bed, outside of their single room, held in the nurse station, or 
kept in the clinic room. All medications are prescribed on the paper drug chart by the 
medical staff. The nurses refer to each drug chart in order to administer medications at 
each of the four regular drug rounds. The nurses then record and sign the administration 
of each dose on the patient’s chart in the appropriate section or code this if omitted. 
Each regular medication prescribed on the drug chart allows administration or non-
administration to be recorded for an eight-week period only.   
2.4 Data collection 
This research study as mentioned before employed the mixed-methods approach, and 
the data was collected using the techniques of observations and semi-structured 
interviews which will be explained in more details below. However, types of MAEs and 
some definitions are important to be considered before explaining the data collection 
process. An MAE is defined as “any dose of medication administered (or omitted) that 
deviated from the written medication order” (Allan and Barker, 1990). The observation 
data recorded all the different types of medication administration errors including 
Omission (O), Allergy Error (AE), Extra Dose(s) (EDs), Wrong Dose (WD), Un-
prescribed Drug (UD), Drug Incorrect (DI), Formulation Error (FE), Route Error (RE), 
Deteriorated Drug (DD), Wrong Time Error (WTE), Other, and Linked Error (e.g. 
linked to dispensing error) (see Table  2.4) (Barber et al., 2009). Table  2.4 was critical to 
this study because it formed the basis of the error data collection. Note, if doses were 
left by the patient’s bedside, these could also be considered as MAEs.  
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Table  2.4: Types of medication administration error (Barber et al., 2009) 
Type of errors Definitions 
Omission (O) A dose of medication that has not been administered by the time of 
the next scheduled dose. Does not include doses omitted according to 
doctor’s instructions, nurse’s clinical judgement, if patient refuses or 
if patient not on ward. 
Allergy Error 
(AE) 
Administration of a drug for which the patient has a known drug 
allergy 
Extra Dose(s) 
(EDs) 
The administration of an additional dose of a prescribed medication. 
Includes administration of a drug more times in the day than 
prescribed and administration of a dose of drug after it has been 
crossed off the drug chart. 
Wrong Dose 
(WD) 
The administration of the correct drug by the correct route but in a 
quantity that was not prescribed. Includes administering inhaled 
steroid without spacer when one is available; administration of 
incorrect number of dose units; failure to shake a bottle of suspension 
prior to administration; measurement of an incorrect volume of an 
oral liquid. Where liquid preparations are not measured correctly or 
poured into non-graduated medicines cups, a wrong dose error has 
occurred only when the observer is certain that the wrong volume has 
been administered. If wrong strength is given because of a dispensing 
error this is still an MAE. 
Unprescribed 
Drug (UD) 
The administration of a drug that was not prescribed for the patient 
concerned (classified as a “drug incorrect” error if drug X prescribed 
but drug Y given instead). This may occur if medication had been 
stopped by the prescriber but was not removed from drug trolley. 
Drug Incorrect 
(DI) 
A dose of a drug administered that is not the drug prescribed. This 
could occur if administration followed an undetected dispensing error 
and would be a linked error. 
Formulation 
Error (FE) 
The administration of the correct dose of the drug by the correct route 
but in a formulation that was not prescribed. Includes administration 
of a modified release when non-modified prescribed, and vice versa. 
This may be linked to a dispensing error if the wrong form was 
dispensed. It also includes modification of the dose where not 
authorised, e.g. crushing tablets or opening capsules. 
Route Error (RE) The administration of the correct drug by a route or site which was 
not that prescribed. 
Deteriorated 
Drug (DD) 
Administration of a drug that has exceeded its expiry date or a drug 
with its physical or chemical integrity compromised, where none of 
above error types occurred. N.B. Note that multi-compartment 
compliance aids have a shelf life of 8 weeks from date of dispensing 
and are sometimes prepacked and if so should have an additional 
label (probably out of sight) which has batch number, original expiry 
date and date of dispensing. 
Wrong Time 
Error (WTE) 
All timing errors will be recorded regardless of whether the timing of 
the administration could have clinical significance  
Other Use to record anything that is not covered above 
Linked Error Use to record the MAE if linked to another error e.g. dispensing error 
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In relation to the Deteriorated Drug (DD) type of error, some medications such as liquid 
medication, eye drops and insulin, should be labelled showing the date of opening and 
expiry, according to the BHFT policy. In addition, when the medications did not have a 
label showing the opening and expiry date, the researcher called this type an ‘expiry 
error’ in the current research study. The other error which named by the researcher 
‘other reason errors’ is included anything that is not covered above. In this study it 
included only the failure to following the hospital procedure or other counselling 
guidance when administering the medication. For example, not dissolve dispersible 
tablets prior to administration, not telling the patient to disperse orodispersible tablets in 
the mouth before swallowing directly, and not directing the patient to rinse their mouth 
straight after use of corticosteroid inhalers etc.  Furthermore, a WTE was counted when 
medication was administered before or after two hours from the time prescribed on the 
drug chart as stated in NPSA guidance (NPSA, 2010). This is also in line with BHFT 
SOP around administration of critical medicines, where two hours is the set limit (see 
Appendix 2).  
2.4.1 Sample size and recruitment  
For the quantitative data collection (through direct observation), the purposive sampling 
method was used whereby all of the four medication administration time points on 
every ward at the BHFT was observed at least once to obtain some equality across  the 
wards. In addition, the researcher observed each ward medication round only once due 
to the total number of wards and the potential limitation of the observation logistic time 
plan. A total of 65 observations were made by the researcher covering all 19 of the 
BHFT wards. In total 35 of the 65 observations were of psychiatric wards and 30 of 
community hospital wards.  
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There were two categories of interviewees in this study, namely nurses and pharmacists. 
A total of 12 semi-structured interviews were conducted face-to-face with eight nurses 
(three working on community hospital wards, three psychiatric wards and two lead 
nurses) and four pharmacists. The interviews were conducted and analysed at the same 
time, so that sampling could stop at a stage when data did not generate any new 
information on the issue under investigation; which is known as ‘data saturation’ in 
qualitative research (Glaser and Strauss, 1967 as cited by Francis et al., 2010). 
It was planned to interview one nurse from each ward, with a total of 19 nurses being 
contacted through their wards manager via an email. Six nurses agreed to participate. 
After interviewing these six nurses, it was felt that the information was repetitive and 
no new perceptions were identified. However, to ensure the validity of the data, two 
more nurse interviews were conducted. As a result, the interviews were stopped at 8 
nurses when no new data emerged from the participants. It was possible to conduct 
interviews with four suitable clinical pharmacists to gain more information about MAEs 
from other healthcare professionals related to medication administration and compare 
their perceptions with that of nurses. Moreover, the reason for interviewing the 
pharmacists in this current study is that they routinely looking at drug charts, and that 
the medication administration is one of the pharmacy departmental interests e.g. (blank 
box audits).   
The nurses and pharmacists were recruited from the BHFT after they replied to a letter 
of information passed on via a secondary source (Mrs Kate Masters who is an external 
co-supervisor to the research student). All participants received an information sheet 
that included a full description of the study, and they had a choice to decide whether 
they wished to participate in the study or not (see Section 2.5.4). For observations of 
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medication administration rounds, a suitable rota was constructed (see Appendix 3) to 
allow observation of appropriate staff who had consented to take part. Prior to each 
observation or interview, written consent was obtained from the participants. All 
interviews were conducted face-to-face in a private room at a workplace building (e.g. 
in a meeting room at BHFT). 
2.4.2 Quantitative data collection  
Before starting to collect the data, the researcher was trained for 3-month duration (6-8 
hours a week) in the pharmacy department at BHFT, in order to be familiarised with the 
medication management systems at the Trust. This involved shadowing medicines 
management technicians on all wards as well as dispensary. Also, the researcher took a 
training session on medication administration observation with an expert pharmacist 
(Mr. Alan Cottney) at the East London NHS Foundation Trust in London. The session 
was one working day duration including explanation of the drug chart sections, the 
administration round process at the Trust and training on how to observe the nurse 
during the drug administration round. This training session was very important; Mr. 
Cottney has considerable experience in the observation on medication administration 
errors. Also, Mr Cottney is well-known for his work in mental-health wards as a 
research area as he has published a number of relevant studies. 
2.4.2.1 Pilot study    
A pilot study took place at one of the wards at the noon medication administration 
round, by shadowing the nurse with the aim to assess the usability of the data collection 
form process (whether it was applicable to the study or not). The pilot study allowed the 
researcher to familiarise themselves with the procedure of the medication 
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administration round. The pilot form was found to be acceptable and no major changes 
were made.  
2.4.2.2 Direct observation of medication administration rounds 
The researcher used a cross-sectional prospective direct observation method. Ward 
managers were familiar with the project a month earlier, to discuss the study and 
encourage nursing staff to participate, to examine the proposed visit days, and to 
communicate all information to nurses on duty during the visits. The study was 
approved and endorsed by the Director of Nursing at BHFT encouraging wards to 
participate. 
Medication administration rounds for regular and ‘as required’ (PRN) drugs were 
observed by shadowing the nurses and making notes discretely using a data collection 
form (see Appendix 4). The form illustrated the data that were collected, which 
included start and finish times for each drug administration round observed as well as a 
multitude of other factors relating to medication errors and potential contributing 
factors.  
Moreover, the researcher visited each ward at the Trust at least twice on different days, 
and on every visit one medication administration rounds was observed (e.g. morning or 
lunchtime). In some large wards where the drug administration rounds splits into two 
different ends, the researcher observed only one of these split rounds. Any doses 
administered between the medications rounds were not considered as OEs because it is 
was not possible for these to be observed. Normally OE is counted as any dose of 
medication that is observed either as being administered or omitted, which could be 
classified as being either correct or incorrect (Taxis and Barber, 2003a). In this thesis, 
each OE was associated with no error, one error or with more than one error.  
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Before the start of the medication administration round, the researcher arrived around 2 
hours earlier to check the drug charts and the medication cabinets. Accordingly, the due 
medication for each patient was recorded in the data collection form. Then, the 
researcher introduced himself to the nurse in charge of the medication administration 
round, and when the nurse started the administration round; the researcher shadowed 
the nurse and watched every given dose to the patient carefully. After that, if any error 
occurred, the researcher manually reordered this error by ticking the boxes for the error 
type in the data collection form. The data were transferred from the paper data 
collection forms to a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet which was double-checked by the 
researcher and another PhD student at the University of Reading.   
2.4.3 Qualitative data collection 
Two qualitative data collection techniques were applied in this research. Firstly, 
detailed observational notes were made by the researcher, in addition to the quantitative 
data collection, when making the observations on each ward. In addition, there were 
semi-structured interviews with nurses and pharmacists which were transcribed and the 
data analysed qualitatively. The aim of the qualitative analysis as a whole was to gain 
perspectives on the potential contributing factors leading to the key errors found 
through the observations. As well as categorising the ‘active failure’ category for each 
error, the qualitative work aimed to explore the wider work-related and organisational 
reasons behind MAE occurrences. 
2.4.3.1 Observational notes 
On each visit the researcher took notes about the ward setting (e.g. the environment), 
then, when the nurse started the administration round, the researcher recorded different 
contributory factors in the data collection form such as whether the nurse was 
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interrupted during administering the medications, or whether the ward was busy with 
another activity or not, the mode of administration used in the ward and any other 
contributing factor relating to MAEs. During the same time, notes were taken about 
every potential error in a note book, including the ward name, date, time and number of 
observation. Also, when the errors occurred, the researcher recorded the nurse’s 
behaviours or actions on administration e.g. nurse not give the medication deliberately 
or forget to give the medication, and if these changes related to any contributing factors. 
This helped to reflect more in-depth about the reasons and the contributory factors 
relating to these errors. There are no specific guidelines criteria or templates have been 
followed to record MAEs type and contributing factors. However, the researcher drew 
the MAEs type from one paper (Barber et al., 2009) and the idea of contributing factors 
from another (Cottney and Innes, 2015) which have been piloted as mentioned above 
(see Section 2.4.2.1). Moreover, there was sometimes conversation between the 
researcher and the nurse during the observation regarding some of the medication 
administration errors found; this was mostly instigated by the researcher. The 
conversation outcome gave the researcher greater confidence to justify the reasons 
behind those errors especially if nurses did not comply with the rules. Then further 
descriptive notes were made in relation to the observations. These notes focused on the 
context and explanations about how and why the errors happened. In this sense, the 
qualitative element of the work was in the spirit of ethnographic research described 
earlier. 
2.4.3.2 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews in this study were conducted with a total of 12 participants; 
eight nurses (three from community hospital wards, three psychiatric wards and two 
lead nurses) and four pharmacists. These were completed face-to-face, privately in a 
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meeting room at BHFT. In addition, all the interviews were audio-recorded with a 
digital audio-recorder and participants were asked for permissions to record the 
interviews for a more comprehensive data analysis. The interviews were kept 
confidential and used only for the purposes of this research study.  
The interviews were based on a very detailed and thorough interview schedule relating 
to the medication administration errors found during the observation period. During the 
interview, the researcher asked each participant to answer questions on their 
experiences and opinions about the reasons behind the MAEs (see Appendix 5). These 
recordings were stored on a memory stick in a locked cabinet accessible only by the 
researcher and his supervisor. Then, these recordings were transcribed by a 
transcription agency which is approved by the University of Reading; these transcripts 
were saved onto Microsoft Office Word documents. Finally, the researcher double-
checked the transcripts against the recordings and deleted any names or other 
information that might identify the interviewees. At the end of this study the digital 
recordings were deleted. 
2.5 Ethical issues 
This research primarily involves healthcare professionals working in BHFT who are 
involved in the medication administration or related processes on all wards. For this 
reason, the study received ethical approvals from the University of Reading’s Research 
Ethics Committee and ethical approval was not required by the BHFT Clinical Audit 
department, only an approval to run a service evaluation (see Appendix 6). The overall 
research risk was outlined and considered to be low. The potential risks for both types 
of research (quantitative and qualitative) together with risk management strategies are 
outlined in Table  2.5 and Table  2.6 below.  
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Table ‎2.5: Observation of nurses conducting medication administration rounds on wards 
Potential Issue Description of problem Risk management processes 
Anxiety or distress 
of being observed 
Participants may become anxious or 
distressed by the researcher observing 
their practice. 
Act professionally during observations and work with minimal intrusion so 
as to not provoke anxiety or distress in individuals. If individuals may 
become anxious or distressed they can ask for the observation to be halted / 
terminated. The information letter for the medication administration 
observations will state that individuals do not need to participate in the 
observation of their round if they do not wish to. The Information letter will 
explain the research and its intention as well as how they can withdraw from 
the study if they wish. 
Exploitation and 
undue pressure to 
participate 
Participants may feel pressurised into 
participating in research. 
 
Participants may make a mistake that is 
observed and noted and this may make 
them feel vulnerable.   
Participants will be formally invited via letter. They will be contacted via 
the ward manager and the pharmacist contact. If participants do not wish to 
take part, they will not be pressurised into doing so. 
The invitation letter will explain the research and its intention as well as the 
fact that all observations will be recorded according to date and time of 
ward round rather than recording any nurse details. If any medication 
administration errors are observed they will be dealt with according to the 
description in the next row. 
Risk of poor 
practice being 
identified and 
misrepresented 
Participants’ mistakes may be 
misrepresented or taken out of context 
by being reported to ward manager 
without their knowledge. 
 
Any medication administration error that is observed will be noted on the 
data collection sheet in the first place. The researcher making the 
observations is a pharmacist and will make a judgement about whether or 
not to intervene in the case of a potentially serious error (see next row). 
Otherwise, all data on medication administration errors will be collated and 
fed back anonymously to all staff concerned after the data collection periods 
so that general lessons can be learnt from the nature of mistakes made. 
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Potential Issue Description of problem Risk management processes 
Risk of potential 
harm to patient from 
a medication 
administration error  
Patients may be harmed if the 
researcher notices a medication 
administration error and does not 
intervene to alert the nurse making the 
error. 
The researcher making the observations will be trained to identify potential 
errors and briefed on the importance of stepping in, if necessary, in order to 
protect the patient. If such an issue arises, the researcher will check the 
details of the drug and the dose with the nurse before it is administered to 
the patient. If the nurse does not recognise or agree with the potential for 
error the researcher will ask to speak to the nurse, away from the patient and 
any nurse taking part in observations will be made aware of the fact that this 
is part of the remit of the researcher without wanting to apportion any 
blame. The nurse involved will be encouraged to report such an event as a 
near-miss error using the normal error recording processes. 
Risk of harm to 
researcher  
Researcher may be placed in an 
uncomfortable position when observing 
errors and communicating errors to 
nurses doing drug rounds if they do not 
receive the cooperation of the nurse 
when a potential error is identified. 
 
The researcher making the observations will be trained to use appropriate 
communication skills when speaking with nurses, using a stepped process. 
They will ask the nurse if they can speak privately to them away from the 
patient; the researcher will be trained to speak with confidence to clearly 
state their thoughts about a potential error without attribution of blame. If 
the nurse does not acknowledge the potential for an error or does not 
cooperate, the next step would be for the researcher to abandon the 
observation and seek the assistance of either the pharmacist contact or the 
academic supervisor. The researcher will therefore not be put in an 
awkward situation that necessitates continuing with the observation. 
Risk of harm to 
researcher  
Researcher may see and hear situations 
in the mental health ward that could be 
upsetting when observing a drug round. 
Researcher may encounter patients who 
may be depressed or distressed or 
aggressive towards hospital staff and/or 
the researcher. 
The researcher will be trained to recognise and remove himself/herself from 
potentially dangerous situations.  Regular debrief sessions will be held so 
that the researcher collecting data can talk about and share experiences with 
the pharmacist contact and academic supervisors. 
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Potential Issue Description of problem Risk management processes 
Anxiety or distress 
by patients with the 
researcher to present  
Patients may become anxious or 
distressed by the researcher observing 
the practice. 
The researcher will not observe the drug for this patient.  
 
Table ‎2.6: Interviews with nurses and pharmacists 
Potential Issue Description of problem Risk management processes 
Consent provided to participate 
in interviews 
Participation in interviews may be deemed not to be 
voluntary. Participants may feel that they must take 
part in interviews. 
Participants will be formally invited via a letter. 
They will be contacted again for follow up. If no 
response, no further contact. 
The letter will explain this element of the research 
and its intention as well as how they can access the 
final data before any publication. 
Content of interview questions Participants feel that the questions are not 
appropriate or they do not want to answer the 
questions posed due to the nature of the questions. 
If possible the interview schedule will be piloted 
with a small group of health professionals outside 
the study ward to ensure that the questions are being 
interpreted correctly and that they are appropriate.  
Anonymisation of information 
provided by nurses  
Participants do not want to be identified in results. The interview transcripts will be stored without 
including the identification of the persons who was 
interviewed. 
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2.5.1 Steps taken to ensure ethical practice 
The following were made clear in the information sheets provided to the participants. 
1. Taking part in this research was voluntary and the participants all had the right to 
withdraw their consent to participate at any time before, during or after the study 
without any penalty or repercussions.  
2. In terms of any interviews, the participants had the right not to answer any question 
that causes any disturbance to them and the researcher. In addition, unnecessary 
questions which could provoke anxiety or distress in individuals will be avoided. If 
individuals become anxious or distressed they can stop discussing the topic.  
3. Confidentiality and privacy was ensured for all participants and the information 
gathered only used for research purposes. 
4. All participants were provided with a consent form and information sheet (which 
included a detailed description of the nature of the study, why the research was being 
conducted, why they had been chosen to participate, and the nature of the questions that 
would be asked), and that the researcher would answer any question before the consent 
forms were formally signed. As well as that, all the participants had at least 24 hours to 
decide whether they wished to participate or not. 
5. A written consent form was obtained from all participants before each 
observation/interview which informed them of their right to withdraw from the study at 
any point. 
6. Participants were asked for their permission to record observation or audio-record 
any interviews. The researcher used a digital audio-recorder to record the interviews. 
The recordings were stored on a memory stick in a locked cabinet accessible only by 
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the researcher and his supervisor. Afterwards, transcripts were made from these records 
onto Microsoft Word documents without containing any names or information that 
might identify the participants. At the conclusion of the study the digital recordings will 
be deleted. 
7. Records of observations and transcripts that were made from the interview recording 
contained no names or other details that might identify the participant. Instead non-
identifiable codes were used and other identifiable information altered. 
8. To minimise misrepresentation, participants were provided with a copy of their 
interview transcript if requested and the researcher also offered to feedback the analysis 
to them before the findings are published. 
9. To avoid identification of participant by others by quotes in published research all 
information is anonymised to prevent association of participants to defined quotes. 
Non-identifiable codes were used and other identifiable information was altered. 
2.5.1.1 Handling of patients 
Before each patient received their medication, the nurse explained to the patient that a 
PhD researcher would be observing the nurse’s practice (and not the patient). If the 
patient showed signs of anxiety or distress or indeed disapproval then the researcher did 
not observe the medication administration for this patient. In addition, the researcher 
placed a notice on the ward explaining their presence for the purpose of observing 
medication administration on the ward when he was present (see Appendix 7). If there 
were any unsuitable or ‘at risk’ patients present on the ward, then the researcher took 
advice from the nurses about what to do – for example, whether to cancel the session 
altogether or to take steps to exclude dealings with the relevant patient.  
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The PhD researcher also wore a Pinpoint staff personal attack (PIT) alarm whilst on the 
wards which is easily activated in an emergency.  
2.5.1.2 Conversation with nurses about potential medication administration 
errors 
A participant information leaflet relating to the observations was passed on to all nurses 
before they were asked to consider consenting to take part in the observational study. 
These detailed how the researcher would interact with them if he thought that an error 
had been identified. Although it is quite possible that some errors might not potentially 
cause any patient harm (e.g. vitamin tablet given in the morning instead of lunchtime) 
and could be recorded by the researcher and then reported back after data collection, the 
more likely scenario was envisaged to be for the researcher to encounter a potential 
error that had the possibility of causing patient harm. In this case, it was important for 
the researcher to speak with the nurse being observed as soon as they suspected a 
potential error in terms of the medication selected by the nurse for administration to the 
patient (i.e. before it was given to the patient).  
The researcher did that by asking the nurse if they could please read out what the 
prescribed medication is (drug, dose and time of administration) to check their (the 
researcher’s) understanding of the prescription. If the researcher still believed that the 
wrong product may have been selected, and it did not become apparent to the nurse 
that, in the opinion of the researcher, there appeared to be a discrepancy between what 
they had selected for administration and what had been prescribed, then the researcher 
asked to speak with the nurse away from the patient to discuss with them that there may 
be a potential administration error. Clearly, identifying an error and having a 
conversation with the nurse about it, had the potential to impact on the rapport between 
Methodology                                                                                                  Chapter 2 
 
79 
 
the researcher and the nurse, but as explained in the information leaflet and consent 
form, the nurse had the right to end the observation at any point. 
2.5.2 Payment 
No money or payment otherwise was offered to nurses who were being observed during 
the normal medication administration rounds. Nurses and pharmacists taking part in 
interviews were offered a £10 Amazon vouchers if they agreed to participate in the 
study. The researcher took the decision to offer this amount based on the inconvenience 
participants face, as busy professionals, in giving up their lunch hour or other free time 
to participate in the research and it was believed, and agreed by the Ethics Review 
Committee, that this was reasonable to achieve the recruitment required. 
2.5.3 Data protection and confidentiality 
Confidentiality and privacy was ensured for all participants and the information 
gathered was only used for the scientific purpose of this study. Participants were asked 
for their permission to record observations of medication administration rounds or to 
record the interviews. The researcher used a digital audio-recorder to record the 
interviews. One copy of the recordings was stored on a memory stick in a locked 
cabinet in a secure office accessible only to the researcher and his supervisor. For the 
purpose of transcribing, a copy of the files was directed through a secure website to the 
transcription agency (which is a university-approved supplier of secure transcription 
services). Afterwards, transcripts were made from these records on Microsoft Office 
Word documents without containing any names or any information that might identify 
the participants. All the information was anonymised to prevent association of 
interviewees to defined quotes or specific individuals to mistakes made. As well as that, 
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non-identifiable codes were used throughout when coding for interviews. At the end of 
the study the audio-taped records will be deleted. 
2.5.4 Consent 
All participants received a pack that included an information sheet (inviting them to 
take part in the study and giving them full information about the study) (see Appendix 
8) and a consent form (see Appendix 9). The researcher worked with the ward manager 
to identify suitable timeslots for each week when the medication administration rounds 
were observed. By looking at the staff rota in advance and speaking with duty nurses, it 
was hoped that a sufficient number of nurses would consent to be observed, therefore, a 
letter was sent to wards managers to encourage their nurses to be involved in the study 
without undue coercion (see Appendix 10). 
In terms of the interviews, when an initial interest had been shown, the time and 
location of the interview was identified and agreed. For the interviews, the researcher 
explained verbally prior to each interview the study again to ensure that the participants 
understood everything in the information sheet. In addition, the researcher explained to 
all participants their rights to withdraw from the study at any point without any penalty 
and not to answer any question that caused any disturbance to them. All questions 
posed by potential participants (relating to the study) were answered prior to the start of 
the interviews. A written consent form was obtained before starting the observations, 
with each participant being given a copy of their signed consent form. 
2.6 Data analysis  
Data analysis for this research consisted of both quantitative and qualitative methods 
due to the data collection techniques employed; direct observation, observational notes 
(made by the researcher) and semi-structured interviews with nurses and pharmacists.  
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2.6.1 Observations: statistical data analysis (quantitative) 
During the observations, a previously-devised and printed data collection observation 
form was used in order to record the details of MAEs. After data collection, quantitative 
data (observations) were analysed by employing descriptive data analysis (e.g. the 
number of OEs, followed by the number of MAEs and the error rates) using Microsoft 
Office Excel. As well as that, inferential statistics was used to determine verifiable 
relationships between the number of errors found and a number of potential 
contributing factors using IBM SPSS (version 21). Microsoft Office Excel supports 
different chart formats, such as bar graphs and the generation of numerical tables which 
can be easier to read; meaning that the data was also described by using numbers and 
percentages, as well as visually presented, to provide an overview and add depth to the 
findings. One of the distinct features of inferential statistics is that it allows the 
researcher to decipher whether any statically significant relationships exist. These are 
discussed in terms of the details of the modelling used to examine the MAEs in  Chapter 
3 (Section 3.3).  
The medication administration errors were divided into procedural errors and clinical 
errors. The ‘Procedural errors’ is failure to follow the medication administration 
procedure that includes expiry errors, given but unsigned errors, and other reason 
errors. The ‘Clinical errors’ are any other errors in conduct or judgement in the clinical 
environment that include extra dose errors, formulation errors, almost not given errors, 
omitted and unsigned errors, omitted but signed, un-prescribed drug errors, wrong dose 
errors, and wrong time errors. In this thesis, these two types were separated to acquire 
more accurate results, in order to increase the quality of the data findings, whereas the 
combination between the two types might illustrate inaccurate findings.   
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In addition, after the MAEs were recorded the potential for harm from these was judged 
and rated by the researcher, and one of the Trust clinical pharmacists using inter-rater 
reliability (Haw and Cahill, 2011). The researcher gathered the 367 error cases 
including the notes of how those errors happened, then, the first 20 medication error 
cases were rated by the researcher and a copy was sent separately to the clinical 
pharmacist. After that, the researcher and the clinical pharmacist met to check the 
results and to calculate their agreement rating which was 60% matched cases and 40% 
was not. This might be due to different experiences of the researcher and the clinical 
pharmacist as some errors appeared potentially harm for one and not for the other. 
Differences of judgment between healthcare professionals might happen and can be 
resolved through discussion (Chua et al., 2010). As a result, the researcher and the 
pharmacist completed an analysis of harm for the rest of the 367 error cases after 
agreeing the rating process and discussing the differences then arranged for a second 
meeting to compare and agree on all the rated results. 
2.6.2 Observation notes and interviews: data analysis (qualitative) 
Qualitative research analysis contained three stages; first, defining the data (for 
example, interviews or observation), second, organising the collected data by the 
researcher which is also known as the coding process and the final stage which was 
writing the report (Miles et al., 2013). 
In this study, the qualitative approach was adopted while analysing the observation 
notes and the transcripts of the semi-structured interviews. The researcher applied the 
organisational accident causation model (Taylor-Adams and Vincent, 2004) (see 
Figure  2.3), and the framework developed by Vincent et al. (1998) (see Table  2.1). Both 
are adapted from James Reason’s model of organisational accidents (Reason, 1997). 
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The model is useful to manage the data from the observational notes and nurses and 
pharmacists’ interview transcripts. By using this framework, the researcher started to be 
familiarised with the data and gain a sense to divide them into sections and classifying 
the data into frequent codes and categories. This was completed by highlighting a 
section of the data and coding with labels from the framework which were then 
categorised in more detail. Thematic analysis was carried out in the qualitative data 
where the themes form: recurrent topics, ideas or statements identified across the corpus 
of data. Also, the thematic analysis allows these themes to be mapped against a 
theoretical framework within a deductive approach. 
To begin with the observational notes, the data were transcribed from the researcher’s 
notebook to a Microsoft Office Word document, where these were divided according to 
the ward name that was involved where an error was found on the relevant visit (see 
Appendix 11).  
The researcher’s notes (labelled as quotes) were organised in relation to the mode of 
administration under each type of error; these quotes were then categorised to an active 
failure category i.e. slips, lapses, violations, mistakes etc. Following this, the error-
producing conditions and latent conditions were categorised according to the 
researcher’s perception in relation to the administration round and wards setting at the 
time. The medication administration errors were divided into procedural errors and 
clinical errors.  
Furthermore, collected data from the semi-structured interviews for the nurses and the 
pharmacists were analysed in a similar way in relation to the adopted framework. The 
nurses’ and pharmacists’ quotes were organised in relation to the type of error. These 
quotes were classified according to the nurses and pharmacists’ point of view about the 
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reasons behind these errors. Next, the quotes were categorised into an active failure 
category i.e. slips, lapses, violations, mistakes etc., followed by the error-producing 
condition and latent condition.  
The observational notes and interviews analysis examples are provided in (Appendix 
12). The codes and categories will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 (see 
Table  4.3 and Table  4.4). All data were compared and contrasted the opinions of the 
researcher, nurses and pharmacists about specific errors. 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter has described in detail the overall research design and the methodology 
used in this research study. Also, the methods of data collection in this thesis have been 
presented in relation to the literature, pointing out the advantages and disadvantages 
from using these methods. Subsequently, the methods of data collection were described 
in terms of the observational notes and semi-structured interviews.  In this chapter, the 
qualitative, quantitative and mixed-method approaches were identified. In this study, 
the mixed-method approach was adopted to offer a synergistic way of examining the 
MAEs. Finally, the findings and analysis of the observations and interviews will be 
explicated and discussed in detail in the next chapters. 
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Chapter 3 Quantitative Findings 
3.1  Findings from the ward observations 
After receiving approvals from the University of Reading’s Research Ethics Committee 
and the Trust’s Clinical Audit department, the observation of medication administration 
rounds commenced on 6
th
 July 2015 and continued to 15
th
 October 2015. Nurses who 
administered medication during scheduled ward rounds were observed in both 
psychiatric and community hospital wards at the study site according to a pre-
constructed ward rota (see Appendix 3). The rota had been devised to take account of 
different observation times (e.g. 08:00, 12:00, etc.), and days of the week to ensure an 
even spread across these factors. In addition, the rota had been devised such that one 
ward was not observed on sequential days, but rather that the observations were 
deliberately dispersed across the observation period for maximum variability. 
During the observations, previously-devised and printed data collection forms were 
used in order to record the detail of MAEs that were noted and any potential 
contributing factors (see Appendix 4). As well as that, detailed descriptive notes were 
made in relation to the observations. These added further context and explanations 
about the setting and practices observed. 
This chapter focuses on presenting the entire data in relation to the ward observations 
from a quantitative perspective. To provide an overview; the data recorded on the MAE 
observation forms were analysed quantitatively by employing descriptive as well as 
inferential statistics, using Microsoft Office Excel as well as SPSS (see Figure  3.1). The 
descriptive statistics detail, for example the total number and average of OEs, followed 
by the number of MAEs and the total and mean error rates. The inferential analysis, 
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using SPSS, examines statistically verifiable relationships between the number of errors 
found and number of potential contributing factors. 
 
Figure ‎3.1: Data Analysis – an overview 
 
3.2 Descriptive analysis of the data 
A total of 65 separate observations were made by the researcher covering all 19 of the 
wards at the study site. Of these 65 observations, 19 were made in the morning (08:00), 
16 at lunchtime (12:00), 15 in the evening (18:00) and 15 at night (22:00). From the day 
of the week perspective there were 14 observations on a Monday, 15 on a Tuesday, 14 
on a Wednesday, 14 on a Thursday and 8 on a Friday. Over the time span of the study 
there were 19 observations made in July, 19 in August, 18 in September and 9 in 
October. Each of the 19 wards was observed at least twice with the median number of 
observations being 3. Thirty five of the 65 observations were in psychiatric wards and 
30 in community hospital wards. Therefore it can be concluded that there was a 
reasonable spread of observations according to these categories. 
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The number of patients who received their medications during the observed 
administration rounds totalled 673; although some patients would have been observed 
more than once. Because no patient identifiers were recorded (purposefully) to keep 
data fully anonymised, it is not possible to know how many distinct patients were 
observed. In the same vein, no identifiable record of the nurses being observed was 
made apart from a note of their gender and work grade where (bands grade are related 
to permanent nurse staff, and the bank and agency status are related to non-permanent 
nurse staff). This was so that the performance of individual nurses could not be tracked, 
which was a condition of the ethical approval and detailed in the consent forms. 
Therefore, from a statistical standpoint, 65 different nurses were observed during the 
study; 42 observations (1390 OEs) were of nurse with  band 5 grade, 8 observations 
(416 OEs) of band 6, 1 observation (46 OEs) of bank nurses and 14 observations (385 
OEs) for agency nurses (Table  3.19 and Table  3.20). For band 5 nurses 12 were 
observed at 08:00, 10 at 12:00, 7 at 18:00 and 13 at 22:00. And, in band 6 nurses 3 were 
observed at 08:00, 2 at 12:00, 2 at 18:00, and 1 at 22:00. Whereas, in bank nurse 1 was 
observed at 18:00, and in agency nurses 4 were observed at 08:00, 4 at 12:00, 5 at 
18:00, and 1 observed at 22:00.  
In total, 2237 OEs were recorded and a total of 367 MAEs were observed when the 
WTEs were included in the MAE count, giving a total error rate of 16.4%. The number 
of MAEs observed when excluding WTEs was 320, giving a 14% error rate. On the 
other hand, when the number of errors was separated to procedural errors and clinical 
errors, the clinical error rate was 7.7%. Of the 367 MAEs, 67 were blank boxes; of 
these, 49 blank boxes were omitted medicines where the administration box was 
unsigned, and 18 were instances were medicines were given but the administration box 
was unsigned. The detail of the MAEs is described more fully in (Section 3.2.2). 
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3.2.1 The OEs observed, the MAE numbers and the error rates 
Different variables of interest such as type of wards, ward round time and ward round 
day, etc. were considered to be best represented in relation to OEs observed, numbers of 
MAEs and MAE rate individually. The total MAE rate found for each category was 
calculated from the total OEs and the number of MAEs. However, the calculated mean 
(average) and the median of OEs and error rate depend on the number of observation 
visits as well as the standard deviation (S.D) was presented. Also, box plot and 
ANOVA test were used for the validity of these findings. 
3.2.1.1 CHWs versus PWs  
It was found that the number of OEs observed and the average OEs in community 
hospital wards (CHWs) were more than the number and the average of the OEs 
observed in psychiatric wards (PWs), however, the error rate and the mean error rate 
were similar across the two settings as shown in Table  3.1 and Table  3.2. This means 
that while there were more instances of medication given within a community ward 
setting, the error rate across the two settings were in fact similar as described below.  
Table ‎3.1: The total OEs observed according to ward type as well as the number of MAEs and 
the error rate 
Ward type Total OEs No. of MAEs Total‎MAE‎rate‎%† 
Community hospital wards (CHWs) 1249 217 17.4% 
Psychiatric wards (PWs) 988 150 15.2% 
 †
percentage error rate calculated as a percentage of total OEs for that ward type 
 
 
Table ‎3.2: The average OEs observed, the mean error rate according to ward type as well as 
their standard deviation 
Ward type 
No. of observation 
visits 
Average 
OEs
a
 
S.D 
Mean error 
rate %
b
 
S.D 
Community hospital wards 
(CHWs) 
30 41.6 24.2 18% 11.2 
Psychiatric wards (PWs) 35 28.2 21.4 17.8% 11.7 
 a
calculated as total
 
OEs for each visit/no. of observation visits.
  b
percentage mean error rate calculated as 
a total percentage of error rate for each visit for that ward type/no. of observation visits 
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The difference in terms of the OEs is shown graphically as median values and ranges in 
Figure  3.2. Statistically, the number of OEs were significantly greater in CHWs 
compared to PWs (p-value <0.05) as tested using ANOVA (univariate analysis of 
variance) pairwise comparisons shown in Table  3.3. 
 
Figure ‎3.2: Box plot for the OEs shown against ward type. 
The PWs have a median 19 OEs (range 6-81) and CHWs 37.5 OEs (range 15-109). 
 
 
Table  3.3: The ANOVA pairwise comparisons for the total OEs observed at ward type 
Dependent variable: OEs 
(I) Ward 
type 
(J) Ward 
type 
Mean difference 
(I-J) 
S.E. p-value 95% CI for difference 
Lower bound Upper bound 
CHW PW 13.405
*
 5.657 .021 2.101 24.709 
PW CHW -13.405
*
 5.657 .021 -24.709 -2.101 
 
The error rates however were similar in CHWs versus PWs, as alluded to above. This 
can be seen in Figure  3.3 and is demonstrated further in Table  3.4. The percentage of 
errors observed was not statistically significant in CHWs when compared to PWs.  
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Figure ‎3.3: Box plot for error rate shown against ward type. 
The PWs have median 16.7% errors (range 0-46.7) and CHWs 16.9% errors (range 2-43.8). 
 
 
Table  3.4: The ANOVA pairwise comparisons for the % errors observed at ward type 
    Dependent variable:   % MAEs observed 
(I) Ward 
type 
(J) Ward 
type 
Mean 
difference (I-J) 
S.E. p-value 95% CI for difference 
Lower bound Upper bound 
CHW PW .167 2.855 .954 -5.539 5.873 
PW CHW -.167 2.855 .954 -5.873 5.539 
 
3.2.1.2 Hospital ward codename 
The hospital ward codename and the total OEs observed for each ward are shown in 
Table  3.5. The highest OEs observed were in community hospital ward 9 (CHW9) with 
251 OEs, followed by CHW2 with 191 OEs, then psychiatric ward 9 (PW9) with 188 
OEs. The lowest OEs observed were in PW1 with 30 OEs and slightly higher OEs 
observed in PW3 and PW5.  
Table  3.5 also shows the number of MAEs observed for each ward and therefore the 
error rates at ward level. It becomes apparent, looking at Table  3.5 that the error rate 
was much higher for certain wards such as CHW1 (31.3%), PW8 (26.2%), PW3 
(25.6%) and CHW2 (25.1%), compared to, say, PW1 (3.3%), PW10 (8.9%), CHW6 
(9.1%) and CHW7 (10.3%). On the other hand, Table  3.6 shows the highest average 
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OEs was in CHW9 (62.8) followed by CHW3 and CHW2 (58.3 and 47.8 respectively). 
The lowest average OEs was in PW3 and PW5.  
In addition, the mean error rate was higher for certain wards such as PW8 (30.8%), 
CHW1 (25.3%), PW3 (25.3%) and CHW2 (25%) compared to PW1 (3.9%), PW10 
(7.7%), and CHW6 (8.7%). Furthermore, Figure  3.4 illustrates the median values and 
ranges of OEs observed in hospital wards, and Figure  3.5 clarify the median values and 
ranges of error rate in hospital wards.  
Table ‎3.5: The total OEs observed according to hospital wards as well as the number of MAEs 
and the error rate arranged in increasing order of OEs 
Wards Mode of Administration Total OEs 
No. of 
MAEs 
Total MAE 
rate‎%† 
(PW1) 
Bedside-prepared in clinic 
room 
30 1 3.3% 
(PW3) 
Bedside-prepared in clinic 
room 
39 10 25.6% 
(PW5) 
Bedside-prepared in clinic 
room 
39 7 17.9% 
(PW10) 
Bedside-prepared in clinic 
room 
56 5 8.9% 
(CHW7) Bedside-trolley 87 9 10.3% 
(CHW1) Bedside-patient lockers 96 30 31.3% 
(CHW8) Bedside-patient lockers 97 16 16.5% 
(PW4) Queue 98 12 12.2% 
(CHW6) Bedside-trolley 99 9 9.1% 
(PW8) 
Bedside-prepared in clinic 
room 
107 28 26.2% 
(CHW4) Bedside-patient lockers 124 24 19.4% 
(PW7) Queue 126 16 12.7% 
(CHW5) Bedside-trolley 129 24 18.6% 
(PW2) Mixed and queue 132 (19,113) 15 11.4% 
(PW6) 
Bedside-prepared in clinic 
room and mixed 
173 (81,92) 31 17.9% 
(CHW3) Bedside-trolley 175 20 11.4% 
(PW9) Queue 188 25 13.3% 
(CHW2) Bedside-patient lockers 191 48 25.1% 
(CHW9) Bedside-patient lockers 251 37 14.7% 
†
percentage error rate calculated as a percentage of total OEs for that hospital ward 
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Table ‎3.6: The average OEs observed, mean error rate according to hospital wards as well as 
their standard deviation 
Wards 
No. of observation visits (no. 
patients and whether Morning, 
Lunch, Evening, Night) 
Average 
OEs
a
 
S.D 
Mean 
error rate 
%
b
 
S.D 
(PW1) 2 (6M, 5M) 15 1.4 3.6% 5.1 
(PW3) 3 (8M,3L, 3E) 13 12.1 25.3% 8.4 
(PW5) 3 (5M, 4E,4N) 13 8.7 18% 4 
(PW10) 3 (12M, 6L, 7E) 18.7 13.6 7.7% 7.2 
(CHW7) 3 (8L, 10E, 12N) 29 9.8 11.2% 5.2 
(CHW1) 3 (9M, 7L, 8N) 32 19.7 25.3% 17 
(CHW8) 3 (6M, 9L, 11N) 32.3 11.2 17.9% 6.2 
(PW4) 4 (13M, 7L, 8E,23N) 24.5 20 15.4% 8.5 
(CHW6) 3 (6M, 9L, 12N) 33 4.6 8.7% 4.9 
(PW8) 4 (6M, 7L, 5E, 14N) 26.8 13.9 30.8% 14.3 
(CHW4) 4 (9M, 8L, 4E, 11N) 31 20.2 21.2% 15.8 
(PW7) 4 (15M, 6L, 6E, 17N) 31.5 19.4 14.2% 11 
(CHW5) 3 (6M, 12E, 10N) 43 13.7 21.4 15.2 
(PW2) 4 (17M, 9L, 8E, 20N) 33 23.3 13.2% 6.6 
(PW6) 4 (16M, 5L, 15E, 17N) 43.3 31.2 22.5% 11 
(CHW3) 3 (14M, 9L, 14E) 58.3 43.8 15.2% 8.5 
(PW9) 4 (22M, 13L, 12E, 27N) 47 30.2 19.8% 16.9 
(CHW2) 4 (12M, 10L, 9E, 12N) 47.8 30.9 25% 8.7 
(CHW9) 4 (13M, 14L, 14E, 14N) 62.8 31.6 14% 11.2 
a
calculated as total
 
OEs for each visit/no. of observation visits.
 b
percentage mean error rate calculated as a 
total percentage of error rate for each visit for that hospital ward/no. of observation visits 
 
 
Figure ‎3.4: Box plot for the OEs shown against hospital ward code names. 
The PW1 have a median 15 OEs (range 14-16), PW3 6 OEs (6-27), PW5 9 OEs (7-23), PW10 
14 OEs (8-34), CHW7 32 OEs (18-37), CHW1 26 OEs (16-54), CHW8 35 OEs (20-42), PW4 
20 OEs (8-50), CHW6 32 OEs (29-38), PW8 25 OEs (15-42), CHW4 25.5 OEs (15-58), PW7 
31.5 OEs (12-51),  CHW5 40 OEs (31-58), PW2 31.5 OEs (9-60), PW6 42 OEs (8-81), CHW3 
46 OEs (22-107), PW9 47 OEs (18-76), CHW2 39.5 OEs (20-92) and CHW9 52 OEs (38-109). 
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Figure ‎3.5: Box plot for error rate shown against hospital ward code names. 
The PW1 have a median 3.6% errors (range 0-7.1), PW3 25.9% errors (16.7-33.3), PW5 17.4% 
errors (14.3-22.2), PW10 8.8% errors (0-14.3), CHW7 10.8% errors (6.3-16.7), CHW1 30.8% 
errors (6.3-38.9), CHW8 14.3% errors (14.3-25), PW4 15.2% errors (6-25), CHW6 9.4% errors 
(3.4-13.2), PW8 32.4% errors (11.9-46.7), CHW4 17.2% errors (6.7-43.8), PW7 13.9% errors 
(3.9-25),  CHW5 15% errors (10.3-38.7), PW2 11.9% errors (6.8-22.2), PW6 20.5% errors 
(11.3-37.5), CHW3 18.2% errors (5.6-21.7), PW9 13.3% errors (7.9-44.4), CHW2 23.9% errors 
(17.1-35) and CHW9 13.8% errors (2-26.3). 
 
3.2.1.3 Wards administration round time 
Table  3.7 shows the total OEs observed according to each ward administration round 
time, the number of MAEs and the respective error rate. It demonstrates that most of 
OEs observed were at morning rounds 08:00 with 957 OEs, and night rounds 22:00 
with 627 OEs. The average OEs was higher for 08:00 with (50.4) and at 22:00 with 
(41.8) as shown in Table  3.8. This is graphically illustrated in Figure 3.6 showing the 
median values and ranges. 
Table ‎3.7: The total OEs observed at each ward round time as well as the number of MAEs and 
the error rate 
Time observed Total OEs No. of MAEs Total MAE rate%
† 
08:00 (morning) 957 175 18.3% 
12:00 (lunchtime) 273 60 21.9% 
18:00 (evening) 380 59 15.5% 
22:00 (night time)  627 73 11.6% 
†
percentage error rate calculated as a percentage of total OEs for that time point 
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Table  3.8: The average OEs observed, mean error rate at each ward round time as well as their 
standard deviation 
Time observed 
No. of 
observation visits 
Average 
OEs
a
 
S.D 
Mean error 
rate%
b S.D 
08:00 (morning) 19 50.4 29.2 18% 11.1 
12:00 (lunchtime) 16 17.1 8.9 22% 12.3 
18:00 (evening) 15 25.3 16.6 18% 13.2 
22:00 (night time)  15 41.8 15.4 13% 6.8 
a
calculated as total
 
OEs for each visit/no. of observation visits.
  b
percentage mean error rate calculated as 
a total percentage of error rate for each visit for that time point/no. of observation visits
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3.6: Box plot for the OEs shown against observation time. 
The morning rounds have a median 42 OEs (range 14-109), lunchtime rounds 16 OEs (range 6-
38), evening rounds 18 OEs (range 6-58) and night rounds 40 OEs (range 7-70). 
 
Statistically, the number of OEs were significantly greater during the morning round 
compared to the lunchtime (p-value <0.001) and evening (p-value =0.001) rounds as 
tested using ANOVA (univariate analysis of variance) pairwise comparisons 
(Table  3.9). The number of OEs were significantly greater during the night time round 
compared to the lunchtime (p-value =0.001) and evening (p-value <0.05) rounds.  
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Table  3.9: The ANOVA pairwise comparisons for the total OEs observed at each ward round 
time 
Dependent variables: OEs  
 (I) Medication 
round time 
(J) Medication 
round time 
Mean 
difference (I-
J) 
S.E. p-value 95% CI for difference 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
 8:00 
12:00 33.306
*
 6.696 .000 19.916 46.696 
18:00 25.035
*
 6.816 .001 11.405 38.665 
22:00 8.568 6.816 .214 -5.062 22.198 
 12:00 
8:00 -33.306
*
 6.696 .000 -46.696 -19.916 
18:00 -8.271 7.093 .248 -22.453 5.912 
22:00 -24.738
*
 7.093 .001 -38.920 -10.555 
 18:00 
8:00 -25.035
*
 6.816 .001 -38.665 -11.405 
12:00 8.271 7.093 .248 -5.912 22.453 
-2.057 22:00 -16.467
*
 7.206 .026 -30.876 
 22:00 
8:00 -8.568 6.816 .214 -22.198 5.062 
12:00 24.738
*
 7.093 .001 10.555 38.920 
18:00 16.467
*
 7.206 .026 2.057 30.876 
 
Despite seeing the least number of OEs during the lunchtime round, the highest error 
rate (21.9%) was observed during these rounds. The lowest error rate (11.6%) was 
found in the night rounds. Similarly, the mean error rate was higher for 12:00 (22%) 
and the lower mean error was at 22:00 with (13%) Table  3.7 and Table  3.8. Further 
illustrates in Table  3.10 and Figure  3.7. The percentage of errors observed were 
significantly higher during the lunch round time only when compared to the night round 
time (p-value <0.05).  
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Table  3.10: The ANOVA pairwise comparisons for the % errors observed at each ward round 
time 
Dependent variable: % MAEs observed  
(I) Medication 
round time 
(J) Medication 
round time 
Mean 
difference (I-
J) 
S.E. p-value 95% CI for difference 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
 8:00 
12:00 -4.438 3.772 .244 -11.980 3.105 
18:00 -.200 3.840 .959 -7.878 7.478 
22:00 5.600 3.840 .150 -2.078 13.278 
 12:00 
8:00 4.438 3.772 .244 -3.105 11.980 
18:00 4.238 3.995 .293 -3.751 12.226 
22:00 10.038
*
 3.995 .015 2.049 18.026 
 18:00 
8:00 .200 3.840 .959 -7.478 7.878 
12:00 -4.238 3.995 .293 -12.226 3.751 
22:00 5.800 4.059 .158 -2.317 13.917 
 22:00 
8:00 -5.600 3.840 .150 -13.278 2.078 
12:00 -10.038
*
 3.995 .015 -18.026 -2.049 
18:00 -5.800 4.059 .158 -13.917 2.317 
 
 
 
Figure  3.7: Box plot for error rate shown against observation time. 
The morning rounds have median 17% errors (range 0-39), lunchtime rounds 24% errors (range 
0-44), evening rounds 17% errors (range 2-47) and night rounds 12% errors (range 3-31). 
 
To summarise, the above analysis indicates that while there were more OEs in the 
morning and night time round, in fact the error rate was greater during the lunchtime 
round.  
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3.2.1.4 Wards administration round day 
The total OEs and average OEs observed and the total error rate and mean error rate 
according to the day of the week are shown in Table  3.11 and Table  3.12. This is 
graphically illustrated in Figure  3.8 which shows the data range. Figure  3.9 illustrates 
the error rate ranges according to OEs. 
Table ‎3.11: The total OEs observed at each ward round day as well as the number of MAEs and 
the error rate 
Day observed Total OEs No. of MAEs Total MAE rate %
†
 
Monday 473 93 19.7% 
Tuesday 511 90 17.6% 
Wednesday 462 78 16.9% 
Thursday 532 63 11.8% 
Friday 259 43 16.6% 
†
percentage error rate calculated as a percentage of total OEs for that day point 
 
 
Table  3.12: The average OEs observed, mean error rate at each ward round day as well as their 
standard deviation 
Day observed 
 
No. of 
observation 
visits 
Average 
OEs
a
 
S.D 
Mean error 
rate%
b
 
S.D 
Monday 14 33.8 26.5 19.3% 11.6 
Tuesday 15 34.1 24.9 17.7% 12.2 
Wednesday 14 33 22 18.9% 13.5 
Thursday 14 38 26 16.2% 9.9 
Friday 8 32.4 18.1 17% 10.2 
a
calculated as
 
total
 
OEs for each visit/no. of observation visits.
  b
percentage mean error rate calculated as 
a total percentage of error rate for each visit for that day point/no. of observation visits
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Figure ‎3.8: Box plot for the OEs shown against observation weekday. 
Monday rounds have a median 23.5 OEs (range 8-109), Tuesday rounds 26 OEs (range 7-92), 
Wednesday rounds 26 OEs (range 9-81), Thursday rounds 36.5 OEs (range 6-107) and Friday 
31.5 OEs (range 6-58). 
 
Figure ‎3.9: Box plot for error rates shown against observation weekday. 
Monday rounds have median 15.8% errors (range 5.6-44.2), Tuesday rounds 16.7% errors 
(range 0-46.7), Wednesday rounds 18.5% errors (range 0-43.8), Thursday rounds 13.7% errors 
(range 3.9-37.5) and Friday 15.5% errors (range 6-38.7). 
 
Table  3.13 demonstrates that the comparison between the number of OEs at each day 
observed were not statistically significant. Also, Table  3.14 shows that error rate 
observed was not statistically significant when compared between the different days of 
the week.    
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Table  3.13: The ANOVA pairwise comparisons for the total OEs observed at each day of week 
Dependent variable: OEs 
(I) Day of 
week 
(J) Day of 
week 
Mean difference 
(I-J) 
S.E. p-value 95% CI for difference 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Monday 
Tuesday -.281 9.003 .975 -18.290 17.728 
Wednesday .786 9.157 .932 -17.531 19.102 
Thursday -4.214 9.157 .647 -22.531 14.102 
Friday 1.411 10.738 .896 -20.068 22.889 
Tuesday 
Monday .281 9.003 .975 -17.728 18.290 
Wednesday 1.067 9.003 .906 -16.942 19.076 
Thursday -3.933 9.003 .664 -21.942 14.076 
Friday 1.692 10.607 .874 -19.525 22.908 
Wednesday 
Monday -.786 9.157 .932 -19.102 17.531 
Tuesday -1.067 9.003 .906 -19.076 16.942 
Thursday -5.000 9.157 .587 -23.317 13.317 
Friday .625 10.738 .954 -20.853 22.103 
Thursday 
Monday 4.214 9.157 .647 -14.102 22.531 
Tuesday 3.933 9.003 .664 -14.076 21.942 
Wednesday 5.000 9.157 .587 -13.317 23.317 
Friday 5.625 10.738 .602 -15.853 27.103 
Friday 
Monday -1.411 10.738 .896 -22.889 20.068 
Tuesday -1.692 10.607 .874 -22.908 19.525 
Wednesday -.625 10.738 .954 -22.103 20.853 
Thursday -5.625 10.738 .602 -27.103 15.853 
 
Table  3.14: The ANOVA pairwise comparisons for the % errors observed at each day of week 
Dependent variable: % MAEs observed  
(I) Day of 
week 
(J) Day of 
week 
Mean 
difference (I-J) 
S.E. p-value 95% CI for difference 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Monday 
Tuesday 1.593 4.346 .715 -7.101 10.287 
Wednesday .429 4.421 .923 -8.414 9.271 
Thursday 3.114 4.421 .484 -5.728 11.957 
Friday 2.300 5.184 .659 -8.069 12.669 
Tuesday 
Monday -1.593 4.346 .715 -10.287 7.101 
Wednesday -1.165 4.346 .790 -9.859 7.529 
Thursday 1.521 4.346 .728 -7.173 10.215 
Friday .707 5.120 .891 -9.536 10.949 
Wednesday 
Monday -.429 4.421 .923 -9.271 8.414 
Tuesday 1.165 4.346 .790 -7.529 9.859 
Thursday 2.686 4.421 .546 -6.157 11.528 
Friday 1.871 5.184 .719 -8.497 12.240 
Thursday 
Monday -3.114 4.421 .484 -11.957 5.728 
Tuesday -1.521 4.346 .728 -10.215 7.173 
Wednesday -2.686 4.421 .546 -11.528 6.157 
Friday -.814 5.184 .876 -11.183 9.555 
Friday 
Monday -2.300 5.184 .659 -12.669 8.069 
Tuesday -.707 5.120 .891 -10.949 9.536 
Wednesday -1.871 5.184 .719 -12.240 8.497 
Thursday .814 5.184 .876 -9.555 11.183 
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3.2.1.5 Gender of the nurse staff 
The gender of the staff member being observed was recorded during the observations. 
Table  3.15 shows the total OEs observed according to gender of staff as well as the 
number of MAEs and the error rate. It can be seen that OEs observed with female 
nurses were far higher (1774) than the OEs observed with male nurses (463). However, 
the average OEs was slightly higher with female nurses as shown in Table 3.16. This is 
also indicated in Figure  3.10. Further results are shown in Table  3.17 where the number 
of OEs observed with female staff was not statistically significant compared to male 
staff.  
Table ‎3.15: The total OEs observed according to gender of nurse as well as the number of 
MAEs and the error rate 
The gender of staff Total OEs No. of MAEs Total MAE rate %
†
 
Male 463 74 15.9% 
Female 1774 293 16.5% 
†
percentage error rate calculated as a percentage of total OEs for that gender  
 
 
Table ‎3.16: The average OEs observed, the mean error rate according to gender of nurse as well 
as their standard deviation 
The gender of 
staff 
No. of 
observation 
visits 
Average 
OEs
a
 
S.D 
Mean error 
rate%
b
 
S.D 
Male 16 28.9 20 17.1% 14 
Female 49 36.2 24.5 18.1% 10.5 
a
calculated as
 
total
 
OEs for each observation visit/no. of observation visits. 
b
percentage mean error rate 
calculated as a total percentage of error rate for each observation visit for that gender point/no. of 
observation visits
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Table  3.17: The ANOVA pairwise comparisons for the total OEs observed for nurse gender 
Dependent variable: OEs 
(I) Nurse  
gender 
(J) Nurse 
gender 
Mean difference 
(I-J) 
S.E. p-value 95% CI for difference 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Female Male 7.267 6.770 .287 -6.262 20.796 
Male Female -7.267 6.770 .287 -20.796 6.262 
 
From Table  3.15 and Table  3.16 the total error rate and the mean error rate against 
gender of nurse staff were almost the same between male and female which is presents 
in Figure  3.11. Likewise, Table  3.18 indicates the percentage of errors observed was not 
significantly with female nurse when compared with male nurses.  
 
Figure ‎3.11: Box plot for error rate observed according to gender of nurse staff. 
Males have a median 14.3% error (range 0-46.7) and female 17.1% errors (range 2-43.8). 
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
Male Female
%
 M
A
E
s 
o
b
se
rv
ed
 
Gender of nurses observed 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Male Female
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
O
E
s 
Gender of nurses observed 
Figure  3.10: Box plot for the OEs observed according to gender of nurse staff.  
Males have a median 21 OEs (range 7-76) and female 32 OEs (range 6-109) 
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Table  3.18: The ANOVA pairwise comparisons for the % errors observed for nurse gender 
Dependent variable: % MAEs observed  
(I) Nurse  
gender 
(J) Nurse 
gender 
Mean difference 
(I-J) 
S.E. p-value 95% CI for difference 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Female Male 1.043 3.302 .753 -5.555 7.641 
Male Female -1.043 3.302 .753 -7.641 5.555 
 
3.2.1.6 Nurse staff grade or status 
In relation to the staff grade, most OEs were observed when shadowing band 5 nurses 
then band 6 nurses, and the lowest OEs were with bank nurses (Table  3.19). On the 
other hand, Table  3.20 shows the average OEs was higher in band 6 nurses with (52) 
OEs, then bank nurses (46) and lower for agency nurses (27.5), which is demonstrates 
also in Figure  3.12. Applying the ANOVA test, it can be seen from Table  3.21 that the 
number of OEs observed were significantly greater with band 6 nurses compared to 
band 5 nurses (p-value <0.05) and agency nurses (p-value <0.05). Table  3.22 shows the 
average OEs observed, according to grade or status of nurse staff as well as the mean 
error rate in CHWs, and Table  3.23 illustrates the average OEs observed, according to 
grade or status of nurse staff as well as the mean error rate in PWs.  
Table ‎3.19: The total OEs observed according to grade or status of nurse staff as well as the 
number of MAEs and the error rate 
Grade or status of staff Total OEs No. of MAEs Total MAE rate %
†
 
Band 5 1390 228 16.4% 
Band 6 416 52 12.5% 
Bank 46 10 21.7% 
Agency 385 77 20% 
†
percentage error rate calculated as a percentage of total OEs for that grade point 
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Table ‎3.20: The average OEs observed, the mean error rate according to grade or status of nurse 
staff as well as their standard deviation  
Grade or status of 
staff 
No. of 
observation 
visits 
Average 
OEs
a
 
S.D 
Mean error 
rate%
b
 
S.D 
Band 5 42 33.1 20.7 18.5% 11.2 
Band 6 8 52 30.9 14.7% 12.2 
Bank 1 46 - 21.7% - 
Agency 14 27.5 24.6 17.5% 12.4 
a
calculated as
 
total
 
OEs for each observation visit/no. of observation visits. 
b
percentage mean error rate 
calculated as a total percentage of error rate for each observation visit for that grade point/no. of 
observation visits 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3.12: Box plot for the OEs shown against nurse grade or status.  
Band 5 nurses have a median 31.5 OEs (range 6-109), Band 6 51.5 OEs (range 16-107), Bank 
46 OEs with no range (observed once), and Agency 16 OEs (range 6-92). 
 
Table  3.21: The ANOVA pairwise comparisons for the total OEs observed for nurse grade or 
status 
Dependent variable: OEs 
(I) Nurse 
grade 
(J) Nurse 
grade 
Mean 
difference (I-J) 
S.E. p-value 95% CI for difference 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Band 5 
Band 6 -18.905
*
 8.851 .037 -36.604 -1.206 
Bank -12.905 23.217 .580 -59.329 33.520 
Agency 5.595 7.081 .432 -8.564 19.755 
Band 6 
Band 5 18.905
*
 8.851 .037 1.206 36.604 
Bank 6.000 24.337 .806 -42.665 54.665 
Agency 24.500
*
 10.169 .019 4.165 44.835 
Bank 
Band 5 12.905 23.217 .580 -33.520 59.329 
Band 6 -6.000 24.337 .806 -54.665 42.665 
Agency 18.500 23.750 .439 -28.992 65.992 
Agency 
Band 5 -5.595 7.081 .432 -19.755 8.564 
Band 6 -24.500
*
 10.169 .019 -44.835 -4.165 
Bank -18.500 23.750 .439 -65.992 28.992 
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Table  3.22: The average OEs observed, according to grade or status of nurse staff as well as the 
mean error rate in CHWs 
Grade or status 
of staff 
No. of 
observation  
Average  
OEs  
S.D 
Mean error 
rate% 
S.D 
Band 5 15 39.8 21.5 16.8% 9.6 
Band 6 6 47 33.7 14.7% 14.3 
Bank 1 46 - 21.7% - 
Agency 8 40.5 25.7 22.3% 12.5 
 
Table  3.23: The average OEs observed, according to grade or status of nurse staff as well as the 
mean error rate in PWs 
Grade or status 
of staff 
No. of 
observation  
Average 
OEs  
S.D 
Mean 
error 
rate% 
S.D 
Band 5 27 29.4 19.7 19.5% 12.1 
Band 6 2 67 19.8 14.9% 5.1 
Bank 0 0 0 0 0 
Agency 6 10.2 3.9 11.2% 9.8 
 
It can be seen from Table  3.19 that the total percentage of errors associated with bank 
and agency nurses were higher than those associated with band 5 and band 6 nurses. 
However, in Table  3.20 the mean error rate percentages were similar between the nurse 
grades. Figure  3.13 indicates no major difference in the percentage of errors between 
nurse grades. Correspondingly, as shown in Table  3.24 there were no statistically 
significant difference when comparing the percentage MAEs observed for each nurse 
grade.  
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Figure ‎3.13: Box plot for error rates shown against nurse grade or status. 
Band 5 nurses have a median 16.9% error (range 3.4-46.6), Band 6 10.8% errors (range 2-38.7), 
Bank 21.7% errors with no rang due to observed once, and Agency 15.8% errors (range 0-43.8). 
 
 
Table  3.24: The ANOVA pairwise comparisons for the % errors observed for nurse grade or 
status 
Dependent variable: % MAEs observed  
(I) Nurse 
grade 
(J) Nurse 
grade 
Mean 
difference (I-J) 
S.E. p-value 95% CI for difference 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Band 5 
Band 6 3.804 4.468 .398 -5.130 12.738 
Bank -3.183 11.719 .787 -26.617 20.251 
Agency .981 3.574 .785 -6.166 8.128 
Band 6 
Band 5 -3.804 4.468 .398 -12.738 5.130 
Bank -6.988 12.285 .572 -31.552 17.577 
Agency -2.823 5.133 .584 -13.088 7.441 
Bank 
Band 5 3.183 11.719 .787 -20.251 26.617 
Band 6 6.988 12.285 .572 -17.577 31.552 
Agency 4.164 11.989 .730 -19.809 28.137 
Agency 
Band 5 -.981 3.574 .785 -8.128 6.166 
Band 6 2.823 5.133 .584 -7.441 13.088 
Bank -4.164 11.989 .730 -28.137 19.809 
 
3.2.1.7 Drug group 
The category of drugs observed was also recorded. It can be seen in Table  3.25 that a 
much higher number of OEs related to non-psychiatric drugs (1713) with the OEs 
relating to psychiatric drugs being (524). Furthermore, the error rate detected in the 
non-psychiatric drug group was (18.2%) whereas that found in the psychiatric drug 
group was (10.5%). Table  3.26 shows that the MAEs were significantly higher in the 
non-psychiatric drug group compared to the psychiatric drug group (p-value <0.001). 
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Table  3.27 illustrates the total OEs observed according to drug group as well as the 
number of MAEs in CHWs and PWs. In addition, in Appendix 13 Table 1 includes the 
main medications involved in MAEs including whether these were in the critical list 
medications or not and shows that most of these medications were not critical. 
Moreover, it can be seen in Appendix 13 Table 2 the number of MAEs in terms of route 
of administration observed. The oral route had the far highest number of errors followed 
by the topical route. 
Table ‎3.25: The total OEs observed according to drug group as well as the number of MAEs 
and the error rate 
Drug group 
Total 
OEs 
No. of 
MAEs 
Total MAE rate %
†
 
Non-psychiatric drug 1713 312 18.2% 
Psychiatric drug 524 55 10.5% 
†
percentage error rate calculated as a percentage of total OEs for that drug group point 
 
 
Table  3.26: The ANOVA pairwise comparisons for the MAEs observed for drug group 
Dependent variable: MAEs 
 
Table  3.27: The total OEs observed according to drug group as well as the number of MAEs in 
CHWs and PWs 
Drug group 
Total OEs 
in CHWs 
No. of MAEs 
in CHWs 
Total OEs 
in PWs 
No. of MAEs 
in PWs 
Non-psychiatric drug 1172 208 541 104 
Psychiatric drug 77 9 447 46 
 
3.2.1.8 Wards busy with other activity or not  
Whether any ward busy with other activity is taking place during the medication rounds 
was also recorded. As shown in Table  3.28 the total OEs observed on busy wards with 
(I) Drug group (J) Drug group  Mean 
difference 
(I-J) 
S.E p-value 95% CIfor difference 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Non-psychiatric 
drug 
Psychiatric 
drug 
.077
*
 .019 <0.001 .039 .115 
Psychiatric 
drug 
Non-psychiatric 
drug 
-.077
*
 .019 <0.001 -.115 -.039 
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other activities taking place were more than the OEs observed in quiet wards. However, 
the average OEs was quite similar between the wards with other activity compared with 
wards with no other activity as revealed in Table  3.29. This is also shown in 
Figure  3.14. Table  3.30 shows no statistically significantly difference of OEs observed 
in wards with other activity compared with wards with no other activity. 
Table ‎3.28: The total OEs observed according to whether wards had other activities taking place 
or not as well as the number of MAEs and the error rate 
Ward busy with other activity  Total OEs No. of MAEs Total MAE rate
†
  
Yes 1545 291 18.8% 
No 692 76 10.9% 
†
percentage error rate calculated as a percentage of total OEs for that ward activity point 
 
Table ‎3.29: The average OEs observed, the mean error rate according to whether wards had 
other activities taking place or not as well as their standard deviation 
Ward busy with 
other activity  
No. of 
observation 
visits 
Average 
OEs
a
 
S.D 
Mean error 
rate%
b
 
S.D 
Yes 46 33.6 23.2 19.5% 11.6 
No 19 36.4 24.8 13.9% 10 
a
calculated as
 
total
 
OEs for each observation visit/no. of observation visits. 
b
percentage mean error rate 
calculated as a total percentage of error rate for each observation visit for that ward activity point/no. of 
observation visits
 
 
 
Figure ‎3.14: Box plot for the OEs observed according to the wards including other activities or 
not. 
The presence of other activity has a median 31 OEs (range 6-109) and no activity has 35 OEs 
(range 6-107). 
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Table  3.30: The ANOVA pairwise comparisons for the total OEs observed for wards that had 
other activities or not 
Dependent variable: OEs  
(I) Other 
activity 
(J) Other 
activity 
Mean difference 
(I-J) 
S.E. p-value 95% CI for difference 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Yes No -2.834 6.461 .662 -15.745 10.076 
No Yes 2.834 6.461 .662 -10.076 15.745 
 
As shown in Table  3.29 the mean error rate in wards where other activities are taking 
place at the time of the medication administration round (19.5%) which was slightly 
higher than the mean error rate in wards without other activities (13.9%) taking place. 
This is also shown in Figure  3.15 as the median error rate for the wards. In addition, 
Table  3.31 demonstrates that there was weak evidence (p-value = 0.069) of increased 
mean error rate in the wards with other activity compared with wards with no other 
activity. 
 
Figure ‎3.15: Box plot for error rate observed according to whether the wards had other activities 
taking place or not. 
Other activity being present has a median 17.7% error per ward (range 0-46.7) and with no 
activity 11.3% error per ward (3.4-44.4). 
 
 
Table  3.31: The ANOVA pairwise comparisons for the % errors observed for wards that had 
other activities or not 
Dependent variable: % MAEs observed  
(I) Other 
activity 
(J) Other 
activity 
Mean difference 
(I-J) 
S.E. p-value 95% CI for difference 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Yes No 5.640 3.048 .069 -.450 11.731 
No Yes -5.640 3.048 .069 -11.731 .450 
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Table  3.32 shows the relationship between the total OEs observed according to the 
medication administration round time and whether or not there was other activity taking 
place. All of the OEs observed at the lunchtime round took place on wards that were 
busy with other activities. 
 
Table ‎3.32: Relationship between the total OE observed at the round time and the total of OE 
observed on wards with other activity or not. 
 Other activity 
Time of medication administration round Yes No 
08:00 (morning) 756 201 
12:00 (lunchtime) 273 0 
18:00 (evening) 311 69 
22:00 (night time)  205 422 
 
3.2.1.9 Nurses interrupted versus nurses not interrupted 
As well as recording the other activities taking place, instances of interruptions during 
the medication administration round were recorded (the nurse interruptions were 
measured for each OEs). The number of OEs observed with nurses not interrupted 
during the medication administration round (2061) was greater than that observed with 
nurses having been interrupted (176) as shown in Table  3.33. On the other hand, the 
error rate was higher when nurses were interrupted compared to no interruption. 
Table  3.34 shows that the MAEs were significantly greater when nurses were 
interrupted compared to when nurses were not interrupted (p-value <0.001). 
Table ‎3.33: The total OE observed according to whether the nurse was interrupted or not as well 
as the number of MAEs and the error rate 
Interruptions Total OEs No. of MAEs Total MAE rate %
†
 
No 2061 315 15.3% 
Yes 176 52 29.5% 
†
percentage error rate calculated as a percentage of total OEs for that interruptions point 
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Table ‎3.34: The ANOVA pairwise comparisons for the MAEs observed for nurses when 
interrupted or not 
Dependent variable: MAEs  
(I) Nurse was 
interrupted  
(J) Nurse was 
interrupted  
Mean 
difference (I-J) 
S.E p-value 95% CI for difference 
Lower bound Upper bound 
No Yes -.143
*
 .030 <0.001 -.202 -.083 
Yes No .143
*
 .030 <0.001 .083 .202 
 
 
3.2.1.10 The modes of administration  
During the medication administration observation; the mode of administration of each 
ward is recorded. Table  3.35 shows that the number of OEs observed in wards using the 
bedside-patient locker mode was the highest, and in wards using a mixed mode of 
administration, it was the lowest. However, Table  3.36 illustrates that the average OEs 
was lowest in the bedside-prepared in clinic room mode.  
This also appeared in Figure  3.16 the OEs median values and ranges. The number of 
OEs observed were significantly lower in bedside-prepared in clinic room mode 
compared to bedside using patient lockers mode (p-value <0.05) and bedside using 
trolley mode (p-value <0.05) as seen in Table  3.37.  
Table ‎3.35: The OEs observed according to mode of administration as well as the number of 
MAEs and the error rate 
Ward 
type 
Mode of Administration 
Total 
OEs 
No. of 
MAEs 
Total‎MAE‎rate‎%† 
CHWs 
Bedside-patient lockers 759 155 20.4% 
Bedside-trolley 490 62 12.7% 
PWs 
Bedside-prepared in clinic room 343 64 18.6% 
Mixed-bedside and queue 120 20 16.7% 
Queue 525 66 12.6% 
†
percentage error rate calculated as a percentage of total OEs for that mode of administration point 
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Table ‎3.36: The average OEs observed, the mean error rate according to mode of administration 
as well as their standard deviation 
Ward 
type 
Mode of Administration 
No. of 
observation 
visits 
Average 
OEs
a
 
S.D 
Mean 
error 
rate%
b
 
S.D 
CHWs 
Bedside-patient lockers 18 42.2 25.5 20.6% 11.8 
Bedside-trolley 12 40.8 23.3 14.1% 9.5 
PWs 
Bedside-prepared in clinic room 15 22.9 19.6 18.6% 13.2 
Mixed-bedside and queue 5 24 18.7 20.8% 10.9 
Queue 15 35 23.2 16% 10.8 
a
calculated as
 
total
 
OEs for each observation visit/no. of observation visits. 
b
percentage mean error rate 
calculated as a total percentage of error rate for each observation visit for that mode of administration 
point/no. of observation visits
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3.16: Box plot for the OEs shown against mode of administration. 
The Queue mode has a median 31 OEs (range 8-76), bedside-prepared in clinic room 15 OEs 
(range 6-81), Mixed 19 OEs (range 8-53), bedside-patient lockers 38 OEs (range 15-109) and 
bedside-trolley 34.5 OEs (range 18-107) 
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Table ‎3.37: The ANOVA pairwise comparisons for the total OEs observed for mode of 
administration 
Dependent variable: OEs 
(I) Mode 
of administration 
(J) Mode 
of administration 
Mean 
difference 
(I-J) 
S.E. p-value 95% CI for difference 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Queue 
Bedside-prepared in clinic room 12.133 8.346 .151 -4.560 28.827 
Mixed 11.000 11.802 .355 -12.608 34.608 
Bedside-patient lockers -7.167 7.990 .373 -23.150 8.816 
Bedside-trolley -5.833 8.852 .512 -23.540 11.873 
Bedside-prepared 
in clinic room 
Queue -12.133 8.346 .151 -28.827 4.560 
Mixed -1.133 11.802 .924 -24.742 22.475 
Bedside-patient lockers -19.300
*
 7.990 .019 -35.283 -3.317 
Bedside-trolley -17.967
*
 8.852 .047 -35.673 -.260 
Mixed 
Queue -11.000 11.802 .355 -34.608 12.608 
Bedside-prepared in clinic room 1.133 11.802 .924 -22.475 24.742 
Bedside-patient lockers -18.167 11.554 .121 -41.278 4.945 
Bedside-trolley -16.833 12.166 .172 -41.168 7.502 
Bedside-patient 
lockers 
Queue 7.167 7.990 .373 -8.816 23.150 
Bedside-prepared in clinic room 19.300
*
 7.990 .019 3.317 35.283 
Mixed 18.167 11.554 .121 -4.945 41.278 
Bedside-trolley 1.333 8.518 .876 -15.705 18.371 
Bedside-trolley 
Queue 5.833 8.852 .512 -11.873 23.540 
Bedside-prepared in clinic room 17.967
*
 8.852 .047 .260 35.673 
Mixed 16.833 12.166 .172 -7.502 41.168 
Bedside-patient lockers -1.333 8.518 .876 -18.371 15.705 
 
The medication administered using the bedside-patient locker mode had the highest 
error rate associated with it (20.4%), followed by the bedside administration where the 
medication was prepared in the clinic room (18.6%). Bedside administration using the 
trolley and queuing modes of administration had lower error rates at (12.7% and 12.6% 
respectively) as shown in Table  3.35.  
However, in Table  3.36 there was no significant difference of the mean error rate 
between the modes of administration. Moreover, Figure  3.17 shows the error rate 
median values and ranges. Table  3.38 shows that the comparison between the 
percentages of errors in different mode of administration is not statistically significant. 
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Figure ‎3.17: Box plot for error rates shown against mode of administration. 
The Queue mode have a median 13.3% errors (range 3.9-44.4), bedside-prepared in clinic room 
16.7% errors (range 0-46.7), Mixed 22.2% errors (range 10.5-37.5), bedside-patient lockers 
17.8% errors (range 2-43.8) and bedside-trolley 12% errors (range 3.4-38.7). 
 
 
Table ‎3.38: The ANOVA pairwise comparisons for the % errors observed for mode of 
administration 
Dependent variable:  % MAEs observed   
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Mode of Administration 
(I) Mode 
of administration 
(J) Mode 
of administration 
Mean 
difference 
(I-J) 
S.E. p-value 95% CI for difference 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Queue 
Bedside-prepared in clinic 
room 
-2.673 4.187 .526 -11.049 5.702 
Mixed -4.853 5.922 .416 -16.698 6.992 
Bedside-patient lockers -4.594 4.009 .256 -12.613 3.425 
Bedside-trolley 1.858 4.441 .677 -7.025 10.742 
Bedside-prepared 
in clinic room 
Queue 2.673 4.187 .526 -5.702 11.049 
Mixed -2.180 5.922 .714 -14.025 9.665 
Bedside-patient lockers -1.921 4.009 .634 -9.940 6.098 
Bedside-trolley 4.532 4.441 .312 -4.352 13.415 
Mixed 
Queue 4.853 5.922 .416 -6.992 16.698 
Bedside-prepared in clinic 
room 
2.180 5.922 .714 -9.665 14.025 
Bedside-patient lockers .259 5.797 .965 -11.337 11.854 
Bedside-trolley 6.712 6.104 .276 -5.498 18.921 
Bedside-patient 
lockers 
Queue 4.594 4.009 .256 -3.425 12.613 
Bedside-prepared in clinic 
room 
1.921 4.009 .634 -6.098 9.940 
Mixed -.259 5.797 .965 -11.854 11.337 
Bedside-trolley 6.453 4.274 .136 -2.096 15.001 
Bedside-trolley 
Queue -1.858 4.441 .677 -10.742 7.025 
Bedside-prepared in clinic 
room 
-4.532 4.441 .312 -13.415 4.352 
Mixed -6.712 6.104 .276 -18.921 5.498 
Bedside-patient lockers -6.453 4.274 .136 -15.001 2.096 
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3.2.2 The type and frequency of MAEs 
Figure  3.18 presents the percentage of MAEs detected by the researcher during the 
observation by the error type. It can be seen that expiry errors represented the highest 
proportion of errors with (32%). Moreover, (23%) of errors related to omissions (almost 
not given 5%, omitted and unsigned 13% and omitted but signed 5%) which gave the 
second highest type of errors. The third highest proportion of errors related to ‘other 
reason’ errors with (16%) (note. rinse mouth after using some corticosteroid inhalers 
was the most common error detected for ‘other reason’). Wrong time errors were the 
fourth highest type of errors with (13%). In addition, the wrong dose, given but 
unsigned and formulation errors type were (7%, 5% and 3% respectively). Extra dose 
errors and prescribed drug errors were the least common type of errors. 
 
 
Figure ‎3.18: The type and frequency of MAEs 
 
Table  3.39 illustrates the type and number of MAEs in wards. It can be seen from the 
table that expiry errors were the most error type in wards CHW2, PW6, PW8, CHW3, 
PW9, PW5 and PW10 with 17, 15, 11, 10, 10, 4 and 4 errors, respectively. Moreover, 
omissions (almost not given, omitted and unsigned and omitted but signed) were the 
greatest type of errors in CHW5, CHW9, CHW4 and CHW8 with 13, 13, 8, and 6 
errors, respectively and the other reason errors in PW2 and PW4 with 11 and 5 errors. 
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WTEs were the greatest type of errors in CHW1 with 15 errors and PW3 with 6 errors. 
Furthermore, the expiry errors were higher in CHW2 compared with the expiry errors in 
the other wards, and WTEs were higher in CHW1 compared with the WTEs in the other 
wards. Finally, the most WTEs detected were in wards that used bedside patient locker 
mode of administration CHW1, CHW2 and CHW9 as shown in Table  3.5.  
Table ‎3.39: The type and frequency of MAEs according to code wards name 
 
E
x
p
ir
y
 E
rr
o
r 
E
x
tr
a 
D
o
se
 
F
o
rm
u
la
ti
o
n
 
E
rr
o
r 
O
th
er
 r
ea
so
n
 
A
lm
o
st
 n
o
t 
g
iv
en
 
G
iv
en
 b
u
t 
u
n
si
g
n
ed
 
O
m
it
te
d
 a
n
d
 
u
n
si
g
n
ed
 
O
m
it
te
d
 b
u
t 
si
g
n
ed
 
U
n
-p
re
sc
ri
b
ed
 
d
ru
g
 g
iv
en
 
W
ro
n
g
 d
o
se
 
W
ro
n
g
 t
im
e 
er
ro
r 
(PW1) 1           
(PW3) 4          6 
(PW5) 4  2    1     
(PW10) 4   1        
(CHW7) 1   1  3 2   2  
(CHW1) 8     6  1   15 
(CHW8) 5  1 1  2 3 3  1  
(PW4) 3   5 1  1   2  
(CHW6) 3   3   1 1  1  
(PW8) 11  1 4 2 2 7  1   
(CHW4) 4 3  7 1  1 6  2  
(PW7) 2  3   1 3   5 2 
(CHW5) 5   2 10  2 1  4  
(PW2) 2   11 1  1     
(PW6) 15  2 1  1 7 1 1 3  
(CHW3) 10   3   1 6    
(PW9) 10   6 1  7   1  
(CHW2) 17  1 11  2 2   2 13 
(CHW9) 9   1 3 1 10  1 1 11 
 
Table  3.40 shows the variety of error types found per 100 observations in both ward 
type (community hospital and psychiatric wards). Expiry errors were the most frequent 
type of error with 5 errors per 100 observations in CHWs, and with 5.7 errors per 100 
observations in PWs. Omissions (almost not given, omitted and unsigned and omitted 
but signed) were the second frequent type with 4.3 errors per 100 observations in 
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CHWs and 3.3 errors per 100 observations in PWs. This indicates that the first and 
second most frequent type of error was the same in both ward types. Moreover, the 
third type of error was different between the two ward types, in CHWs it is WTE with 
3.1 errors per 100 observations and in PWs it is the ‘other reason’ error with 2.8 errors 
per 100 observations.  
Table ‎3.40: The type and the errors found per 100 observations according to ward type 
Error types per 100 
observations 
Community Hospital Wards Psychiatric Wards 
Expiry Error  5 5.7 
Extra Dose  0.2 0 
Formulation Error  0.2 0.8 
Other reason  2.3 2.8 
Almost not given  1.1 0.5 
Given but unsigned  1.1 0.4 
Omitted and unsigned  1.8 2.7 
Omitted but signed  1.4 0.1 
Unprescribed drug  0.1 0.2 
Wrong dose  1 1.1 
Wrong time error  3.1 0.8 
 
The data was also examined in relation to the mode of administration. It can be seen 
from Table  3.41 that expiry errors were the most frequent type in wards that 
administered medication at the patient beside but prepared the medication in the clinic 
room, and wards using bedside-patient lockers as mode of administration, with 9.3 and 
5.7 per 100 observations respectively. The second most frequent was different between 
these modes (bedside-prepared in clinic room and bedside-patient lockers) i.e. 
omissions (almost not given, omitted and unsigned and omitted but signed) were in 
bedside-prepared in clinic room mode with 3.5 per 100 observations and wrong time 
errors in bedside-patient lockers mode of administration with 5.1 per 100 observations.  
In addition, the omissions were the most frequent error type in wards where the 
bedside-trolley mode of administration was used with 4.8 per 100 observations, and 
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expiry errors were second with 3.9 per 100 observations. Expiry errors and omissions 
were similar in mixed-bedside and queue modes of administration with 5.8 per 100 
observations. The ‘other reason’ errors were the most frequent type in queue modes 
with 4 per 100 observations. Additionally, the expiry errors rate was higher in bedside-
prepared in clinic room mode compared with the expiry errors rate in the other modes, 
and the omissions rate was higher in mixed-bedside and queue mode compared with 
omissions rate in other modes. 
Finally, the wrong time errors rate was the highest in the bedside-patient lockers mode 
of administration compared with the wrong time errors rate in other modes, and there 
were no wrong time errors found in bedside-trolley mode of administration and mixed-
bedside and queue mode of administration 
Table ‎3.41: The type and the errors found per 100 observations according to mode of 
administration 
Error types per 100 
observations 
Bedside - 
prepared in 
clinic room 
Bedside - 
patient 
lockers 
Bedside - 
trolley 
Mixed - 
bedside and 
queue 
Queue 
Expiry Error  9.3 5.7 3.9 5.8 3.2 
Extra Dose  0 0.4 0 0 0 
Formulation Error  0.9 0.3 0 1.7 0.6 
Other reason  1.7 2.6 1.8 0.8 4 
Almost not given  0.6 0.5 2 0 0.6 
Given but unsigned  0.9 1.4 0.6 0 0.2 
Omitted and unsigned  2.6 2.1 1.2 5.8 2.1 
Omitted but signed  0.3 1.3 1.6 0 0 
Unprescribed drug  0.3 0.1 0 0.8 0 
Wrong dose  0.3 0.8 1.4 1.7 1.5 
Wrong time error  1.7 5.1 0 0 0.4 
  
Table  3.42 shows the type and the errors found per 100 observations according to ward 
round time. Also, it demonstrates that the expiry errors were the most frequent type of 
errors at ward round time observed 08:00, 18:00 and 22:00 with 5.9, 5.8 and 3.2 errors 
per 100 observations respectively. At lunch round time 12:00 omissions (almost not 
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given, omitted and unsigned and omitted but signed) were the highest error type with 
8.1 errors followed by expiry errors with 7.3 errors per 100 observations. The second 
most frequent type of error was related to omissions (almost not given, omitted and 
unsigned and omitted but signed) at evening round time 18:00 with 4.5 errors per 100 
observations, and the omission and other reason was at night round time 22:00 with 2.2 
errors per 100 observations. The WTE was the second highest error at morning round 
time 08:00 with 4.9 errors per 100 observations. In addition, there was no WTE 
detected in 12:00, 18:00 and 22:00 round time.   
Table ‎3.42: The type and the errors found per 100 observations according to ward round time 
Error types per 100 
observations 
08:00 12:00 18:00 22:00 
Expiry Error  5.9 7.3 5.8 3.2 
Extra Dose  0 0 0 0.5 
Formulation Error  0.2 0 1.1 0.6 
Other reason  2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 
Almost not given  1 1.5 0 0.8 
Given but unsigned  0.2 1.8 0 1.8 
Omitted and unsigned  1.5 4.8 3.4 1.4 
Omitted but signed  1 1.8 1.1 0 
Unprescribed drug  0.1 0.4 0.3 0 
Wrong dose  0.6 1.8 1.6 1.1 
Wrong time error  4.9 0 0 0 
 
It can be seen from Table  3.43 that expiry errors were the most frequent type of errors 
found in all nurses’ grade. Also, it shows that expiry errors and omissions (omitted and 
unsigned and omitted but signed) were the highest occurring errors with bank staff 
(10.9 per 100 observations), compared with other nurses grades. In addition, the chance 
of detecting some errors (formulation error, other reason errors, given but unsigned, 
omitted and unsigned and wrong time error) with band 5 nurses was slightly higher than 
the chance of detecting these errors with band 6 nurses.  
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However, the chance of detecting omissions (almost not given and omitted but signed) 
was slightly higher with band 6 nurses than the chance of detecting these errors with 
band 5 nurses. The chance of wrong time error was only detected with agency and band 
5 nurses with 3.4 per 100 observations with agency and 2.4 per 100 observations with 
band 5 nurses, respectively.  
Table ‎3.43: The type and the errors found per 100 observations according to grade or status of 
nurse 
Error types per 100 
observations 
Band 5 Band 6 Bank Agency 
Expiry Error  4.7 5.3 10.9 6.8 
Extra Dose  0.2 0 0 0 
Formulation Error  0.6 0.2 0 0.3 
Other reason  2.2 1.4 0 5.5 
Almost not given  0.6 1.9 0 0.8 
Given but unsigned  1.2 0.5 0 0 
Omitted and unsigned  2.9 1.0 2.2 1.0 
Omitted but signed  0.3 1.2 8.7 1.6 
Unprescribed drug  0.2 0 0 0 
Wrong dose  1.2 1.0 0 0.8 
Wrong time error  2.4 0 0 3.4 
 
Table  3.44 illustrates that expiry errors were the most frequent type of errors in non- 
psychiatric and psychiatric drug group 5.8 and 3.6 per 100 observations respectively, 
followed by omissions (almost not given, omitted and unsigned and omitted but 
signed). Also, it shows that the chance of detecting expiry errors, other reason errors, 
omissions (almost not given, omitted and unsigned and omitted but signed) and WTEs 
in non- psychiatric drug group was higher than the chance of detecting these errors in 
psychiatric drug group. 
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Table ‎3.44: The type and the errors found per 100 observations according to drug group 
Error types per 100 
observations 
Non-psychiatric drug Psychiatric drug 
Expiry Error  5.8 3.6 
Extra Dose  0.2 0 
Formulation Error  0.2 1.1 
Other reason  3.0 1.0 
Almost not given  0.9 0.8 
Given but unsigned  0.8 0.8 
Omitted and unsigned  2.6 0.8 
Omitted but signed  1.1 0 
Unprescribed drug  0.1 0.2 
Wrong dose  1.1 1.1 
Wrong time error  2.4 1.1 
 
Finally, as shown in Table  3.45 the highest error types were different between days 
observed. On Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday the expiry errors were the main type 
of error with 6.1, 7.6 and 4.1 errors per 100 observations, respectively. On Monday, the 
WTEs were the highest type with 6.8 errors per 100 observations, and omissions on 
Friday with 8.5 errors per 100 observations.  
The second highest type of error on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday were the 
omissions with 4.4, 3.5 and 3.9 errors per 100 observations, respectively. On Thursday 
it was ‘other reason’ errors with 2.3 errors per 100 observations, and on Friday it was 
the expiry errors with 4.2 errors per 100 observations. Overall, there were no WTEs 
detected on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. 
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Table ‎3.45: The type and the errors found per 100 observations according to ward round day 
Error types per 100 
observations 
Monday  Tuesday Wednesday  Thursday Friday  
Expiry Error  4 6.1 7.6 4.1 4.2 
Extra Dose  0 0 0 0.6 0 
Formulation Error  0.2 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.4 
Other reason  2.7 2.2 3.2 2.3 2.3 
Almost not given  0.6 0.6 0.9 0 3.5 
Given but unsigned  1.1 1.2 0.6 0.8 0 
Omitted and unsigned  3 2.5 1.9 1.3 2.3 
Omitted but signed  0.8 0.4 1.1 0.2 2.7 
Unprescribed drug  0 0.2 0.2 0 0.4 
Wrong dose  0.4 1 1.1 1.9 0.8 
Wrong time error  6.8 2.9 0 0 0 
 
3.2.3 The MAEs potential for harm 
After the MAEs were recorded the potential for harm was judged and rated by the 
researcher, and one of the Trust clinical pharmacists and agreement gained through a 
meeting as suggested by (Haw and Cahill, 2011). Figure  3.19 shows that 27% of total 
MAEs found were judged to have had the ability to potentially harm the patient. 
Table  3.46 demonstrates the number of potential for harm errors in CHWs and PWs. In 
addition, Table 3 in Appendix 13 shows different types of potential harm that were 
found.  
 
Figure ‎3.19: The % of potential for harm 
 
 
No harm 
73% 
Potential for 
harm 
27% 
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Table  3.46: The number of potential for harm errors in CHWs and PWs 
Potential for harm CHWs PWs 
Yes  64 34 
No  153 116 
 
Overall, the descriptive data analysis revealed several meaningful ways of expressing 
the findings. This was conducted by describing different categories individually that 
were related to the study objectives. The total number and average of OEs was shown 
followed by the number of MAEs, the total and mean error rates.  
The chapter also included the contributing factors and other variables that were 
examined separately. The type and frequency of MAEs, and finally, the MAEs’ 
potential for harm were also examined. Table  3.47 summarise the significant findings in 
CHWs and PWs.  
Table ‎3.47: Breakdown of some MAEs finding in CHWs and PWs 
 CHWs PWs 
Error types per 100 observations 
Expiry Error 
Extra Dose 
Formulation Error 
Other reason 
Almost not given 
Given but unsigned 
Omitted and unsigned 
Omitted but signed 
Unprescribed drug 
Wrong dose 
Wrong time error 
5 
0.2 
0.2 
2.3 
1.1 
1.1 
1.8 
1.4 
0.1 
1 
3.1 
Expiry Error 
Extra Dose 
Formulation Error 
Other reason 
Almost not given 
Given but unsigned 
Omitted and unsigned 
Omitted but signed 
Unprescribed drug 
Wrong dose 
Wrong time error 
5.7 
0 
0.8 
2.8 
0.5 
0.4 
2.7 
0.1 
0.2 
1.1 
0.8 
Number of MAEs according to 
drug group  
Non-psychiatric drug 208 Non-psychiatric drug 104 
Psychiatric drug 9 Psychiatric drug 46 
Potential for harm 
Yes  64 Yes  34 
No  153 No  116 
Mean MAE rate % according to Band 5 16.8% Band 5 19.5% 
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grade or status of staff Band 6 
Bank 
Agency 
14.7% 
21.7% 
22.3% 
Band 6 
Bank 
Agency 
14.9% 
0 
11.2% 
Mean MAE rate % according to 
mode of Administration 
Bedside-patient lockers 
Bedside-trolley 
20.6% 
14.1% 
Bedside-prepared in clinic room 
Mixed-bedside and queue 
Queue 
18.6% 
20.8% 
16% 
 
Furthermore, to investigate the reliability of the relationships between numbers of 
potential contributing factors with probability of increasing the risk of MAEs, 
inferential statistical data analysis was conducted using Poisson Regression Model 
(PRM). This is explained in more detail below. 
3.3 Inferential statistical data analysis  
This section presents the statistical model used to determine the “best” combination of 
predictors (contributing factors) with regard to the occurrence of MAEs. There are 
different potential models under the broad class of regression approaches known as 
Generalized Linear Models (GzLM) encompassing logistic regression, Poisson 
regression and negative binomial regression (Cohen et al., 2013, Hayat and Higgins, 
2014). 
One of the distinct features of the data is that it measured the occurrence of MAEs by 
counting them. According to Long and Freese (2014), count variables which record 
how many times an event has happened can be studied using the classic Linear 
Regression Model, but the estimates can be inconsistent or inefficient, and attributable 
to a number of modelling violations. In this case, models based on the Poisson 
distribution are deemed to be more applicable, leading to the Poisson Regression Model 
(PRM). The Poisson Regression Model, a member of the GzLM family, is suitable for 
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modelling count variables that measure the frequency of very rare and random events 
(Cohen et al., 2013).  
The Poisson Regression Model has been used to investigate the relationship between a 
dependent count variable Y, e.g. number of errors, and a set of predictor variables or X- 
variables, also known as explanatory variables. It can also be used to describe 
interactions between predictor variables. The inclusion of terms in the model, to explain 
the variation in Y, may be judged using significance testing (McCullagh and Nelder, 
1989 as cited by Cohen et al., 2013). 
3.3.1 Poisson regression model (PRM) 
The Poisson Regression Model is usually reserved for modelling count data, as 
described above, and is viable and efficient as an alternative modelling approach to 
classic linear regression. Also, the PRM avoids log transforming of the dependent count 
variable, which can be problematic with zero values in Linear Regression. More 
generally it avoids awkward inverse transformations. Historically, a PRM has been 
commonly used to analyse frequency of events in the form of a rate for selected unit of 
exposure (Hayat and Higgins, 2014). 
In particular, PRMs have been used to model the number of events that happen in 
specific periods of time according to a set of explanatory variables. One of the 
advantages of the PRM, and statistical modelling in general, is it allows a time effect to 
depend on the levels of other explanatory variables and vice versa, i.e. interaction 
affects can be incorporated (Millsap and Maydeu-Olivares, 2009).  
To define a Poisson Regression Model, suppose we have a count observation, yi, on a 
dependent Poisson random variable Yi for i = 1 to n. Then the expected count (true 
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mean), μi, corresponding to each Poisson random variable may be modelled on values 
of explanatory variables, x1i, x2i, … , xki as follows: 
𝜇𝑖 = exp⁡(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑖 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖) 
Where the regression coefficients β0, β1, … , βk are unknown parameters. This defines 
the classic PRM within the GzLM framework, where the effect of an explanatory 
variable may be described in terms of a ratio of means, simply referred to as a relative 
risk from now on (Kutner et al., 2004, Long and Freese, 2014).  
Moreover, medication error data usually have a positively skewed distribution with a 
low mean. The distribution typically has a large number of small counts starting at zero 
and a rapidly decreasing number of higher counts. These data frequently follow a 
Poisson distribution. Hence, a PRM can be considered as one possible approach to the 
modelling of medication error counts (Hutchinson and Holtman, 2005 as cited by 
Chang, 2007). 
For a Poisson distribution, the mean and the variance are equal.  A specific violation of 
this is commonly referred to as over-dispersion, which occurs when the variance is 
greater than the mean (under-dispersion occurs less frequently). Over-dispersion may 
be the source of lack-of-fit of a Poisson Model to a dataset. In such cases, there are a 
number of remedial approaches, including the use of negative binomial regression 
(Bharti, 2008), and quasi-likelihood methodology (Agresti, 2003).  
Overall, both Poisson and negative binomial regression models are generally used to 
analyse count data (Coxe et al., 2009). The difference between the two models is in the 
mean and variance; where the Poisson Regression imposes equality of mean and 
variance, the negative binomial regression model allows the variance to be greater than 
the mean, making it well-suited for modelling over-dispersed data (Berk and 
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MacDonald, 2008, Hilbe, 2011, Piza, 2012). Goodness-of-fit of Poisson Regression 
Model to the MAE data is considered further later on. 
3.3.2 Estimation and model selection  
The method of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) was used to fit Poisson 
Regression Models (McQuade and Gromova, 2015), using the GENLIN command in 
SPSS (version 21) (IBM Crop, 2012). The significance of explanatory terms was 
assessed using likelihood ratio tests at the 5% significant level (Bharti, 2008, Long and 
Freese, 2014). Wald tests were also used when practically convenient.  
In this study, all explanatory variables (contributing factors) (i.e. wards type, time of 
medication administration round observed, whether the nurse was interrupted or not, 
mode of administration, whether the drug administered was a psychiatric drug or not, 
number of patients in the round, number of opportunity of error in the round, day of 
mediation administration round observed, whether the ward busy with other activity or 
not, shortage of staff, nurse grade or status, nurse gender, rout of administration, and 
drug frequency including PRN) were considered in the Poisson modelling and their 
significance tested. Predictors were included in the final model if they were statistically 
significant (p-value ≤ 0.05). Variables were removed if they were not statistically 
significant (p-value > 0.05) in the presence of other predictors included in the model.  
3.3.3 Findings  
3.3.3.1 PRM for the total errors found 
A preliminary Poisson Regression analysis demonstrated four explanatory factors have 
a statistically significant association with the making of errors: (1) whether the nurse 
was interrupted when drug was being given or not; (2) time of medication 
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administration round observed; (3) the mode of drug administration; and (4) whether 
the drug administered was a psychiatric drug or not, see Table  3.48. 
Table ‎3.48: Explanatory factors selected in Poisson regression modelling and adjusted 
likelihood ratio test results 
Explanatory factor Likelihood ratio test 
statistic 
df p-value 
Whether the nurse was interrupted or not  14.720 1 <0.001 
Time of day observed 9.750 3 .021 
Mode of administration 13.390 4 .010 
Psychiatric drug or not 10.666 1 .001 
 
Because the explanatory factors are categorical it is convenient to utilise a reference 
constraint when reporting the fitted Poisson Regression Model. Table  3.49 presents 
estimated regression coefficients associated with each level of an explanatory factor 
apart from a selected reference category where the regression coefficient is constrained 
to be zero. Hence, for specific explanatory factors, the exponential of an estimated 
regression coefficient is comparing that respect category to the reference, via a ratio of 
means (relative risk).  
A relative risk greater than one suggests an increased risk of MAEs, Wald tests are also 
presented. The results in Table  3.49 illustrate that interrupting the nurse during drug 
administration significantly increases the risk of MAEs by 86% (p-value <0.001).  
Also, it shows that time of day 08:00 and 12:00, when drug administration takes place 
are associated with significantly increased risk of MAEs relating to 22:00. The 
increased risks are (44% and 65% respectively).  
Furthermore, mode of administrations bedside-prepared in clinic room, bedside-patient 
locker, and mixed between bedside and queuing administration mode are significantly 
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different from drug trolley mode of administration with corresponding increased risk of 
(65%, 61%, and 71% respectively).  
Moreover, the queuing mode of administration is not significantly different from drug 
trolley mode of administration. Finally, the type of drug is significantly associated with 
MAEs, with non-psychiatric drugs resulting in an increased risk of (66%).  
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Table ‎3.49: Fitted PRM corresponding to Table ‎3.48 
Explanatory term Regression 
coefficient 
S.E. 95% Profile likelihood CI Wald test Relative risk 
=exp(regression 
coefficient) 
95% Profile 
likelihood CI for 
relative risk 
Lower Upper Test 
statistic 
df p-
value 
Lower Upper 
Intercept -2.904 .2234 -3.352 -2.476 169.021 1 <.001 ˗ ˗ ˗ 
Nurse interrupted or not 
 
 
         
Nurse was interrupted  .622 .1508 .316 .909 17.030 1 <.001 1.864 1.372 2.481 
Nurse was not interrupted  0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
Time of day 
 
 
         
Time of day 08:00 .367 .1446 .089 .656 6.459 1 .011 1.444 1.093 1.927 
Time of day 12:00 .500 .1774 .149 .846 7.934 1 .005 1.648 1.161 2.331 
Time of day 18:00 .238 .1790 -.115 .588 1.769 1 .183 1.269 .891 1.800 
Time of day 22:00 0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
Mode of administration  
 
 
         
Bedside-prepared in clinic room 
administration mode 
.498 .1869 .130 .865 7.084 1 .008 1.645 1.139 2.375 
Bedside-patient locker administration 
mode 
.476 .1516 .184 .779 9.848 1 .002 1.609 1.202 2.180 
Mixed between bedside-prepared in 
clinic room and queuing administration 
mode 
.537 .2646 -.005 1.038 4.112 1 .043 1.710 .995 2.823 
Queuing administration mode .249 .1865 -.117 .615 1.783 1 .182 1.283 .889 1.850 
Bedside-trolley administered mode 0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
Drug group  
 
 
         
Non-Psychiatric drug .504 .1601 .198 .826 9.933 1 .002 1.656 1.219 2.285 
Psychiatric drug 0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
a Reference constraint  
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The statistical modelling has so far ignored possible interactions between explanatory factors, 
where the effect of one factor is modified by another, and concentrated on a main effects 
model where overall effects of explanatory factors are considered. According to Chang 
(2007), most medication errors depend on combinations of factors, which suggest the 
inclusion of interaction terms in the Poisson Regression may improve it. On adding pair-wise 
interaction terms (between explanatory factors) into the PRM Table  3.48, only the interaction 
between interruption and time of day was statistically significant (p-value = 0.015).  
The nature of the interaction between interruption and time of day was investigated by 
examining the relative risk of MAEs when nurses were interrupted versus when not 
interrupted at different times of the day. These relative risks, from the fitted Poisson 
Regression Model, are provided in Table  3.50. Clearly, the only statistically significant 
comparisons are at 12:00 and 22:00 when interruptions are associated with increased risk of 
MAEs; 2.05 and 3.83 times the non-interruptions respectively. There is also weak evidence 
(p-value = 0.059) of increased MAEs risk at 18:00 with a relative risk of 2.15. 
 
Table ‎3.50: Relative risk of MAEs when interrupted versus not for different time of day 
Time of day Relative risk of MAE 
(ratio of means) for 
interrupted nurse vs. not 
df Wald test 
p-value 
95% Wald CI for 
relative risk 
Lower Upper 
08:00 1.07 1 .820 0.62 1.84 
12:00 2.05 1 .016 1.14 3.68 
18:00 2.15 1 .059 0.97 4.75 
22:00 
 
3.83 
 
1 <.001 2.19 
 
6.68 
       
 
On examining the estimated relative risks in Table  3.50 further, there is an increasing trend 
across the day. On comparing these relative risks across time of day the only statistically 
significant change is between 08:00 and 22:00 (p-value ≤ 0.001), with the earlier time having 
a relative risk 72% lower. The goodness-of-fit of the above was initially examined using 
PRM by comparing the sample mean and variance of the MAEs counts cross-tabulated by the 
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explanatory factors in Table  3.48. These sample statistics were roughly comparable in value 
which is consistent with the Poisson assumption.      
Further, to allow for extra-Poisson variability in the above models two alternative models 
were fitted with the same explanatory terms. The first was a negative binomial regression and 
the second a PRM utilising a robust estimator of the covariance matrix of regression 
coefficients. Both of these models lead to the same practical conclusion as those derived from 
using Poisson Regression. Hence, there is no clear evidence against the use of Poisson 
Regression for modelling the MAEs data.  
3.3.3.2 PRM for procedural errors Vs clinical errors 
The total errors (367) found were then classified to clinical errors (174) and procedural 
errors (193) as shown in Figure  3.20. PRM was used to investigate separately any 
combination of the contributing factors with regard to increasing the risk of clinical errors or 
procedural errors. 
 
Figure  3.20: Error classification 
 
The Poisson Regression analysis demonstrated two explanatory factors have a statistically 
significant association with the making of procedural errors: (1) the mode of drug 
administration; and (2) whether the drug administered was a psychiatric drug or not 
(Table  3.51). In addition, three explanatory factors have a statistically significant association 
with the making of clinical errors: (1) time of medication administration round observed; (2) 
the mode of drug administration; and (3) nurse grade or status (Table  3.52). 
Errors found 
Clinical error 
174 errors 
Procedural error 
193 errors 
Quantitative Findings                                                                                    Chapter 3 
 
132 
 
Table ‎3.51: Explanatory factors selected in Poisson regression modelling and adjusted likelihood ratio 
test results (procedural errors) 
Explanatory factor Likelihood ratio test 
statistic 
df p-value 
Mode of administration 13.059 4 .011 
Psychiatric drug or not 15.306 1 <0.001 
 
Table ‎3.52: Explanatory factors selected in Poisson regression modelling and adjusted likelihood ratio 
test results (clinical errors) 
Explanatory factor Likelihood ratio test 
statistic 
df p-value 
Time of Day observed  19.958 3 <0.001 
Mode of administration  20.306 4 <0.001 
Nurse grade or status 13.769 3 .003 
 
The results in Table  3.53 shows that mode of administrations bedside-prepared in clinic room 
and bedside-patient lockers are significantly different from drug trolley mode of 
administration with corresponding increased risk of procedural errors by (136% and 54%, for 
the first two, respectively). Moreover, the mixed administration mode and the queuing mode 
of administration are not significantly different from drug trolley mode of administration. 
Lastly, the type of drug administered is significantly associated with procedural errors, with 
non-psychiatric drugs resulting in an increased risk of 2.3 times the psychiatric drugs. 
Table  3.54 illustrates that the time of day 08:00 and 12:00, when drug administration takes 
place are associated with significantly increased risk of clinical errors compared to 22:00. 
The increased risks are 2.5 and 2.4 times respectively. Further, bedside-patient lockers and 
mixed mode of administrations are significantly different from queuing administration mode 
with corresponding increased risk of 2.4 and 2.7 times respectively. Moreover, the drug 
trolley and bedside-prepared in clinic room mode of administration are not significantly 
different from queuing mode of administration. Finally, the band 6 and agency nurses staff 
are significantly different from band 5 nurses staff in terms of association with clinical errors, 
with a lower risk of (47% and 43% respectively). There is no significantly difference between 
error rates of bank nurses and band 5 nurses. 
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Table ‎3.53: Fitted PRM corresponding to Table ‎3.51 (procedural errors) 
Explanatory term Regression 
coefficient 
S.E. 95% Profile likelihood 
CI 
Wald test Relative risk 
=exp(regression 
coefficient) 
95% Profile 
likelihood CI for 
relative risk 
Lower Upper Test 
statistic 
df p-
value 
Lowe
r 
Upper 
Intercept -3.549 .2832 -4.126 -3.013 157.111 1 <.001 . . . 
Mode of administration  
 
 
         
Bedside-prepared in clinic room 
administration mode 
.858 .2423 .386 1.340 12.553 1 <.001 2.359 1.471 3.819 
Bedside-patient locker administration 
mode 
.431 .2139 .022 .864 4.057 1 .044 1.539 1.022 2.372 
Mixed between bedside-prepared in 
clinic room and queuing 
administration mode 
.229 .3981 -.622 .961 .332 1 .565 1.258 .537 2.613 
Queuing administration mode .461 .2489 -.026 .954 3.428 1 .064 1.586 .974 2.596 
Bedside-trolley administered mode 0
a
 . . . . . . 1 . . 
Drug group  
 
 
         
Non-Psychiatric drug .825 .2254 .399 1.286 13.403 1 <.001 2.282 1.491 3.619 
Psychiatric drug 0
a
 . . . . . . 1 . . 
a Reference constraint  
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Table ‎3.54: Fitted PRM corresponding to Table ‎3.52 (clinical errors) 
Explanatory term Regression 
coefficient 
S.E. 95% Profile likelihood 
CI 
Wald test Relative risk 
=exp(regression 
coefficient) 
95% Profile 
likelihood CI for 
relative risk 
Lower Upper Test 
statistic 
df p-
value 
Lowe
r 
Upper 
Intercept -3.508 .2489 -4.023 -3.045 198.663 1 <.001 . . . 
Time of day 
 
 
         
Time of day 08:00 .897 .2238 .471 1.352 16.052 1 <.001 2.452 1.601 3.864 
Time of day 12:00 .885 .2708 .352 1.419 10.690 1 .001 2.424 1.422 4.133 
Time of day 18:00 .514 .3044 -.089 1.110 2.854 1 .091 1.672 .915 3.035 
Time of day 22:00 0
a
 . . . . . . 1 . . 
Mode of administration  
 
 
         
Bedside-prepared in clinic room 
administration mode 
.232 .2899 -.344 .799 .639 1 .424 1.261 .709 2.223 
Bedside-patient locker administration 
mode 
.860 .2340 .412 1.334 13.503 1 <.001 2.363 1.511 3.795 
Bedside-trolley administered mode  .304 .2915 -.272 .876 1.088 1 .297 1.355 .762 2.402 
Mixed between bedside-prepared in 
clinic room and queuing 
administration mode 
1.009 .3822 .231 1.740 6.964 1 .008 2.742 1.259 5.699 
Queuing administration mode 0
a
 . . . . . . 1 . . 
Nurse grade or status 
 
 
         
Band 6 -.638 .2469 -1.145 -.173 6.677 1 .010 .528 .318 .841 
Bank .470 .5440 -.698 1.476 .747 1 .387 1.600 .498 4.373 
Agency -.556 .2250 -1.011 -.126 6.102 1 .014 .574 .364 .882 
Band 5 0 . . . . . . 1 . . 
a Reference constraint  
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It can be seen from the above inferential statistical findings that the PRM demonstrated 
a number of contributing factors which have a statistically significant association with 
the occurrence of errors; whether the nurse was interrupted when drug was being given 
or not, time of medication administration round observed, the mode of drug 
administration and whether the drug administered was a psychiatric drug or not. 
Overall, there were interrelations between these contributing factors which increased 
the risk of MAEs. However, these contributing factors were slightly different when the 
errors were separated to procedural errors and clinical errors.    
3.4 Summary 
This chapter has analysed the main findings of the MAEs quantitatively. These findings 
have been considered by employing descriptive and inferential statistics. The 
descriptive statistics are the total number and average of OEs, the number of MAEs and 
the total and mean error rates, type and frequency of MAEs and MAEs potential for 
harm. The inferential analysis using PRM examines statistically verifiable relationships 
between the number of errors found and a number of potential contributing factors, 
Table  3.55 summaries the main findings of the descriptive and the inferential statistics, 
which will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
The findings show that the expiry errors, is a major component of procedural errors, 
take place across both psychiatric and community hospital ward types, specifically 
when medication is given at the patient bedside and is prepared either in the clinic room 
or given via patient lockers. The findings also suggest that omissions, a major 
component of clinical errors, were associated with the mixed mode of administration on 
psychiatric wards and the 12:00 administration time. Another type of clinical error was 
the wrong time error which was associated mainly with the patient lockers and the 
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08:00 administration time. The results suggest that patient lockers are not as safe as 
perceived because they are implicated in both clinical and procedural errors. It now 
remains for the researcher to develop an understanding of why these errors occur and 
how they might be addressed. Therefore, the next chapter will qualitatively analyse the 
researcher’s observational notes and the semi-structured interviews to add context and 
to gain the healthcare professional (nurses and pharmacists) opinions about the causes 
behind MAEs found.   
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Table ‎3.55: The main findings of the descriptive and the inferential statistics 
Descriptive Findings Inferential Statistics Findings 
 MAEs rate include WTEs 16.4%, MAEs rate exclude WTEs 
14% and MAEs rate exclude procedural error 7.7% 
 The average OEs for CHWs higher than PWs, with similar 
mean error rate 18% 
 The highest average OEs was in (CHW9, CHW3 and 
CHW2) 
 The lowest average OEs (PW3 and PW5) 
 The highest mean error rate was in (PW8, CHW1, PW3 and 
CHW2) 
 The lowest mean error rate was in (PW1, PW10 and CHW6) 
 The highest average OEs (08:00 and 22:00) 
 The highest mean error rate (12:00) 
 The highest average OEs was in band 6 
 The mean error rates for nurse grade not statistically 
significant 
 The OEs of non-psychiatric higher than OEs of psychiatric 
 The error rates of non-psychiatric higher than error rates of 
psychiatric 
 The OEs observed with no interrupted nurse higher than the 
OEs observed with interrupted nurse  
 The error rate higher with interrupted nurse than error rate 
with no interrupted nurse  
 The average OEs was lowest at bedside-prepared in clinic 
room  
 The mean error rate for mode of administration not 
statistically significant 
 Expiry errors were most frequent of MAE type with 32% 
followed by omission with 32% 
 Omission was most frequent type when excluding the 
procedural error 
 WTEs more in (CHW1, CHW2 and CHW9) using bedside-
patient lockers 
 Expiry errors were the most frequent type in patient bedside 
prepared in the clinic room and bedside-patient lockers 
 Omission was the most frequent error type in bedside-trolley 
 Expiry errors rate was higher in bedside-prepared in clinic 
room compared to the other modes, and the omission rate 
was higher in mixed-bedside and queue mode compared to 
other modes 
 Expiry errors were most frequent type of errors at (08:00, 
18:00 and 22:00) 
 Omission was the highest error type for (12:00)  
 WTEs only found at (08:00) 
 Expiry errors were the most frequent type of errors found in 
all nurses’ grade 
 Expiry errors and omission were the highest-occurring errors 
with bank 
 The chance of WTEs were only detected with agency and 
band 5 
 The chance of detecting omission was slightly higher in band 
6 nurses than band 5 
 27% of total MAEs found were judged to have had the 
ability to potentially harm the patient 
1- PRM for the total errors found 
 Interrupting the nurse during drug 
administration significantly increases the risk 
of MAEs by 86% 
 Time of day 08:00 and 12:00 are associated 
with significantly increased risk of MAEs 
44% and 65% 
 Bedside-prepared in clinic room, bedside- 
patient locker, and mixed between bedside 
and queuing administration mode are 
significantly increased risk of MAEs 65%, 
61%, and 71% 
 Non-psychiatric drugs resulting in an 
increased risk of 66%  
 
2- PRM for procedural errors found 
 Bedside-prepared in clinic room and bedside-
patient locker are significantly different from 
drug trolley mode of administration with 
increased risk by 136% and 54% 
 Non-psychiatric drugs resulting in an 
increased risk of 2.3 times the psychiatric 
drugs 
 
3- PRM for clinical errors found 
 08:00 and 12:00 significantly increased risk 
of clinical errors by 2.5 and 2.4 times 
respectively compared to 22:00  
 Bedside-patient locker and mixed mode of 
administrations are significantly increased 
risk of 2.4 and 2.7 times queuing 
administration mode 
 Band 6 and agency nurses staff are 
significantly different from band 5 nurses 
staff in terms of association with clinical 
errors, with a lower risk of 47% and 43% 
respectively 
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Chapter 4    Qualitative Findings 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the qualitative interpretation of the observational notes and 
interview transcripts. The key findings from the quantitative work outlined in  Chapter 3 
are summarised here. The contributing factors for clinical errors were found to relate to 
the time of the medication administration round observed (with morning and lunchtime 
rounds increasing the risk of MAEs), the mode of drug administration (with bedside-
patient lockers and mixed between bedside administration when prepared in clinic room 
and queuing both increase the risk of MAEs) and the nurse grade or status (with band 5 
nurses increase the risk of MAEs). The contributing factors for procedural errors were 
found to relate to the modes of drug administration (bedside-patient lockers and bedside 
administration when prepared in clinic room) but also it was found that non-psychiatric 
drugs increased the risk of MAEs. The present chapter aims to provide an interpretation 
of these findings. The purpose of the researcher was to first examine their own 
observational notes to provide a systematic interpretation of the causes of the observed 
MAEs. Then nurses and pharmacists were interviewed about their experience of MAEs 
in general and their views about specific cases relating to the observations made in 
order to gain their view about the reasons behind these MAEs. These interviews views 
were then compared with the data from the researcher observation notes.  
4.2 Qualitative data 
For the qualitative data analysis (for both the observation notes and interviews), the 
researcher adopted a codifying process based on thematic analysis. Thematic analysis 
was carried out because it provides a way of organising qualitative interview data in the 
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form of themes: recurrent topics, ideas or statements identified across the corpus of 
data. Thematic analysis also allows for these themes to be mapped against a theoretical 
framework within a deductive approach. The framework of the adapted organisational 
accident causation model was used to identify the themes and make sense of the data. 
Each transcript extract (e.g. part of a sentence) was coded with words or sentences 
against elements of the adapted organisational accident causation model.  
4.2.1 The observational notes 
As described in Chapter 2, the researcher made detailed observational notes during each 
visit to a ward. These notes were personal reflections about the general setting of the 
ward and specific notes about why MAEs occurred and what may have contributed to 
the errors (see Appendices 11 and 12). These notes had been made throughout and the 
researcher coded the notes retrospectively using thematic analysis. The main aim of the 
analysis was to group together specific types of errors (e.g. expiry errors) and to provide 
an interpretation of why these errors had occurred against the coding framework. The 
researcher notes transcript was given a code, RN.  
4.2.2 The interviews  
The semi-structured interviews were completed with eight nurses (three community 
hospital wards nurses, three psychiatric wards nurses and two lead nurses) and four 
pharmacists as previously described. Each interview transcript was given a code, e.g. 
PWN1, PWN2 etc. for the psychiatric wards nurses; CWN1, CWN2, etc. for 
community wards nurses, LN for lead nurses and PH1, PH2 etc. for the pharmacists. 
Table  4.1 and Table  4.2 demonstrate more information about participants’ interviews. 
The researcher then analysed the responses of the nurses and pharmacists using 
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thematic analysis and according to specific MAE types (see Appendix 12). Table  4.3 
presents the main categories and codes used for the thematic analysis.   
Table ‎4.1: Participants nurses interviews’ information 
Participant Gender  Grade Profession Setting of work 
Usual ward 
type working 
CWN1 Female  Band 5 Administered nurse CHWs CHWs 
CWN2 Female Band 5 Administered nurse CHWs CHWs 
CWN3 Female Band 5 Administered nurse CHWs CHWs 
PWN1 Female Band 5 Administered nurse PWs PWs 
PWN2 Female Band 5 Administered nurse PWs PWs 
PWN3 Female Band 5 Administered nurse PWs PWs 
LN1 Female - Lead nurses PWs CHWs and PWs 
LN2 Female - Lead nurses CHWs CHWs 
 
Table ‎4.2: Participants pharmacists interviews’ information 
Participant Gender Profession Setting of work 
Usual ward 
type working 
PH1 Male  Clinical pharmacist CHWs and PWs CHWs 
PH2 Female  Clinical pharmacist PWs PWs 
PH3 Male Clinical pharmacist CHWs and PWs PWs 
PH4 Female Clinical pharmacist  PWs CHWs and PWs 
 
Table ‎4.3: Codes and categories for the observation notes and interviews  
Category Codes Quotes from observation notes or 
interviews as examples 
Active failure  Slips “The nurse was attempting to give 1 gm 
instead of 750 mg” 
Lapses  
 
“I think just forgetting possibly” 
Rule-based mistake  “Because you’re discussing things with 
patients when they come in and you’re 
just giving them a bit of time” 
Knowledge-based mistake  “Not many of them are aware that we 
have to put a date on”  
Situational violation  “Because it’s not careful. I think, it’s just 
like a routine, keep doing that” 
Exceptional violations “Sometimes people sign because they 
have to make sure that they don’t leave 
blank boxes” 
Routine violations “The nurses believe the patient has taken 
it and the nurse isn’t actually 
administering it themselves” 
Error-producing 
condition 
Staff workload (interruptions, 
distractions, ward pressure etc.)  
 
“Maybe it’s the rush, like pressure or 
something” 
Lack of knowledge  “Probably lack of education” 
Miscommunication (drug chart 
not clear) 
Miscommunication (between 
carer and nurse) 
“The charts that when, they need to be 
really clear.  Quite often doctors scribble 
things out or whatever” 
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Patient attitude “But it depends on the nature of our 
patients” 
Inexperience nurse “Some of them like the newly graduated 
students, sorry nurses” 
Nurse attitude “It’s surely a misconduct, they shouldn’t 
do this” 
Latent condition Safety culture and priorities  “I think that’s not talked about enough, so 
it’s not pressed in to people’s minds” 
 
4.3 Observation notes and interviews findings 
The data collected by the researcher through their observational notes and the 
transcripts of the 12 semi-structured interviews were analysed against the adapted 
organisational accident causation model (Taylor-Adams and Vincent, 2004) which has 
been previously described as originating from Reason’s model of organisational 
accidents (Reason, 1997). The purpose of using this framework was to identify people’s 
perceptions about the main causes of the procedural and clinical errors through 
categorisation as active failures, error-producing conditions and latent condition. This 
model provides a helpful structure for the analysis and has been used by others (Dean et 
al., 2002, Taxis and Barber, 2003a). Table  4.4 presents the categorisation of errors as 
procedural versus clinical. Figure  4.1 shows the thematic map underpinning the 
analyses of the observation notes and the interviews.  
Table ‎4.4: The framework used to complete analysis of different error types 
Category Type of error Accident Causation 
 
Procedural 
errors  
Expiry error Active failure category – i.e. slips, lapses, violation, 
mistake etc. 
Error-producing condition 
Latent condition 
Given but unsigned 
Other reason 
 
Clinical errors  
Omitted and 
unsigned  
Active failure category – i.e. slips, lapses, violation, 
mistake etc. 
Error-producing condition 
Latent condition 
Omitted but signed  
Almost not given  
Wrong time error 
Wrong dose 
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Figure ‎4.1: The thematic map for analysis of the observation notes and the interviews 
 
4.3.1 Procedural errors 
4.3.1.1 Reasons for expiry errors 
When expiry errors were made, the active failure was categorised by the researcher 
during the medication administration rounds as a situational violation in the main. This 
means that most, if not all, of the expiry errors were deemed by the researcher to have 
been actions based on conscious decisions by the nurses to not comply with the rules 
about checking expiry dates or rules about writing the date when a new package is 
opened. Situational violations are non-compliance with the rules due to situation-
specific factors such as time pressure and workload.  For example, the researcher noted: 
“The nurse obtained an insulin pen from the fridge and gave it to the patient. This is 
because the patient regularly takes this medication and had their own supply stored in 
the fridge. When I checked to see if there was a label on the insulin pen to indicate 
when it has been opened and therefore when it might expire, I did not find this label. I 
think this error happens because some nurses maybe think that the medication might be 
used up before it expires.” RN 
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In this example, the researcher thinks the main cause of expiry errors is situational 
violation due to the conversation with the nurses during observation about writing the 
opening date of the insulin label, where the nurse said “The insulin is already labelled with 
the dispensing date and the medication might be used up before it expires.” This means that 
the nurse gave a rationale for their action, clearly showing they knew they were not 
adhering to the rules, making this a situational violation. Another example: 
 “The nurse obtained an insulin pen from the fridge and gave it to the patient. This is 
because the patient regularly takes this medication and had their own supply stored in 
the fridge. The nurse was interrupted by the patient. When I checked to see if there was 
a label on the insulin pen to indicate when it has been opened and therefore when it 
might expire, I did not find this label. I think this error happens because some nurses 
noted that some of medications will be removed or relabelled by the pharmacy 
department.” RN 
Also, in this example the researcher thinks about the reason of expiry errors due to the 
conversation with the nurse during observation about writing the opening date of the 
insulin, the nurse said “It is the pharmacy department responsibility and the pharmacy 
technician will remove or relabel the insulin.” In this situation the researcher found that 
most of the nurses were aware of the procedure of checking expiry dates or rules about 
writing the date when a new package is opened due to many of such medications 
observed. However, some nurses did not follow this procedure during the observation 
which identified by the researcher as situational violation; from the conversation with 
the nurses and sometimes from the action made by nurse when checking the 
medication. For example, the nurse only check the dispensing label and the quantity of 
medication when they opened liquid bottle without writing the opening date label. This 
is due to time pressure and workload. Indeed, the researcher interpreted the error-
producing conditions for expiry errors as relating mainly to staff workload based on the 
observations made (e.g. interruption from other staff and some of the patients, ward 
pressure or skill mix). For example for the skill mix: 
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“During the insulin administration most of the nurses were doing other thing such as 
checking the patient blood glucose level.” RN 
In addition, the researcher’s opinion about the latent condition at play related to the 
safety culture and priorities as a part of the organisational and management factors. In 
the researcher’s opinion, the Trust needs to train their nurse staff to increase their belief 
about the safety culture and how to reduce the interruptions, how to organise their tasks, 
and how to separate their priorities during administration. Also, some wards need to be 
more organised to allocate the staff in the right place during administration round to 
reduce work pressure, reducing interruptions and to ensure a suitable skill mix.  
In contrast, the interviews with the nurses revealed a very different view about the 
reasons for expiry errors. Nurses explained expiry errors as errors of omission or 
knowledge-based mistakes. That is, during the interviews most of the nurses described 
expiry errors in the context of forgetting to check the expiry date or forgetting to write 
the opening date of a newly-opened medication package. Or they reported that perhaps 
some nurses are not actually aware of what the rules are in relation to expiry errors. For 
example, one nurse interviewee noted: 
“That, I think that one, it was, it’s probably Gaviscon bottle, it’s a full big bottle, when 
you’re opening that one you asking, patient is asking for ten ml Gaviscon, you’re 
getting that one and giving it straight to the patients and you’re not staying there to 
write the date and time on there at the time so then you forget.”  CWN1  
Lack of knowledge was identified by the nurses as an additional error-producing 
condition, in addition to staff workload already identified by the researcher. The 
researcher related staff workload to safety culture and priorities, the interviewees also 
related staff workload and lack of knowledge to the safety culture and priorities. For 
example, one nurse showed that the nurses need a better safety culture to know this type 
of error: 
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“I think that’s not talked about often enough, about those little things like expiry dates 
and writing when things have been opened.  I think that’s not talked about enough, so 
it’s not pressed in to people’s minds that that’s something you need to be doing on a 
regular basis, whenever you open anything new. I think we don’t, probably don’t 
discuss that enough in terms of medicines management.” PWN1 
The pharmacist interviews indicated a somewhat similar view with the nurses about the 
reasons for expiry errors. Pharmacists described expiry errors as knowledge-based 
mistakes. That is, during the interviews most of the pharmacists described expiry errors 
in the context of nurses not being trained, or not familiar about putting the opening and 
expiry date label onto products. Or they reported that perhaps some nurses do not know 
at all what the rules are in relation to expiry errors. For example, one pharmacist 
interviewee noted: 
“Because I don’t think the nurses are familiar with the process, they’re not familiar 
about putting the expiry date on when they’re opening up liquid medicines; they’re not 
familiar at all. So, they’re not aware of it, I would say, yeah.” PH3 
On the other hand, one pharmacist indicated situational violations as a possible active 
failure category. During the interview, the pharmacist stated expiry errors occurred in 
the context of the nurse considering the date opened and expiry dates as not important 
and deciding not to write the opening and expiry date because they know the pharmacist 
will come and write the date opened.   
In addition, another pharmacist viewed expiry errors as errors of omission and 
explained in the interview that the nurses forget to write the date opened and expiry 
dates; the pharmacist noted:  
“They don’t know that they’ve got to do it for that medicine.  Because it’s not for every 
medicine they don’t know which ones they do have to do it to and they don’t remember 
to do it.” PH4   
Following on from these explanations of expiry errors, lack of knowledge was 
identified by the pharmacists as an error-producing condition, one pharmacist stated: 
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“I know what you are saying but in real life sometimes people don’t do that but it will 
be good so it should be done but it’s not and a lack, is the key, it’s the training, it’s not 
been done.  We should teach, it’s a good point.” PH1 
 
Also, staff workload was identified by only one of the pharmacists: 
“Because they have thousands of other bits of information to remember and trying to 
remember everything is impossible.” PH4 
 
Lack of knowledge was identified by the nurses, in addition to staff workload which 
was also identified by the researcher. The pharmacist and nurses related staff workload 
and lack of knowledge to the safety culture and priorities. For instance, one pharmacist 
expressed that nurses need different skills to be familiarised with and to remind them to 
write the date: 
“I think you need posters, training sessions, reminders, but something has to be at the 
product level where the nurses are using it to remind them to do it.  So, you would have 
a blank sticker on it that says, date opened, expiry date, which they then fill in because 
it’s a visual reminder on the packet for them to do it.” PH4   
 
Another pharmacist said: 
“We should and say, oh look you haven’t write it, it’s wrong.” PH1 
 (Figure  4.2). 
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Figure  4.2: Consolidation of observational notes, nurses’ and pharmacists’ interviews for the 
reason of expiry errors 
4.3.1.2 Reasons for given but unsigned errors 
During the medication administration rounds when nurses gave the medication and left 
the box blank, the active failure was categorised as an omission by the researcher. This 
means that most of these errors were believed by the researcher to have been actions not 
as planned and occurred because the nurses forgot to sign the box. For example, the 
researcher noted: 
“The nurse obtained the tablet from the patient’s locker and gave it to the patient. This 
is because the patient regularly takes this medication and had their own supply stored 
in their locker. However, as the round was moving quickly I noticed that the nurse 
didn’t sign the box on the chart to indicate that this was given. I think this error 
happens because some nurses under the pressure of time, and they forget to sign the 
box which is not happened occasionally in this ward.” RN 
Lapse omission is a short-term memory lapse resulting in forgetting to do what you are 
meant to do. Based on the observations made, the researcher deduced that the error-
producing conditions for this type of procedural errors were relating mainly to staff 
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workload (e.g. work pressure or interruptions). For instance in relation to work 
pressure: 
“The nurse under pressure, many medications for administration today and the nurse 
wants to finish on time.” RN 
Additionally, the researcher also judged that the latent condition related to the safety 
culture and priorities where the nurses have some difficulties to control the interruptions 
as well as not being very familiar in terms of dealing with blank boxes, and some wards 
need to be more organised to minimise work pressure and interruptions. 
The nurse’s view about the reasons for given but unsigned errors was very similar to the 
researcher’s viewpoint. During the interview, most of the nurses thought that forgetting 
to sign the drug chart box was an omission mainly due to different error-producing 
condition such as staff workload and patient attitude. For example, one nurse 
interviewee noted: 
“Yeah, rushing, time, you’ve got to, if you give it then you’ve got to sign it straight 
afterwards.  But if someone distracts you, or the next person’s already come in and you 
put it away and say, oh, I’ll do that later.  It’s not, yeah, you’ve got quite a big chance 
of just forgetting then I think.” PWN1  
Another example relating to workload is where one nurse said: 
 
 “I think because the ward’s busy and we get distracted, too many people want a bit of 
us at the same time.” PWN2 
 
Another nurse stated that: 
“Some patients they do like before breakfast, some they like after breakfast, yeah.  Then 
I don’t know how you’re going to resolve that problem.”  CWN2 
The researcher related staff workload to the safety culture and priorities, the nurses also 
related staff workload but in addition patient attitude to the safety culture and priorities 
(the nurses’ double-checking culture, and to be more focused in the administration 
round). For example, one nurse stated: 
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“Well, I think it’s nurses who are doing the drug round having one, proper dedicated 
time to do the drug round but two, having understanding of the implications of their 
actions, or omissions.” LN1 
In another example, a nurse said: 
“When starting doing medication rounds that’s what they should be focused on, 
nothing else.  That’s what should happen.” PWN2 
The pharmacists indicated a similar view to the researcher and the nurses about the 
reasons for given but unsigned errors. Pharmacists explained this error as an omission. 
Most of the pharmacists, if not all, said that nurses forget to sign because of staff 
workload (e.g. interruption or distraction). Two of the pharmacists added situational 
violation as reasons one pharmacist said that some nurses “not being careful enough” 
PH1 and the other pharmacist stated that some nurses “not following the flow 
procedure” PH2 due to workload (distraction). The error-producing conditions were 
again relating to staff workload. For example, one pharmacist interviewee noted: 
“They get distracted.  Someone interrupts them, they get distracted. The patient asks 
them a question and the person just gets distracted and moves on to the next thing. The 
phone goes, someone, it’s usually interruptions that cause that one.” PH4   
Furthermore, most of interviewed pharmacists related staff workload to the safety 
culture and priorities as the latent condition. For example: one pharmacist stated: 
“Finding a way of not just getting so the nurses don’t have distractions and 
interruptions.  The nature of the psych ward means that its quite hard for them not to be 
interrupted, double checking each other, having two people always there for 
administration.” PH2 
 (Figure  4.3) 
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Figure  4.3: Consolidation of observational notes, nurses and pharmacists’ interviews for the 
reason of given but unsigned errors 
 
 
4.3.1.3 Reason for other errors 
For the ‘other reason’ errors, the active failure was categorised by the researcher 
mainly as situational violation. Also, the researcher believed that most of the identified 
‘other reason’ errors were based on conscious decisions by the nurses to not comply 
with the rules about following the drug usage instructions. In this situation, the 
researcher discovered that a situational violation is the main active failure of other 
reason errors (such as rinsing mouth after using corticosteroid inhaler or did not 
dissolve the dispersible tablet in small amount of water etc.) from the conversation with 
the nurses and sometimes from an action made by the nurse during observation. For 
example, the researcher noted:  
“The nurse obtained the corticosteroid inhaler and gave it to the patient. This is 
because the patient regularly takes this medication and had their own supply stored in 
clinic room. However, I noticed that the nurse didn’t ask the patient to rinse their 
mouth after the use as the ward pharmacist pointed at the drug chart. I think this error 
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happens because some nurses might find that unnecessary to follow the drug usage 
instructions.” RN 
In this example, during the conversation with the nurse about the rinsing mouth after 
using the corticosteroid inhaler the nurse said “The patient has been using the inhaler from 
long time ago and he/she is familiar with the inhaler use.”  
The researcher interpreted the error-producing conditions for ‘other reason’ errors as 
relating to staff workload (e.g. work pressure or skill mix issues) based on the 
observations made. In addition, the researcher’s perspective about the latent condition 
related to the safety culture and priorities where some wards need to allocate the staff in 
the right place during administration round to reduce work pressure, and to ensure 
suitable skill mix.  
However, the interviews with the nurses highlighted a different view to this about the 
reasons for other errors. Most of the nurses talked about reasons for other errors mainly 
as knowledge-based mistakes, then some as situational violation, but also rule-based 
mistakes and omissions. That is, during the interviews most of the nurses described 
other errors as follows. In the context of not telling the patient to rinse their mouth after 
using the corticosteroid inhaler as an example, they reported that perhaps some nurses 
are not actually aware of what the usage instructions are, they do not pay attention, they 
think that patients are already aware of the advice, or they forget to tell the patients 
what the right instructions are. For example, one nurse interviewee said: 
“There is a queue of people waiting, the patient has got other medication that they are 
taking other than the tablets, I mean the inhaler. I have seen it written but not always.  
Ok, maybe, perhaps I am not paying attention, Ok. Definitely education because I 
wasn’t even aware of that myself.” PWN3 
Following on from these explanations of other errors, lack of knowledge was identified, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, by most nurses as an error-producing condition for knowledge-
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based mistakes. This was followed by staff workload for omissions and situational 
violations. For example, one nurse interviewee said: 
“Staff are just too busy. And the nature of our patients sometimes, you get distracted.  
And, I don’t know, because normally they get water with their medications.”PWN2 
 
Also, patient attitude for situational violations as well as rule-based mistakes were other 
error-producing conditions cited by the nurses. The nurse interviewees related staff 
workload, patient attitude, and lack of knowledge to the safety culture and priorities as 
latent conditions. For instances, one nurse stated: 
“I think rather than, over the, the whole thing about medication is about allowing 
enough time for nurses to focus and not be distracted and that would be throughout all 
of them, but I think with those two it's more around competency.” LN2 
 
Another nurse noted: 
I think some nurses would be surprised what the huge variety of errors that you can 
make and what is classed as an error.  I think if we had information about that it would 
make people think. So I think that, more awareness or knowledge of that, would be 
good.” PWN1 
   
The pharmacist interviews showed an almost similar view with the nurses about the 
reasons for other errors. Pharmacists indicated other errors arose due to knowledge-
based mistakes and omissions. That is, during the interviews most of the pharmacists 
described other errors in the context of nurses forgetting or not being aware about 
providing instructions to patients. For example, one pharmacist interviewee said: 
“Yes, and I suspect that is probably due to lack of knowledge of the consequences and 
also lack of experience of the consequences, so they may still know that they should and 
they may know why, but actually they’ve never seen anyone with oral thrush from it.  
So, probably, with no experience, they’ll say I know we’re meant to, but really?  I’ve 
never seen anyone have a consequence from it, so possibly that’s how it’s happened.” 
PH2 
Additionally, inexperienced nurses, and miscommunication between the pharmacists 
and nurses were identified by some pharmacists as error-producing conditions, in 
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addition to staff workload, lack of knowledge which were also identified by the nurses. 
An example in relation to the staff workload is shown here where one pharmacist noted: 
“I think that probably happens quite routinely, the nurses probably will forget to tell 
the patient. I think it’s because the nurses are also distracted.” PH3 
 
 The interviewee pharmacists related all these error-producing condition to the safety 
culture and priorities as latent conditions. For example, one pharmacist said:  
“Yes, perhaps giving them more training and also making sure they’re not distracted 
when they’re giving medicines.” PH3 
 
Another pharmacist said: 
 
“Ensuring instructions are on the prescription and training people to understand the 
importance of the instructions.  And, writing the instructions that people can read 
them.” PH4   
 
(Figure  4.4)  
 
Figure  4.4: Consolidation of observational notes, nurses and pharmacists’ interviews for the 
reason of other errors 
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4.3.2 Clinical errors 
4.3.2.1 Reason for omitted and unsigned errors 
During the medication administration rounds when nurses omitted the medication and 
the charts remained unsigned, the active failure was categorised as an omission by the 
researcher. This means that most of the errors were believed to have been actions not as 
planned that were based on nurses forgetting to give the medication and leaving the box 
on the administration chart blank. For example, the researcher noted: 
“The cream is one of the patient regularly medication and had their own supply stored 
in clinic room. However, I noticed that the nurse forgot to get the cream and give it to 
the patient. There was another patient interrupt the nurse. I was waiting until the nurse 
end with the patient but the nurse still forgot to give and left the box blank. I think this 
error happens because some nurses were confused from the complicated drug charts 
and was interrupted.” RN 
Based on the observations made, the researcher inferred the error-producing conditions 
for this type of clinical errors as relating mainly to staff workload (e.g. ward pressure, 
interruptions or skill mix) and miscommunication (drug chart order not being clear). 
Additionally, the researcher interpreted the latent condition as relating to the safety 
culture and priorities where the nurses have some difficulties controlling the 
interruptions, as well as separating their priority during administration. Also, nurses 
were not quite familiar dealing with omissions and how to solve miscommunication. In 
addition, some wards need to allocate their staff in the right place during administration 
rounds to decrease the work pressure, reduce interruptions and to ensure suitable skill 
mix. More or less similar latent conditions were found by the researcher in other 
clinical errors below.  
Most of the nurse’s views about the active failure category for these errors were similar 
to the researcher’s opinion (i.e. as omissions). In addition, situational violation was 
suggested as an active failure category of this error by one of the nurses. Throughout 
the interviews most of the nurses referred to this error as forgetting to administer the 
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medication and forgetting to sign the drug chart box or that the medication was deemed 
to not be needed due to different error-producing conditions such as written 
miscommunication (drug chart order not clear), staff workload, miscommunication 
between carer and nurse, patient attitude and inexperienced nurses. For example, about 
written miscommunication one nurse interviewee stated: 
“Omissions might happen if perhaps the patient refuses to take the medication and you 
forget to put the refused sign or sometimes it happens because there is, the patient has 
a lot of medication and sometimes things are crossed out, so it’s you’re looking through 
and then you might not realise that something hasn’t been crossed out because maybe 
there’s something above has been crossed out, something below has been crossed out, 
so it’s just a matter of perhaps not looking properly and seeing that it’s not been 
crossed out.” PWN3 
In another example relating to staff workload, other nurse said: 
“I’ve seen charts sometimes that are just, you look at it and it’s, and just the time and 
space to do medication properly. Sometimes you feel a bit rushed by the other pressures 
on the ward and you want to get it done as quickly as possible.”PWN1 
One of the lead nurses had a similar view with other nurses that workload and 
miscommunication between carer and nurse were the error-producing conditions behind 
the omission and unsigned errors, however, this participant pointed out that omission of 
some topical drugs such as E45 cream was due to prescribing errors:  
“So, to me, something like E45 is actually it’s a prescribing error, because it should be 
prescribed PRN rather than at set times.”  LN1 
The researcher had related staff workload and miscommunication (drug chart order not 
clear) to the safety culture and priorities, and similarly the nurses related the error-
producing condition to the safety culture and priorities. For example, one nurse 
interviewee showed the need for two nurses’ availability in administration instead of 
one nurse: 
“Always two staff administering medication and one person should really be checking 
what the other’s administering rather than two of us doing different medications at the 
same time, which does happen.” PWN1 
Another nurse said: 
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“Yeah, so we as an organisation have had a missed medicines not administered 
problem over quite a considerable amount of time.  I don’t think we’re that unusual but 
we have, and so what should happen now is, is at the end of each shift, so as part of 
your nurse in charge responsibilities, is that you should do a blank box audit at the end 
of the shift.” LN1   
Likewise, the interviews with the pharmacists indicated a similar view with the 
researcher and the nurses about the reasons for omitted and unsigned errors. Some 
pharmacists explained this error as an omission and a situational violation due to some 
nurses forgetting to administer, or thinking it is not necessary. One of the pharmacists 
added rule-based mistake as a reason due to some nurses maybe using their own 
judgement for not giving the medication. For example, one pharmacist said: 
“So in terms of the topical preparation itself, this is quite, sometimes people don’t look 
at it, the topical preparation as a medicine.” PH3 
All of the pharmacist interviewees identified that staff workload were the main error-
producing conditions and some added patient attitude and lack of knowledge. For 
example, one pharmacist interviewee noted the staff workload: 
“It is important to understand what type of error it is because if it’s E45 cream that is 
forgotten has minor importance than to give, for example, Flucloxacillin which is an 
antibiotic so it’s very important to know what you are missing because it can happen 
that a cream can be missed but Flucloxacillin definitely it’s very important.  It should 
be investigated. Mostly because nurses have difficult life in the wards and sometimes 
humanly they forget to sign.” PH1  
Furthermore, the pharmacists also related the staff workload, patient attitude and lack of 
knowledge to safety culture and priorities as the latent condition. One pharmacist 
stated: 
“Ward managers need to ensure that nurses have enough time to give medication also 
that they don’t get disturbed while they give medication.” PH1 
In another example, another pharmacist said that: 
“I think it’s about raising the profile and raising the seriousness of it, but I think it 
possible has to come from the nurses themselves, or from senior nursing staff rather 
than from pharmacy, because it’s a bit like we’re just policing them.” PH2  
(Figure  4.5)  
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Figure  4.5: Consolidation of observational notes, nurses and pharmacists’ interviews for the 
reason of omitted and unsigned errors 
4.3.2.2 Reason for omitted but signed errors 
When omitted but signed errors were made during the medication administration 
rounds the active failure was categorised by the researcher as a situational violation or a 
lapse omission. This means that the omitted but signed errors were believed by the 
researcher to be based on conscious decisions by some nurses to not comply about 
giving the medication or forgetting to give it (while signing the drug chart). For 
example, the researcher noted: 
“The cream is one of the patient regularly medication and had their own supply stored 
in the trolley. However, I noticed that the nurse did not get the cream from the patient’s 
medication container and give it to the patient. I was waiting until the nurse end with 
the patient but the nurse still did not give and the box on the chart signed which 
indicated that this was given. I think this error happens because of the work 
environment: the nurse could be under pressure to finish the round on time.”  RN 
This situation was repeated many times during the observation, and when the researcher 
asked the nurses in a side conversation about signing the drug chart without giving the 
medication (specially the topical medication), some psychiatric ward nurses said “oh, 
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sorry I forgot to give the medication, the chart is not clear, I confused between this drug 
and the one crossed above” and other nurses said that “it is busy ward, we have many 
patients today, the carer or patients applied the cream after the morning bath” without 
double-checking with them. The researcher thought of the error-producing conditions 
for omitted but signed errors as relating to staff workload (e.g. nurse under pressure to 
finish the round time or being interrupted) and miscommunication (drug chart order not 
clear) based on the observations made. Furthermore, the researcher’s view about the 
latent condition was that these related to the safety culture and priorities.  
The nurse interviews returned a very similar view as the researcher’s about the reasons 
for omitted but signed errors. Nurses clarified thought of these errors as a situational 
violation or omission. That is, during the interviews most of the nurses described 
omitted but signed errors in the context of forgetting to apply the topical medication or 
dependence on another carer to apply it, as an example. For instance, one nurse 
interviewee noted: 
“With creams that’s, as I said earlier if the nurse would probably say I will do it after 
your wash because if they do it and then they wash it, they’ll wash it off something like 
that or could say, could be like tell the carer when you wash the patient can you apply 
this, but they don’t. So, for me personally I would do it myself, I would make sure that I 
would do it myself and not tell anyone to do it themselves.” CWN3  
During the nurse interviews staff workload was recognised as an error-producing 
condition. For instance, lead nurse stated:  
“Workload, I mean the workload, there is a list of things, tasks that need to be done at 
the end of the day.” LN2   
 
Also, miscommunication between carer and nurse, patient attitude and inexperienced 
nurses were identified as other error-producing conditions. The interviewees related 
these error-producing conditions to the safety culture and priorities. For example, one 
nurse explained: 
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“It's actually about ensuring that qualified nurses have the time to do the drug round 
appropriately, without distractions and be able to follow through on things.” LN2 
 
Another nurse said: 
 
“I think just education really, just education and pointing it out to people if they are 
doing it, supervision maybe.” PWN3 
 
The pharmacists’ interviews presented a different view to the researcher and nurses 
regarding the reasons for omitted but signed errors. Pharmacists thought of these errors 
as errors of exceptional violation, slips, knowledge-based mistakes, situational 
violations and routine violations. During the interviews, most of the pharmacist 
described omitted but signed errors in the context of some nurses signing the drug chart 
just to make sure not to leave blank boxes, “Pop all the medicines out and sign everything 
without looking” PH2, poor practice, relying on patients to self-administer or getting in 
the habit of signing boxes. For example, one pharmacist interviewee noted: 
“I would have thought it’s where the nurses believe the patient has taken it and the 
nurse isn’t actually administering it themselves. They’re expecting the patient to 
administer it and therefore they’re signing it in the part of the drug, and they’re signing 
it going yeah, the patients had it.  But they may or may not have checked properly 
whether the patient has actually had it or not. People get in the habit of signing boxes. 
They just go down the list and sign them all.” PH4  
In addition, nurses’ attitude, inexperienced nurses, lack of knowledge, staff workload 
and miscommunication between patients and nurses were identified by the pharmacists 
as the error-producing condition. An example for staff workload, one pharmacist stated:  
“Because obviously, as I explained before, it’s like they’re working in a distracting 
environment which is high pressurised.  And also, when it comes to topical medicine, as 
I said, it’s very grey, isn’t it, because you, you’re relying on patients, it’s not very, 
whereas with the tablets and things like injections, there’s a point of starting, you’re 
getting the medication and then you’re administering it. Whereas, with topics you’re 
sometimes relying on patients to self-administer.  So you sign for it saying that, oh, the 
patient’s going to self-administer possibly.” PH3   
The pharmacists related all those error-producing conditions to the safety culture and 
priorities. For instance, one pharmacist said: 
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“Well, I’ve been told, and I don’t know if this is true that nurses are not taught at 
university or when they, how to administer medicines, they learn on the job as student 
nurses, so they learn from each other, so if they learn from someone with a poor 
practise, then that is what they’ll do.  We have created a flow chart for how to 
administer medicines, but I somehow doubt that they use it, or that they think it’s 
important because they’re professionals in their own right and they do it the way they 
want to do it, but I suppose pointing out the error that happens from doing it that way, 
maybe that will help.” PH2 
 (Figure  4.6)   
 
Figure  4.6: Consolidation of observational notes, nurses and pharmacists’ interviews for the 
reason of omitted but signed errors 
 
4.3.2.3 Reason for almost not given errors 
For almost not given errors, the active failure was categorised as an omission by the 
researcher during the medication administration rounds. This means that most of these 
errors were believed by the researcher to have been based on nurses forgetting to give 
the medication the first time (before being reminded by the researcher). For example, 
the researcher noted: 
“This tablet is one of the patient regularly medication and had their own supply stored 
in clinic room. However, I noticed that the nurse forgot to get the tablet from the 
cupboard and give it to the patient. The patient interrupts the nurse. I was waiting until 
the nurse finished giving all patient other medication and still forgot to give the tablet. 
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In this time, I Intervene and remind the nurse to give this drug. I think this error 
happens because some nurses were interrupted during the drug administration or 
confused from the complicated drug chart.” RN 
Also, the researcher found that the error-producing conditions for almost not given 
errors related generally due to staff workload (e.g. nurse interrupted during the drug 
administration) and miscommunication (drug chart order not clear). Additionally, the 
researcher inferred that the latent condition related to the safety culture and priorities.  
The nurses’ point of view was similar to the researcher’s about the almost not given 
errors. Most of the nurses during the interviews referred to this error as forgetting to 
administer the medication due to different error-producing conditions such as staff 
workload, patient attitude and inexperienced nurses. For example, one nurse 
interviewee noted: 
“When you’ve got 27 people to do medication for I suppose it’s quite easy to forget to 
go back to someone.  Again, it’s about being organised.  Don’t put the chart away, 
because you haven’t given it yet.  Keep it out.  Yeah, work demands and pressure I think 
usually.” PWN1 
Another nurse stated about the workload: 
“Because of busyness of the ward, interruptions, again you could be going to do 
something someone else calls you with something else.” PWN3 
The nurse interviewees related the different error-producing conditions again to the 
safety culture and priorities as a latent condition. One nurse said: 
“I think we need to be given more time to do it in a proper way.  I’ll quite often just 
take it to them just so that they’ve had it, and remind them, you really do need to come 
to the clinic for your medication.  We’ve got a lot of people, we can’t go round to 
everyone’s rooms, but I’ve brought it this time.” PWN1 
Another nurse noted that they need “More staff really.  I doubt that they will.” CNW2   
Moreover, the interviews with the pharmacists indicated a similar view with the 
researcher and the nurses about the reasons for almost not given errors. Most of the 
pharmacists explained this error as an omission. They described that nurses forget to 
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administer the medication because of staff workload and patient attitudes as error-
producing conditions. One pharmacist added knowledge-based mistakes as reasons that 
some nurses do not look properly at the drug chart and related that to lack of knowledge 
and miscommunication between the doctors and nurses. One pharmacist interviewee 
noted: 
“I think they must, they might have got distracted or interrupted, I know you looked at 
that about why that might have happened, or there might have been a second chart or 
they couldn’t find something, they moved on and they forgot to go back and look at it 
again, yes I’m sure it can happen. Interruptions, distractions, busy, psychiatric wards, 
depends which ward it was, was it CHS wards or psychiatric wards, but they’re very 
busy, stressful environments and I think the nurses just have a lot of interruptions and a 
lot going on that they have to do.” PH2   
Furthermore, most of the interviewed pharmacists related the error-producing 
conditions to safety culture and priorities as the latent conditions. One pharmacist 
mentioned that: 
“Methods again I suppose, so if a patient isn’t up, maybe there is somewhere that you 
put the chart, separated, so we know that person still needs to have the medication, 
maybe it’s written on a whiteboard.  Maybe on the whiteboard in the nurse’s office, 
they’re highlighted to say this person hasn’t had their morning medicine so that all the 
nursing staff know, so I think it’s just about methods that are consistently followed.” 
PH2 
Another pharmacist said: 
“I think, as I said before, having those two nurses so that, if there is something 
distracting, then there is one nurse who will be able to follow it and allow the other 
nurse to on with the medication.” PH3 
 (Figure  4.7)  
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Figure  4.7: Consolidation of observational notes, nurses and pharmacists’ interviews for the 
reason of almost not given errors 
 
4.3.2.4 Reason for wrong time errors 
During the medication administration rounds, the active failure for wrong time errors 
was categorised by the researcher as rule-based mistakes. This means that the WTEs 
were considered to have been actions that were based on decision-making failures or 
errors of judgement by the nurses. For example, the researcher noted: 
“The nurse obtained the tablet from patient’s locker and gave it to the patient. This is 
because the patient regularly takes this medication every day and the supply stored in 
their locker. I detected that the nurse gave it at 10:03 am instead of 8:00 am. I think 
this error happens because of the extreme task demands e.g. high workloads where 
most patients were polypharmacy.” RN 
Based on the observations made, the researcher related the error-producing conditions 
for this type of clinical error to staff workload (e.g. high workloads where most patients 
were on multiple medications). In addition, the researcher thought again that the latent 
condition related to the safety culture and priorities.  
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Further, the nurse interviews revealed the same opinion as the researcher’s about the 
reasons for wrong time errors as errors of rule-based mistake. During the interviews, 
most of the nurses described wrong time errors in the context of decisions-making 
failures due to staff workload (e.g. ward pressure), patient attitude or inexperienced 
nurses as examples of error-producing condition. For instance, one nurse interviewee 
noted: 
“Because you’re discussing things with patients when they come in and you’re just 
giving them a bit of time.  And obviously if you give all the 27 patients that bit extra 
time it takes longer.” PWN1   
Another nurse added: 
“It does happen, yes, it does happen, example if staff coming outside, they’re not used 
to in the ward.  If permanent staff is very rare, I haven't seen anybody doing medicine 
more than two hours.  But then I see a few staff who outside and they’re taking more 
than two hour, because they’re not used to it and it will take time to find the medicine 
and go through, yeah.” CWN2 
The nurse interviewees related staff workload, patient attitude and inexperience nurses 
to safety culture and priorities as the latent condition. For example, one nurse stated: 
“That’s about having the person who’s in charge of the whole ward allocating those 
jobs appropriately, and actually, if the nurse is doing meds, then that nurse needs to be 
doing meds, not dealing with the lunch trolley, as an example.” LN1 
The pharmacists showed a similar view as the researcher and the nurse opinions about 
the WTEs being rule-based mistakes. Most of the pharmacists stated that WTEs 
occurred because of decision-making failures, relating the conditions to staff workload, 
as error-producing condition. For example, one pharmacist interviewee noted: 
“It’s very difficult, if the nurse is trying her best to get round in two hours, it’s very 
hard to call it an error, so it’s a type of error, so if they’re trying their best and they 
just simply can’t do it in two hours, but maybe their ward manager needs to put two 
nurses on doing the medication, so that it is possible for them to do it within two hours. 
Distractions and just a lot of medication, a lot of stuff when it’s once daily is usually 
just put in the morning because that’s just the convention and that makes the morning 
rounds very, very busy and people are getting up, they need to get washed, they need 
their breakfast, so there’s just a lot going on for that also to be the biggest round in the 
morning.” PH2 
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Also, the pharmacists related the error-producing condition to the safety culture and 
priorities. One pharmacist explained: 
“It’s more for the ward manager that should organise their staff to make sure that they 
complete the ward round within whatever, two hours (inaudible) If he’s more, 
something went wrong, we need to rearrange the staff because if he’s, I don’t think 
nurses are lazy it’s just that they are busy and they cannot finish.” PH1 
(Figure  4.8) 
 
Figure  4.8: Consolidation of observational notes, nurses and pharmacists’ interviews for the 
reason of wrong time errors 
 
4.3.2.5 Reason for wrong dose errors 
The active failure for wrong dose errors was categorised by the researcher as slips or 
situational violations. This means that the wrong dose errors were thought to have been 
based on the wrong physical actions or non-compliance with the rules. For slip 
example, the researcher noted: 
“The nurse obtained the tablet from the locked trolley and gave it to the patient. This is 
because the patient regularly takes this medication as inpatient.  I noticed that the 
nurse was attempting to give 1 gm instead of 750 mg then I intervene and remind to 
give the right dose. I think this happen because of the time pressure.” RN 
 
Qualitative Findings                                                                                      Chapter 4 
 
166 
 
The slips happen because the nurse selects the right item but the wrong dose. In another 
example for the situational violation, the researcher noted: 
 
“The nurse obtained the ampoule from the trolley and gave it to the patient. This is 
because the patient regularly takes this medication as inpatient. I noticed that the nurse 
was attempting to give 0.3 ml instead of 0.2 ml then I intervene and remind to give the 
right dose. I think this happens because of the extreme task demands.” RN 
When the researcher asked the nurse about taking 0.3 ml instead of 0.2 ml and whether 
she knows the right dose or not, the nurse said “It is a busy ward and I took all the 
ampule but I know the right dose.” Based on the researcher observations, the related 
error-producing conditions for this type of clinical error were judged mainly to be 
related to staff workload (e.g. ward pressure or extreme task demands). In addition, the 
researcher expected that the latent condition related to the safety culture and priorities.  
Moreover, the nurse interviews revealed a different view to the researcher about the 
reasons for wrong dose errors; they judged these as being knowledge-based mistakes 
and situational violations. One of the nurses also added omission as an active failure 
category. During the interviews, most of the nurses described wrong dose errors in the 
context of nurses not being careful, or not knowing how to calculate and they related 
these to different error-producing conditions such as of staff workload (e.g. ward 
pressure), lack of knowledge, miscommunication (drug chart order not clear) and 
inexperienced nurses. For example, one nurse interviewee noted: 
“Well as I say from if they don’t know how to calculate their, the liquid.  But especially 
the tinzaparin do you know, if they don’t know how, like 4,500 and 3,500 they come in 
different colours as well isn’t it.” CWN3   
Another nurse added that: 
“Yeah, definitely.  I think again I think sometimes nurses, particularly nurses that have 
been working a long time, rather than really taking in instructions, perhaps glance 
over.  Think, oh I know what this says.  Fill in the gaps kind of thing.  I think it’s always 
best for us not to assume that you know and to read what’s directed properly.” PWN1  
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The nurse interviewees related these conditions to the safety culture and priorities 
(latent conditions). One nurse stated: 
“Two staff that double check, having two staff to double check. Because some of the 
injections are preloaded.” PWN2 
Another nurse said: 
“Study days, and training and general discount of things. Double check always, yeah, 
always.  If you’re not sure ask your second opinion.” CWN2    
In addition, the pharmacists’ interviews revealed a similar view with the nurses about 
the reasons for wrong dose errors as being knowledge-based mistakes and situational 
violations e.g. most of the pharmacists stated that wrong dose errors occurred because 
of nurses not being careful or not knowing how to calculate and these were related to 
lack of knowledge and staff workload as error-producing conditions. One pharmacist 
added that sometimes proper equipment was not available.. For example, one 
pharmacist interviewee noted: 
“Extremely poor training of the nurse that should know how to measure the right 
amount.  They should be able to otherwise how can they be a registered nurse?” PH1 
Another pharmacist said: 
“Why is it, because I think the nurse may not be familiar with maths, her mathematics 
may not be good.  So, and they may, again, could be possibly distracted.” PH3  
Also, most pharmacists related the error-producing condition to the safety culture and 
priorities (latent condition). For instance, one pharmacist explained: 
“Practise I suppose and double checking each other if they’re in any doubt.  If they’re 
feeling uncomfortable or doubtful, they should go and get checked, get a second 
check.” PH2 
(Figure  4.9) 
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Figure  4.9: Consolidation of observational notes, nurses and pharmacists’ interviews for the 
reason of wrong dose errors 
 
Overall, Table  4.5 below illustrates the main active failure categories from the different 
perspectives, for procedural errors and Table  4.6 shows the main active failure 
categories for clinical errors from the overall observational notes and nurses’ and 
pharmacists’ interviews. Table  4.7 shows the summary of MAE causes from the 
observational notes that illustrate the numbers of active failure, error-producing 
condition and latent condition for each detected error.  
Table ‎4.5: Active failures compared through the analysis – procedural errors 
 Expiry errors Given but unsigned Other errors 
Researcher  Situational 
violations 
 Lapse (omissions)  Situational violations 
Nurses  Lapse (omissions) 
 Knowledge-based 
mistakes 
 Lapse (omissions)  Situational violations 
 Knowledge-based 
mistakes 
 Lapse (omissions) 
 Rule-based mistakes 
Pharmacists  Knowledge-based 
mistakes 
 Lapse (omissions) 
 Situational 
violations 
 Lapse (omissions) 
 Situational 
violations 
 Knowledge-based 
mistakes 
 Lapse (omissions) 
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Table ‎4.6: Active failures compared through the analysis – clinical errors 
 Omitted and 
unsigned 
Omitted but 
signed 
Almost not 
given 
Wrong 
time error 
Wrong dose 
error 
Researcher  Lapse 
(omissions) 
 Lapse 
(omissions) 
 Situational 
violations 
 Lapse 
(omissions) 
 Rule-
based 
mistakes 
 Situational 
violations 
 Slips 
Nurses  Lapse 
(omissions) 
 Situational 
violations 
 Lapse 
(omissions) 
 Situational 
violations 
 Lapse 
(omissions) 
 Rule-
based 
mistakes 
 Situational 
violations 
 Knowledge-
based 
mistakes 
 Lapse 
(omissions) 
Pharmacists  Lapse 
(omissions) 
 Situational 
violations 
 Rule-based 
mistakes 
 Exceptional 
violations 
 Situational 
violations 
 Routine 
violations 
 Slip  
 Knowledge-
based 
mistakes 
 Lapse 
(omissions) 
 Knowledge-
based 
mistakes 
 Rule-
based 
mistakes 
 Situational 
violations 
 Knowledge-
based 
mistakes 
 
Table ‎4.7: Summary of MAEs causes from the observational notes   
 MAEs Active failure Error-producing condition Latent 
condition 
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Procedural 
errors 
Expiry Error      118  118      118 
Given but 
unsigned 
 18      18      18 
Other reason      57  57      57 
 
 
 
 
Clinical 
errors  
Omitted and 
unsigned 
 49      41 8     49 
Omitted but 
signed 
 5    14  14 5     19 
Almost not given  19      16 3     19 
Wrong time error    47    34   13   47 
Wrong dose 19     5  22   2   24 
Un-prescribed 
drug 
2     1  2 1     3 
Extra Dose     3   3      3 
Formulation Error 6     4  5 4  1   10 
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From the researcher observation note, nurses and pharmacists’ perspectives; there is no 
difference in active failures relating to the MAEs found between the psychiatric and 
community hospital wards as well as in the latent conditions. The researcher found that 
the situational violation was the same active failure of the expiry errors in both PWs 
and CHWs. Moreover, some nurses and pharmacists revealed that lapses were the same 
active failure for the expiry errors from both PWs and CHWs. One psychiatric ward 
nurse stated: 
“We just forget. We just get the medications and open it to dispense it. I don’t know. I 
think, yeah, just generally you just go to the cupboard, you open it up, you dispense. 
Yeah, I suppose you just, some people just forget.”PWN2 
 
Another community hospital ward nurse said: 
 
“Maybe they forget, maybe it’s the rush, like pressure or something.” CWN2 
 
In addition, some contributing factors were found more in the psychiatric wards such as 
written miscommunication (drug chart not clear) and patient factors. Whereas the verbal 
miscommunication (between the nurse the carers) were found more in the community 
hospital wards. For example, for omitted and unsigned one of PWs nurse illustrated 
that: 
“Sometimes I think the drug cards are too many crossing outs from the doctors, where 
they’ve crossed out medications.  So I think that’s easy sometimes to miss, to miss the 
medication.” PWN2  
Other CWs nurse explained: 
“The E45 and the Cetraben creams are keeping with the patients.  Ideally we are not 
the one who are doing that medications because that is prescribed but the carer is or 
the patients themselves, they are doing it.  Yeah so that’s the reason it happens.  You 
wait for them to use it and then sign it.” CWN1 
 
Qualitative Findings                                                                                      Chapter 4 
 
171 
 
Furthermore, from the observation note the researcher found that most of the WTEs 
were linked to three CHWs used bedside-patient locker as a mode of administration and 
morning observation rounds. Similar notes were written each visit detected WTEs. For 
example, CHW1:  
“This ward is used bedside locker, the administration round start at 8:00 am and finish 
at 10:25 am (more than 2 hours). There are many medications given after 2 hours.” RN    
CHW2: 
“This ward is used bedside locker, the administration round start at 8:00 am and finish 
at 10:15 am (more than 2 hours). There are many medications given after 2 hours.” RN  
CHW9: 
“This ward is used bedside locker, the administration round start at 8:00 am and finish 
at 10:25 am (more than 2 hours). There are many medications given after 2 hours.” RN  
 
Also, from the observation note the researcher found that older adult patient in 
psychiatric wards used many non-psychotropic medications beside their psychotropic 
medication. For example, the researcher noted in one visit of the psychiatric ward used 
bedside-prepared in clinic room mode of administration PW8: 
“The nurse under pressure, many medications was administered and most of it was 
non-psychiatric medications. Most of the patient need to be persuaded to take their 
medications and the nurse find difficult to give the patients their medications.” RN  
 
The above findings showed the causes of MAEs from the researcher’s notes 
perspective, the nurses and pharmacists views. The next section is about the MAEs 
from nurse and pharmacist opinions by answering other interviews questions as 
follows: 
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1- If they agree in principle that specific type of error should be coded as a 
medication administration error?  
2- If they come across similar examples of this error in the past? or if this error 
could happen? 
3- What would be the impact on the patient from the MAEs?  
4- What would help to reduce the occurrence of this type of medication 
administration error? 
 
Regarding question one, whether the participants agreed with the specific type of action 
being classed as an error; most of the nurses and pharmacists agreed about most of the 
situations (such as omitted and unsigned, omitted but signed, almost not given, given 
and unsigned, expiry errors, other reason errors, WTEs, and wrong dose) that it is an 
MAEs. For example, one nurse interviewee stated that: 
 “Yeah I do, because obviously if it’s not signed off on the drug chart it’s not given 
because you don’t have the proof that you’ve given it unless you sign it.” CWN3   
 
In another example, one pharmacist interviewee said: 
“Yes, I think so.  It’s a medication administration error because they didn’t check the, 
we cannot know if we give something expired, yeah.” PH1 
 
Whereas a few of nurses disagreed whether in some of the situations (such as almost 
not given and other reason errors) where occurred is an MAEs. Also, a few pharmacists 
disagreed about whether some of the situations (such as omitted but signed, almost not 
given, and other reason errors) were MAEs. For instance, during the interview, the 
researcher asked whether they agreed in principle that did not rinse the patient mouth 
after giving the corticosteroid inhaler should be coded as medication administration 
error? One nurse noted: 
 “It is not medication administration error.” CWN1   
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Another example, one of the pharmacists said: 
“I don’t think it’s a medication error on a nurse’s part, I don’t think.  It’s more like, 
because someone would have counselled the patient, they could have counselled them, 
you need to rinse.” PH3 
 
On the other hand, regarding the question of whether these types of errors could happen 
in practice, most of the nurse and pharmacist interviewees agreed, however, some of the 
participants disagreed e.g. about the omitted but signed error, one of the nurses noted 
that: 
“I don’t think that happens. They sign without giving the medication?” PWN3 
 
In another example discussing the wrong time error one of the pharmacist stated that: 
“No, it shouldn’t, no. So, they should be able to do it in two hours.” PH1 
 
Moreover, most of the nurse and pharmacist participants agreed that most of MAEs 
could have a negative impact on the patient. For instance, the impact of “giving the 
medication but unsigned” one nurse stated: 
“They could potentially receive their medication twice, which could be terrible.  Yeah, 
hopefully nothing, hopefully the person will go, oh, I need to sign that.  But potentially 
they could receive that twice, and that’s not good.” PWN1 
 
Another example, one pharmacist noted: 
“The risk to the patient is they get it again.  That someone else comes along and gives it 
again or the nurse then gives it again and then they can’t remember they’ve given it 
and they give it again anyway.  Or they, yeah, they’ve had the medicine, the risk is of 
getting it again.” PH4 
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Finally, the nurse and pharmacist participants were asked about how to reduce the 
different type of MAEs via ‘remedial interventions’? Some of the nurses had common 
suggestions (for example less interruption/distraction, self-double-check, two staff 
double-check each other’s, training and education about errors), to reduce the omitted 
and unsigned errors, one of the nurses stated that: 
  
“Yeah just check daily to make sure, a second person, they check on the drug chart.” 
CWN2 
 
Most of the pharmacists had similar suggestions and added for example about the need 
for better planning for nurse staff, more staff organised, and raising the error profile to 
reduce the other reason errors, and one of the pharmacists noted that:  
 “I suppose pharmacy raising the profile again.  We do meds management courses and 
I think that a lot of these, so all the nurses have to go on the meds management course 
and I think that raising these issues as part of the course will raise its profile.” PH2 
 
4.4 Summary  
In this chapter, the collected data were arranged and categorised deductively based on a 
framework of organisational accident causation, and the findings were compared 
between the observation notes and interviews, including the procedural errors were 
expiry errors, given but unsigned and other reason errors; the clinical errors were 
omitted and unsigned, omitted but signed, almost not given, wrong time error and 
wrong dose. The categories assigned to the errors were the active failure category in the 
first stage followed by the error-producing conditions and the latent conditions. 
Table  4.8 shows the overall findings quantitative and qualitative causation of MAEs 
using the “mixed methods matrix” (O’Cathain et al., 2010).  
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In summary the main active failure category for clinical errors was understood to be 
‘lapses’, the main error-producing condition ‘staff workload’ and the main latent 
condition ‘safety culture and priorities’. For omissions there appeared to be a range of 
contributing reasons including workload, miscommunication and staff-related factors. 
The main active failure category for procedural errors was judged to be ‘situational 
violations’ by the researcher, especially in relation to expiry errors and other reasons 
(e.g. adhering to counselling instructions) but this was not the view of nurses and 
pharmacists who painted a more blameless picture of the workplace. Overall, the 
analysis of these qualitative data as well as the quantitative data will be discussed in 
relation to the research objectives in the next chapter. 
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Table ‎4.8: The overall findings quantitative and qualitative causation of MAEs 
Category 
 
 
 
 
Type of 
error 
Cause of MAEs 
Researcher notes Nurses interview  Pharmacists interview  
 
PRM 
 
 
Active failure Error-producing 
condition 
Active failure Error-producing 
condition 
Active failure Error-producing 
condition 
 
Procedural 
errors  
Expiry 
error 
Situational 
violations
  
Staff workload Lapse, Knowledge-
based mistakes  
Staff workload, 
Lack of knowledge 
Knowledge-based 
mistakes, Lapse, 
Situational violations 
Staff workload, 
Lack of knowledge 
PRM for procedural errors 
found 
-Bedside-prepared in clinic 
room and bedside-patient 
locker are increased risk by 
136% and 54% 
-Non-psychiatric drugs 
resulting in an increased risk 
of 2.3 times the psychiatric 
drugs 
Given 
but 
unsigned 
Lapse  Staff workload Lapse Staff workload, 
Patient attitude 
Lapse, Situational 
violations 
Staff workload 
Other 
reason 
Situational 
violations 
Staff workload Situational violations, 
Knowledge-based 
mistakes, Lapse,  
Rule-based mistakes 
Staff workload, 
Patient attitude, 
Lack of knowledge 
Knowledge-based 
mistakes, Lapse  
Staff workload, 
Lack of knowledge 
 
Clinical 
errors  
Omitted 
and 
unsigned  
Lapse Staff workload, 
Miscommunication 
Lapse, 
Situational violations 
Staff workload, 
Miscommunication 
Lapse, Situational 
violations, Rule-based 
mistakes 
Staff workload, 
Patient attitude 
PRM for clinical errors 
found 
-08:00 and 12:00 
significantly increased risk 
of clinical errors by 2.5 and 
2.4 times  
- Bedside-patient locker and 
mixed mode of 
administrations are 
significantly increased risk 
of 2.4 and 2.7 times  
-Band 6 and agency nurses 
staff are significantly 
different from band 5 nurses 
staff with a lower risk of 
47% and 43% respectively 
Omitted 
but 
signed  
Lapse,  
Situational 
violations 
Staff workload, 
Miscommunication 
Lapse, 
Situational violations 
Staff workload, 
Miscommunication, 
Patient attitude,  
Inexperience nurse 
Exceptional 
violations, Situational 
violations, Routine 
violations, Slip, 
Knowledge-based 
mistakes 
Staff workload, 
Miscommunication, 
Nurse attitude,  
Inexperience nurse, 
Lack of knowledge 
Almost 
not given  
Lapse Staff workload, 
Miscommunication 
Lapse Staff workload, 
Patient attitude 
Lapse, Knowledge-
based mistakes 
Staff workload, 
Lack of knowledge 
Wrong 
time 
error 
Rule-based 
mistakes 
Staff workload Rule-based mistakes Staff workload, 
Patient attitude, 
Inexperience nurse 
Rule-based mistakes Staff workload 
Wrong 
dose 
Situational 
violations, 
Slips 
Staff workload, 
Inexperience nurse 
Situational violations, 
Knowledge-based 
mistakes, Lapse  
Staff workload, 
Miscommunication 
Situational violations,  
Knowledge-based 
mistakes 
Staff workload, 
Lack of knowledge 
* Researcher, nurses and pharmacists related these conditions to the safety culture and priorities as latent conditions
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Chapter 5     Discussion 
This chapter discusses the findings of this study with regard to the work of other 
published scholars about MAEs. In this study, a mixed-method approach was adopted 
to combine the data from different sources.  
Firstly, the quantitative data of this research presents the results of ward observations, 
including verifiable relationships between the number of errors found and a number of 
potential contributing factors which increase the risk of procedural errors and clinical 
errors. 
Secondly, qualitative data analysis was also undertaken in order to provide supportive 
evidence about the cause of MAEs; through the researcher’s observation notes, nurse 
and pharmacist interviews on experiences of medication administration errors, and 
these findings offered an understanding of opinions and perceptions about causes of 
MAEs and contributory factors within the Trust wards. This chapter presents a 
comparison and triangulation of both the quantitative and qualitative data.  
5.1 Quantitative data  
There are no previous studies observing MAEs in community hospital wards as well as 
psychiatric wards and studies of psychiatric wards are limited. A large direct 
observational study by Cottney and Innes (2015), investigated medication 
administration errors on mental-health wards arguing that these warrant separate 
investigation because the mode of administration on these wards is different to common 
practice in general wards. For example, patients in mental-health settings can attend a 
central location to receive their medication rather than receiving their medication at 
their bedside.  
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In this current study, 19 wards were observed (9 community hospital wards and 10 
psychiatric wards) during different medication administration rounds and this is the first 
study that combines psychiatric wards and community hospital wards. Moreover, this 
research study is particularly novel because it has investigated different modes of 
administration using the same researcher and methodology; i.e. medicines administered 
from clinic room that includes the queuing mode, bedside-prepared in clinic room or 
mixed administration mode on psychiatric wards, and medicines administered from 
drug trolley or from patient locker in community hospital wards.  
Overall, the quantitative findings showed a total error incidence rate of 16.4%. The 
MAEs rate reduced to 14% after excluding WTEs as some other studies have (Bruce 
and Wong, 2001, Chua et al., 2010). The MAEs rate in this current study was above the 
average error rate in the UK from studies that have observed non-IV medications using 
paper drug charts, which have shown the rate to range from 3%-8% (Dean et al., 1995, 
Ho et al., 1997, Taxis et al., 1999, Cottney and Innes, 2015). Only one previous study 
has shown a higher error rate of 25.9% which took place on psychiatric wards (Haw et 
al., 2007). On the other hand, when the errors were separated according to procedural 
errors and clinical errors; the clinical error rate in the current study was 7.7% which is 
within the error rate range noted in other studies (Dean et al., 1995, Ho et al., 1997, 
Taxis et al., 1999, Cottney and Innes, 2015).  
In addition, when the error rate was divided according to ward type; the CHWs error 
rate was 17.4% and PWs error rate was 15.2% where both rates were still above the 
error range noted in other studies (Dean et al., 1995, Ho et al., 1997, Taxis et al., 1999, 
Cottney and Innes, 2015) and within the error rate range (8.6-28.3%) noted in a 
systematic review study (Keers et al., 2013b). Also, MAEs rate of PWs in current study 
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was still within the range (3.3-48%) that was stated in a mental-health systematic 
review study by Alshehri et al. (2017).  
Furthermore, comparing the errors detected showed that expiry error was the most 
frequent type of MAEs followed by omissions. Other studies reported in the literature 
review stated omissions as the most frequent type of MAEs (Dean et al., 1995, Ho et 
al., 1997, Taxis et al., 1999, Cottney and Innes, 2015). This difference in what 
constitutes the most frequent type of medication administration error as found in this 
research compared to the literature could be due to the study setting which combined 
psychiatric wards and community hospital wards, whereas previous studies have 
focused on either psychiatric wards or general hospital wards. However, another 
explanation for the high rate of expiry errors found could be due to the definition and 
procedure for classifying this type of error as described below. 
In this study, the definition of expiry errors was very broad and included the 
administration of the drug that did not have a label showing the opening and expiry date 
such as (liquid medication, eye drops and insulin). In the literature, however, there is no 
consistency in relation to what counts as an expiry error. Whereas the very strict 
definition would be “the administration of a drug that had deteriorated due to incorrect 
ward storage or had exceeded its expiry date” (Taxis et al., 1999), however, in this 
research, the broader definition used resulted in the findings noted above. 
Furthermore, the results from the total of MAEs included the procedural and clinical 
errors where in most previous studies clinical errors were the only MAEs reported. If 
for the current study, clinical errors only are considered, omission was the most 
frequent type of error overall similar to previous studies (Dean et al., 1995, Ho et al., 
1997, Taxis et al., 1999, Cottney and Innes, 2015). Correspondingly, by separating the 
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errors type between the CHWs and PWs, still the expiry errors were the most frequent 
type of MAEs followed by omissions. However, when considering the clinical errors 
only, omission was the most frequent type of error in CHWs and PWs followed by 
WTEs in CHWs and wrong dose in PWs, this was similar to error type finding in the 
study by Alshehri et al. (2017). 
Another finding presented in the current study is that most of the errors detected were 
of little clinical importance. The potential harm from the errors detected were 
considered minor in both CHWs and PWs, which supports the finding of previous 
studies (Berdot et al., 2013, Cottney and Innes, 2015, Alshehri et al., 2017) which 
showed that most of the errors detected were of minor clinical importance. Cottney also 
divided the severity of error into four categories (Negligible, Minor, Serious and Fatal), 
however, in the current study the errors found were categorised to potential of harm, 
and no harm.  
5.2 Contributing factors increase the risk of errors  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the purpose of the study was to identify the baseline rate of 
MAEs at BHFT and to determine the relationship between possible contributing factors 
and the error rate. The PRM was used to determine the combination of some variables 
(contributing factors) with regard to the occurrence of MAEs. The test revealed that, 
two contributing factors in relation with the risk of procedural errors and three 
contributing factors in relation with the risk of clinical errors. 
Considering the impact of the administration mode on increasing the risk of errors; for 
example, in bedside-patient locker the findings showed that the procedural errors and 
clinical errors had a similar rate which is also considered a very high rate. The expiry 
errors and the wrong time errors were the highest type of error in this situation. On 
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closer examination, it becomes apparent that the three wards (CHW1, CHW2 and 
CHW9) which used bedside-patient locker were experiencing the highest number of 
expiry errors and wrong time errors. Comparing the findings with some previous 
studies mentioned in the literature review (Camac et al., 1996, Hogg et al., 2012), these 
had reported that the bedside-patient locker helped to reduce the error rate. Another 
study by Dean and barber (2000), found that there was no difference between the uses 
of bedside medicine cabinets vs. the traditional system, on the MAEs rate. However, the 
finding of this research study is different compared to the previous studies; that the 
bedside-patient lockers are one of the factors that could increase the risk of MAEs. 
Moreover, the finding that the nurses were taking too long to finish the round when 
using patient lockers mode of administration, is in direct contrast to the National 
Prescribing Centre (NPC, 2007, 2008) which suggested bedside-patient locker could 
help to make better use of nurses’ time.  
Other findings from the current study are that the expiry errors rate was very high in 
bedside-prepared in clinic room mode of administration when compared to the other 
modes. Bedside administration where the medication is prepared in clinic room is a 
common administration mode used in psychiatric wards that care for older adults’ 
patients with dementia. Most of these expiry errors in this instance were related to non-
psychiatric medications such as liquid bottles, eye-drop and insulin for older adults in 
these wards which were prepared in the clinic room but administered by the patients’ 
bedside. According to Trust procedures, there are specific medications which should be 
labelled with a date they were opened to calculate the expiry date. The older adults’ 
patients on these wards usually had a lot of non-psychiatric medications besides their 
psychiatric medications and that showed the bedside-prepared in clinic room could 
increase the risk of these procedural errors.  
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Moreover, the researcher believed from the point of view of an observer, in wards using 
‘bedside-prepared in clinic room’ some nurses were occasionally under pressure and 
found it hard dealing with several older patients sequentially all in one round. Here 
there were patients with disabilities and evidence of cognitive decline, and providing 
them their medications, taking into account that some of the patients had a high number 
of medications, potentially resulted in nurses making a conscious decision to not 
comply with the rules about checking the opening and expiry date or rules about writing 
the date when a new package is opened. This meant that on reflection, the researcher 
categorised the expiry errors occurred due to nurses’ staff workload and this 
contributing to ‘situational violation’. However, the nurses had a different point of view 
that usually expiry errors happened which to them was because ‘some’ nurses’ lack of 
knowledge or forgetting due to work pressure. In this way, the health professionals 
interviewed painted a more innocent picture of the workplace where mistakes occurred 
not consciously but unintentionally. 
Another point is that the omissions rate was higher in ‘mixed bedside-prepared in clinic 
room and queue mode of administration’ compared with the omission rate in other 
modes. The ‘mixed bedside and queue’ mode is one of the administration modes used 
in psychiatric wards. Omissions could occur because different modes were being used 
at the same time, which left some nurses under pressure and (in the researcher’s 
opinion) confused. Therefore, omissions were considered by the researcher to be mainly 
related to nurses’ forgetting, akin to Reason’s category of ‘lapses’ due to workload as a 
contributory factor. This provides an explanation for why the ‘mixed bedside and queue 
mode’ could increase the risk of clinical errors. In addition, the researcher observations, 
and nurses’ and pharmacists’ points of views were similar, in that lapses are the most 
relevant reason for omissions and that this is due to workload.  
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Another finding was that non-psychiatric drugs increased the risk of procedural error. 
This could be because the requirement to add expiry dates relates to liquid bottles, eye 
drops and insulin which are mainly non-psychiatric, also most of ‘other reasons’ for 
MAEs found related to inhalers or tablets which were categories of medicines that were 
mainly non-psychiatric. For example, dispersible aspirin, where the tablets were not 
dissolved prior to administration, the orodispersible tablets of olanzapine (although this 
is a psychiatric drug) which patients were told to swallow directly (rather than 
dispersing in the mouth), and corticosteroid inhalers where patients were not directed to 
rinse their mouth straight after use. Usually, the dispersible and orodispersible tablets 
are clearly written in the drug chart, and rinsing mouth straight after use corticosteroid 
inhalers is written in green by the pharmacist that nurses needed to do this. This meant 
that on reflection, the researcher categorised the ‘other reasons’ for MAEs occurred due 
to nurses wilfully choosing not to do something due to staff workload, which is 
contributing to situational violation. A study by Maidment et al. (2008) stated that non-
psychiatric medication in older adult mental-health sittings are considered as one 
potential risk factor linked to errors.   
In addition, from the analysis of the results, 08:00 is one of the factors that could 
increase the risk of clinical errors. It was found that some drug administration rounds 
took a long time to complete in the morning rounds which resulted in a higher 
occurrence of wrong time errors. This administration time was the only time where 
WTEs occurred frequently. This is explained by the fact that the morning rounds are 
busier than other rounds due to the higher number of medicines being prescribed to be 
given in the morning. An indication of the busy nature of wards in the morning rounds 
is gleaned by considering that the average OE for 08:00 round was 50 compared to just 
17 for 12:00 rounds. A study by Rodriguez-Gonzalez (2011), showed that most 
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medications are administered at morning time and the factors associated with a higher 
risk of administration errors was in the morning shift due to poor communication 
between the physician and the nurse in the morning shift when more treatment 
modification were made.  
This was also noticed by the researcher during the observation at 08:00 round time, 
where most of the patients’ medications were given at this time on most wards. Some 
patients have a high number of medications, beside it is their breakfast time and other 
activities are taking place which makes it very busy for the nurses. This means that 
administration at morning round time could sometimes take longer than at other round 
times, where WTEs could occur by some nurses based on decision-making failures or 
errors of judgement (rule-based mistakes). To explain, if a medication round is taking 
longer than 2 hours to complete, then nurses might need to make a conscious decision 
to omit a patient’s dose of medication from the morning round, if there is now a less 
than 2 hours gap between this round and the start of the next. For medicines such as 
paracetamol or diazepam the shorter gap between administration rounds (the current 
one and the next one) could cause serious problems. Moreover, the nurses and 
pharmacists appeared to hold a similar view to the researcher in terms of the reasons for 
WTEs as being rule-based mistakes due to staff workload.  
Another finding was that the nurses unintentionally omitted the medications more at the 
lunch round time 12:00 when compared to the nurses’ omission in other rounds time, 
which explained how the 12:00 increase the risk in clinical errors. The researcher 
detected during the ward observations that at 12:00, some nurses were under pressure 
(workload), and usually this time was busier with other activities taking place especially 
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lunch time breaks, and this led to some nurses (lapse) forgetting to give medications to 
patients which was the main reason for omissions.  
The finding that band 5 nurse grade was a factor that increased the risk of clinical errors 
which could be because band 5 nurses had more chance of committing clinical error 
than band 6 (by virtue of being in charge of more rounds) or it could be because band 6 
nurses were more cautious during administration rounds as this is not a part of their 
everyday role. There is no specific reason for band 5 nurses to have committed more 
errors, however, from the researcher’s viewpoint, this could be related to the fact that 
band 5 nurses had the most responsibilities of drug administration round in BHFT while 
they were also under pressure and busy with double tasks at the same time during 
administration rounds (e.g. 42 band 5 nurse grade administrations were observed from a 
total of 65 nurse observations).   
Overall, it was found that the contributing factors in the current study were different 
from a previous study set in a mental health Trust reported in the literature by Cottney 
and Innes (2015). That study used similar methods to PRM and identified the 
contributing factors and focused on psychiatric wards only. The study found that the 
risk of error was increased with the nurses interrupting the medication round to attend 
another activity, an increased number of ‘when required’ doses of medication 
administered, a higher number of patients on the ward, and an increased number of 
doses of medication due (Cottney and Innes, 2015). The next section discusses the 
reason behind the presence of errors from the researcher’s, nurses’ and pharmacists’ 
perspectives.  
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5.3 Qualitative data 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the main findings and the characteristics of the 
qualitative data collection including the researcher’s observation notes, and nurses’ and 
pharmacists’ interviews of experiences of MAEs to provide supportive evidence about 
the cause of MAEs in relation to the research objectives. These findings offered an 
understanding of interviewees’ opinions and perceptions about MAEs within the Trust 
wards. A study by Keers et al. (2013a), stated that direct observation combined with 
interviews, could bridge the gap between causes of errors that could not be identified by 
the observer, or when nurses could not notice the causes of errors themselves. Also, 
direct observation could identify potential causes of MAEs and related factors, as well 
as providing these data did not depend on researcher’s opinion on causation (Keers et 
al., 2013a). 
During this study, the researcher observed all wards and made notes on each potential 
error. Then these findings were compared with data from semi-structured interviews, 
with a sample of eight nurses and four pharmacists. The aim of these observation and 
interviews was to compare and contrast the main causes behind the procedural and 
clinical errors by categorising them to three levels (active failures, error-producing 
condition and latent condition) by adopting the adapted organisational accident 
causation model. 
5.3.1  Categorising the active failure category  
To start with, the findings relating to the active failures revealed that there were some 
similarities and differences between the researcher observation’s notes compared with 
the staff interviews. On the other hand, there were no differences in terms of the active 
failures found in PWs and CHWs. First, the observation findings indicated that the 
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highest active failure in clinical errors was in lapses which were detected as omission 
errors. This was similar in a previous study (Keers et al., 2013a), which used Reason’s 
accident causation model to provide the causes of MAEs, as being slips and lapses in 
terms of the most significant unsafe acts (active failures). Similarly a qualitative study 
by Keers et al. (2015) that investigated the causes of IV MAEs in general hospital 
wards showed that slips and lapses were the more frequently detected active failure than 
mistakes and violations. On the other hand, another qualitative study by Keers et al. 
(2016) focused on the cause of MAEs in the mental-health hospital setting found that 
the active failure is divided between errors and violations. Additionally, most of the 
nurse and pharmacist interviewees in the current study were in agreement with the 
researcher about the cause of omission errors being lapses. Therefore, it seems that 
where omissions take place, there is general consensus about these being ‘action errors’ 
namely memory-based action-not-as-planned. 
Second, the second-highest active failure type in clinical errors was in wrong time 
errors categorised by the researcher to be rule-based mistakes. From the observations, it 
was found that most of the nurses were insisting to complete the administration even if 
the 2 hour window for completing the round had passed. The rule-based mistake here is 
a type of thinking error, ‘action-as-planned’. The researcher, nurses and pharmacists 
were in agreement about the cause of WTE. In all, these findings showed that the 
nurses’ and pharmacists’ perspectives and that of the researcher were very similar in 
terms of the causes of WTEs as a type of clinical error, akin to the omissions described 
above. However, there were some slight differences between the researcher’s, nurses’ 
and pharmacists’ opinions in causes of the active failure type for wrong dose errors one 
of clinical errors type. The researcher believed that wrong dose errors might occur due 
to situational violations as the active failure where some nurses do not comply with the 
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rules during the administration or due to slips where some nurses administered the right 
drug name but at the wrong dose. Some nurse and pharmacist interviewees had similar 
views to the researcher that wrong dose might be due to situational violations. 
However, some others believed that knowledge-based mistakes were the active failure 
category relating to wrong dose errors where some nurses had lack of knowledge which 
is also found by Keers et al. (2015).  
In relation to procedural errors, from the researcher’s viewpoint ‘situational violation’ 
was the highest active failure category in relation to these, followed by ‘lapses’. Most of 
the expiry errors and other reason errors found if not all, were due to the nurses not 
complying with the rules. In ‘given but unsigned’ nurses sometimes forgot to follow the 
rules.  
However, there appeared not to be much agreement in terms of the nurses’ and 
pharmacists’ perceptions and that of the researcher’s in terms of the active failures 
taking place in relation to procedural errors.  There were some similarities too and these 
will also be explained. For example, ‘given but unsigned’ is a procedural error and the 
researcher, the nurses and the pharmacists interviewed seemed to concur that these were 
a result of lapses, i.e. ‘action-not-as-planned’. In contrast, there appeared to be discord 
between the researcher’s view about the cause of expiry errors and other reason errors, 
and the viewpoint of nurses and pharmacists. Here the researcher categorised expiry 
errors and other reason errors as situational violations, a type of deliberate non-
compliance whereas the nurses and pharmacists conceptualised these as unintentional 
mistakes.  
Overall, the reason for these differences might be due to nurses in interviews not 
wanting to admit their errors, or not feeling comfortable to respond to the questions 
Discussion                                                                                                      Chapter 5 
 
189 
 
especially those related to potential violations. A systematic review study by Tully et al. 
(2009), concluded that interviews could bias and interviewees be affected by social 
appeal, where they might respond to questions in a way that makes the answers socially 
acceptable e.g. when asked about potential violations, it could be that nurses and 
pharmacists did not want to refer to actual intentional violations.  
5.3.2 The error-producing conditions 
The error-producing condition is the contributing factor that could lead to the active 
failures. Vincent et al. (1998), stated that error-producing condition in health care might 
be related to the patient itself, task, work environment, individual health care 
professional or team health care professional. From the researcher’s observation, it was 
judged that the highest and main error-producing condition is ‘staff workload’ where 
the nurse administered to more patients and more doses of medication due to time 
pressure e.g. (08:00) and ward pressure (e.g. patient locker mode of administration), or 
where the nurse was interrupted and distracted which is also related to ‘work 
environment’ factor. Moreover, some other error-producing conditions were found such 
as ‘written miscommunication’ (prescription not clear in psychiatric wards) that is 
related to team factor and ‘inexperienced nurses’ is related to individual healthcare staff 
factor. According to the researcher’s opinion staff workload was the main error-
producing condition for slips, lapses, rule-based mistakes, and violations. Workload 
was also supported in previous studies used direct observation for example, a study by 
Taxis and Barber (2003b), found that an increased error rate could be due nurses’ 
workload (perform numerous tasks at the same time, working past the end of their shift, 
or nurses being a lack of qualified staff). A further study by Tissot et al. (2003), 
revealed that workload increased errors due to increased number of patients per nurse. 
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Cottney and Innes (2015), found that high workload could have negative effect on 
nurses safely administering medications. 
Furthermore, some of the nurse and pharmacist interviewees considered that the main 
error-producing condition for lapses, situational violation and rule-based mistakes was 
‘staff workload’ that is related to ‘work environment’. One of the nurse interviewees 
indicated that some nurses might forget due to distraction and rushing time (PWN1). 
Some other error-producing conditions were argued by nurses such as, ‘verbal 
communication’ miscommunication between nurses and carers in community hospital 
wards and ‘written communication’ miscommunication (drug chart order not clear) in 
psychiatric wards where some doctors crossed out medications many times which 
makes it difficult for the nurse to read, and both are related to team factor. 
Another error-producing condition was ‘patient attitude’ e.g. the nature of patients in 
psychiatric wards as well as elderly patient in community and psychiatric wards is 
related to patient factor. Also ‘inexperienced nurses’ was where some nurses were 
deemed not to be familiar with wards and patients such as bank and agency nurses 
which is also related to individual staff factors. The pharmacists’ interviewees had 
similar opinions for the error-producing condition as the nurses here.  
The qualitative analysis revealed several meaningful findings that the main error-
producing condition from all scenarios (researcher observation, nurses and pharmacists) 
was ‘staff workload’ and that the main contributing factor of lapses, situational 
violation and rule-based mistakes. Workload is also one of the error-producing 
conditions that contributed to slips and lapses as mentioned in the literature (Keers et 
al., 2013a). This is similar to general hospital wards study by Keers et al. (2015) which 
revealed that workload that related to distractions from patients generally contributed to 
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slips and lapses, and high workload such as busy and noisy environment which lead to 
rushed and distracted nurses also contributed to violations and mistakes. Additionally, 
Keers et al. (2016) found that in the mental-health ward workload (busy and noisy 
working environment that lead to interrupted and distracted the nurse staff) was the 
main error-producing conditions. Overall, these results have drawn the attention to the 
fact that ‘staff workload’ could be also related to the administration mode or the 
administration round time.  
In addition, the researcher observation and nurses both pointed to the ‘written 
miscommunication’ (prescription not clear) being one of the error-producing conditions 
in mental-health wards. This is also found in general and mental-health wards studies 
(Keers et al., 2015, Keers et al., 2016), however, Keers et al. (2015) describes this type 
of error-producing condition as healthcare team factor where prescribers are using 
incorrect sections of the prescription chart and nurses stated poor relationships with 
staff which prevented them from clarifying unclear or possibly incorrect prescriptions. 
Beside that ‘inexperienced nurses’ is another error-producing condition indicated from 
the researcher observation, and speaking with nurses and pharmacists, where some of 
the nurses (e.g. agency) were not familiar with the ward and this was also found in the 
study by Keers et al. (2016). Some other error-producing conditions found (Keers et al., 
2015) were related to equipment and the drug administration task which was not found 
in the current research study. These differences and similarities of error-producing 
condition findings in the current study settings and other studies could help to configure 
the key elements for an effective intervention to reduce MAEs in the future. 
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5.3.3 The latent conditions 
The latent condition is the cause that could lead to error-producing conditions within 
which an active failure occurs, so these are either organisational and management 
factors or institutional context factors (Vincent et al., 1998). In this study, the 
researcher’s point of view was that ‘safety culture and priorities’ was the main latent 
condition behind MAEs which is related to organisational and management factors. 
Safety culture and priorities in the organisation should enhance nurses’ knowledge and 
beliefs regarding medication administration safety and address the work priorities. As 
an example, from the researcher’s observation, some nurses need more training to 
enhance their skills dealing with workload such as, interruptions, ward pressures and 
time pressures and managing their other work priorities. Moreover, regarding work 
priority the organisation could help to allocate adequate staff level to support the 
volume of work.  
The nurse and pharmacist interviewee had similar viewpoints as the researcher that 
safety culture and priorities might, if addressed, minimise the number of errors. For 
example, some of nurses and pharmacists suggested double-checking the drug chart 
before the wards round ends in order to make sure that every drug is given and signed, 
two nurses could double-check each other if there is any doubt, and giving nurses more 
training and making sure they are not distracted during the administration.  
Increasing nurses’ skills and knowledge during medication administration rounds is the 
organisations’ responsibility and forms part of efforts to enhance the safety culture, for 
instance through nurse training on double-checking and more training on types of errors 
and how to remember these types of errors. All of these suggestions might lead to 
improvements in the medications safely and reduce the rate of MAEs. Keers et al. 
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(2013a), argued that safety culture consists of a combination of values, behaviours, and 
attitudes for individuals and groups, to increase the safety of the organisations, 
however, the nature and impact of this culture on MAEs is still unclear. On the other 
hand, Leonard & Frankel (2012), stated that when organisations make it safe for 
healthcare teams to discuss errors, so that a strong learning culture will be developed, 
and being consistent in their accountability for unacceptable behaviours that create risk, 
will have a strong impact on the safety culture as well.  
The above discussions were in relation to the main results; the reasons for MAEs and 
contributory factors. There are other findings from the interview questions indicated the 
extent of knowledge about the errors for the interviewees, where most of the 
participants showed a good level of knowledge about the type of errors and this could 
help in future work to determine the right method to address these errors. Moreover, 
these perceptions could also help to develop recommendations for a training program. 
On the other hand, the question about how to reduce the type of errors help to extract 
more of the participants’ opinions about the latent condition and that might help to draw 
the map of the intervention to reduce MAEs in recommendations section which will be 
explained in more detail in the next Chapter.     
5.4 Summary  
This chapter has discussed the main findings from the researcher observations 
quantitatively. In this current study, findings revealed that MAEs rate was above the 
average error rate in the UK studies. However, when number of errors separated to 
procedural errors and clinical errors; the clinical error was within the error rate average 
noted in other studies. Furthermore, the total number of errors detected, showed that 
expiry errors were the most frequent type of MAEs followed by omissions then ‘errors 
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for other reasons’. Moreover, the PRM test revealed that, two contributing factors 
increase the risk of procedural errors and three contributing factors increase the risk of 
clinical errors.  
The chapter also discussed the main interpretations from the researcher’s observational 
notes, nurse and pharmacist interviews about experiences of MAEs (qualitatively); with 
the aim to reach a paper consensus about the main causes behind the procedural and 
clinical errors by categorising them to three levels, active failures, error-producing 
condition and latent condition. The active failures findings revealed that there were 
some similarity and differences from the researcher’s observation opinion compared 
with the staff interviews. Moreover, the main error-producing condition from all 
scenarios (researcher observation, nurses and pharmacists) was ‘staff workload’ which 
is also the main cause of active failure for lapses, situational violations and rule-based 
mistakes. Finally, the latent condition is the cause that could lead to error-producing 
condition in which active failure occur, and these relate to either organisational and 
management factors or institutional context factors. ‘Safety culture and priorities’ was 
considered as the main latent condition behind MAEs from the researcher’s, nurses’ and 
pharmacists’ point of views. The next chapter will consider the conclusions of this 
research study, significant research findings as well as its limitations, contribution to 
knowledge, research recommendations and any future work required.  
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Chapter 6     Conclusion 
This research study examined firstly the MAEs rate and types, including omissions and 
blank boxes, on all wards at one UK Trust using the direct observation method. One of 
the objectives of the study was to record the apparent reason for omissions and blank 
boxes as well as any other MAEs observed to take place. Moreover, a selection of 
relevant healthcare staff was interviewed in order to gain a more in-depth understanding 
about the reasons behind the MAEs, and other deviations from practice guidelines 
including omissions and blank boxes etc. The ultimate objective of this thesis was to 
make evidence-based recommendations for improving medication administration 
practices at the Trust and in other similar settings. This mixed-method study makes a 
novel contribution to knowledge as the first study to compare mental-health and 
community hospital wards using the direct observation method, researching different 
modes of administration, and then comparing and contrasting the perceptions of the 
researcher with nurse and pharmacist opinions for causes of MAEs. 
This thesis described a mixed-method study that examined in depth the rate and causes 
of MAEs within mental-health and community hospital wards. The medication 
administration methods were vastly different in that some used a standard trolley 
system, some a queuing method and some a patient locker system. This chapter draws 
conclusions from the study, and presents a summary of the research conducted. 
Chapter 1 looked at the literature and provided a review of different modes of drug 
administration on wards; drug trolley, bedside locker and the clinic room. The literature 
review also covered an introduction to MAEs, definitions, and methods used to 
determine MAEs. There was also a review of some of the literature about the rate of 
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MAEs, type and frequency of MAEs, rate of harm, contributing factors linked to the 
risk of MAEs and suggested interventions to reduce the MAEs. 
Chapter 2 described in details the overall research design and methodology used in this 
thesis. Also, the theoretical framework relating to medication errors, including human 
error theory, ‘Swiss Cheese’ model and the organisational accident model were 
outlined. The organisational accident causation model was adopted in this study. The 
chapter also considered the methodology relating to pharmacy practice, and different 
methods of data collection were presented. The methods of data were then clarified in 
terms of the nature of quantitative and qualitative approaches (observation and semi-
structured interviews). It was argued that the mixed-methods offered a broader 
understanding of MAEs. Next, the data collection included sample size and recruitment, 
ethical issues, payment, data protection and confidentiality. The chapter concluded with 
the quantitative and qualitative data analysis.  
In Chapter 3, the main quantitative findings of this thesis were analysed focused on 
presenting the entire data in relation to the ward observations. To provide an overview 
the data recorded on the MAE observation forms were quantitatively processed. Firstly, 
the descriptive data analysis looked at the total number and average of OEs, and the 
number of MAEs and the total and average error rates. This was followed by the 
inferential statistical data analysis using the PRM that examined statistically verifiable 
relationships between the number of errors found and a number of potential 
contributing factors.  
Chapter 4 reported on the qualitative findings of this thesis, including the comparison 
between the observational notes and the semi-structured interviews which provided a 
more in-depth finding relating to medication administration practices, and gained the 
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healthcare professional (nurse and pharmacist) opinions about the reasons behind the 
MAEs, and the contributing factors. These were compared with data from observation 
notes. The MAEs were considered as procedural errors; expiry errors, given but 
unsigned and other reason errors, and clinical errors; omitted and unsigned, omitted but 
signed, almost not given, wrong time error and wrong dose. These MAEs were 
categorised as the active failure category in the first stage followed by error-producing 
condition and the latent condition. 
Chapter 5 discussed the overall findings of the study and discussed the investigation 
corresponding to the work of other published scholars related to MAEs.  
Overall, this chapter concludes with the significant research findings, limitations, 
contribution to knowledge, recommendations as well as providing suggestions for 
future research work.  
6.1 Significant research findings 
Two main objectives were considered to achieve the aim of this study:  
1- To identify the baseline rate of medication administration errors at BHFT for 
psychiatric wards and community hospital wards by measuring quantitatively: 
a) The number and type of medication administration errors.  
b) A range of possible contributing factors including administration times, 
interruptions, staff shortages and medication administration practices. 
2- To explore the healthcare professionals’ perceptions qualitatively: 
a) Their experience of MAEs within the Trust wards. 
b) Their opinions about the reasons behind the MAEs, and the contributing 
factors to the different type of MAEs.  
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The main findings which presented in Chapters 3 and 4 are highlighted below, as well 
as the implications of these findings for clinical practice at the Trust.  
The quantitative and qualitative findings were that:  
1- The MAEs rate was higher than the average found in the literature, however, if 
procedural errors were excluded the error rate was within the range found in other 
studies.  
2- The most frequent type of MAEs was expiry errors followed by omissions; 
however, if procedural errors were excluded omissions were the most frequent 
type. 
3- The PRM test revealed contributing factors that might increase the risk of 
procedural errors as being bedside-prepared in clinic room and bedside-patient 
locker modes of administration and administration of a non-psychiatric drug.  
4- The PRM test revealed contributing factors that could increase the risk of clinical 
errors as being 08:00 and 12:00 round times, bedside-patient locker and mixed 
mode of administrations and band 5 nurse grade.  
5- The main active failure for clinical errors was that of lapses as indicated by the 
researcher, nurses and pharmacists. 
6- The main active failure in procedural errors was situational violations from the 
researcher perspective which was not in agreement with the nurses’ and 
pharmacists’ perceptions.  
7- The highest and main error-producing condition was judged to be ‘staff workload’ 
agreed by the researcher, nurses and pharmacists. 
8- The main latent condition behind MAEs was ‘safety culture and priorities’ agreed 
by the researcher, nurses and pharmacists. 
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No previous study found in the literature review examined the topics in the current 
study by combining an examination of MAEs on psychiatric wards and community 
hospital wards. Also, this research is considered first of its kind to investigate different 
modes of administration, and comparing and contrasting of the researcher observation 
with the nurses’ and pharmacists’ perceptions and opinions of MAEs causes.  
The findings show that expiry errors, a major component of procedural errors, take 
place across both psychiatric and community hospital ward types specifically when 
medication is given at the patient bedside and is prepared either in the clinic room or 
given via patient lockers, and that this is likely because of staff workload and/or lack of 
staff knowledge. The findings also suggest that omissions, a major component of 
clinical errors, were associated with the mixed mode of administration on psychiatric 
wards and the 12:00 administration time, and occurred because of a range of reasons 
that included workload, miscommunication and staff-related factors. Another type of 
clinical error was the wrong time error which was associated mainly with the patient 
lockers and the 08:00 administration time, mainly because of the high staff workload. 
The results suggest that patient lockers are not as safe as perceived because they are 
implicated in both clinical and procedural errors. In addition, the distinct contributing 
factors identified in this study can provide a means through which the occurrence of 
MAEs can be addressed.  
Overall, in this study the findings offer an evidence-base to help enhance the 
understanding of the actual causes behind MAEs. Avoiding or modifying these factors 
could assist in decreasing the error rate and increase the quality of healthcare in this 
NHS Trust.  
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6.2 Reflexivity 
The process of reflexivity is where a researcher is reflective about their own personal 
impact on their methods, values, knowledge, behaviour, biases, beliefs, and the relation 
with the participants which could affect the explanation of their responses (Bryman, 
2012, Parahoo, 2014). Moreover, reflexivity acknowledges that researchers are part of 
the social environment under study, which emphasised an awareness of their role in 
constructing the knowledge that help the reader to understand the findings better 
(Parahoo, 2014, p. 385).  
Furthermore, the purpose of being reflexive is to enhance the quality and validity of the 
research study, recognise the limitations of the knowledge that is produced, increase 
understanding of how positions and awareness as researchers affect all stages of the 
research process, and that will lead to more rigorous research (Primeau, 2003, 
Guillemin and Gillam, 2004).   
In relation to reflexivity, in research studies using observational methodology, it is 
common that the researcher could become involved directly in the study process and 
still preserve a measure of objectivity. In addition, Mauthner and Doucet (2003), state 
that the researcher’s personal and professional biography should be known because the 
research could be the outcome of these biographies.   
I accomplished a BSc degree in pharmacy from King Saud University in Saudi Arabia 
in 2001, before achieving my MSc in Clinical Pharmacy International Practice and 
Policy from the School of Pharmacy, University of London, UK in 2011. I gained my 
professional experience during my job as a ward pharmacist that allowed me to know 
more about medications administration and wards practice and this gave me the 
opportunity to work with other healthcare professionals such as nurses and doctors. The 
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nature of my professional career as a ward pharmacist influenced my knowledge and 
experience that will have impacted on the study subject. Moreover, in the 
administration round, I ensured that the medication was administered to patients in 
appropriate way (the right patient, the right medication, the right dose, the right route, 
and the right time) (Balas et al., 2004), and gave help and advice on the medication 
administration.  
Furthermore, before starting my PhD journey, I worked for two years as a manger of 
clinical services alongside my job as a manger of inpatient and outpatients’ pharmacy in 
a hospital, which influenced my knowledge through challenging medication errors and 
medication administration errors in particular that gave me awareness of how it 
influenced the research process. 
In addition, it could be argued that involvement in the study as an observer is a source 
of bias, however, I contend that it would be impossible to keep myself (the researcher) 
separated from the knowledge and experience that I have gained from my professional 
experience. 
Moreover, during the research process I did not inform the participants about my 
professional experience as a pharmacist; I introduced myself to the participants as a 
PhD student and the main researcher. This allowed me to explore the participants’ 
practice experiences on the medication administration observations freely. Likewise, in 
the interviews by presenting myself as a pharmacist I expected that participants would 
re-evaluate their answers and would reflect what they perceived I want to hear about the 
causes of MAEs so that I introduced myself to them as a PhD researcher only. 
Conclusion                                                                                                     Chapter 6 
 
202 
 
According to Mauthner and Doucet (2003), an important element of reflexivity is 
situating researchers socially and emotionally in relation to respondents that could 
identify with interpretations of their accounts.   
During the observations and the interviews, I did not have difficulty or concerns in 
becoming involved in the UK society and culture as an international PhD student for 
two reasons. First, my professional experience and the training I had at UK Trust 
assisted me to understand the medication administration process as well as dealing with 
the healthcare professionals who participated in this study. Second, during my master 
degree study I lived in the UK for three years (2009-2011) I have increased my 
experience in UK culture which helped me to acquire more confidence in dealing with 
the participants. 
As an example of reflexivity issue during the observation, I noted the following after 
observing one of the nurse participants:  
“It is interesting how it could be helpful in recognising my thoughts and beliefs 
when writing notes during observation and doing analysis. This day was 
difficult for me due to a long time in observation the round which took more 
than two hours. Note: before starting the ward observation with a nurse, she 
was very busy with elderly patients doing other activity, beside that she looked 
tired, during the observation she was a bit annoyed and not feeling comfortable, 
at the end of the observation she apologised to me because she was under 
pressure due to the heavy workload. This made me think about whether there is 
a relationship between the nature of patients and workload and the potential of 
errors e.g. wrong time errors”.  
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6.3 Research limitations 
Some limitations existed in this research study, as with all studies, which are 
highlighted as follows:  
1- Regarding to the methodology limitations; qualitative data findings were based 
on healthcare staff (interviews) which are subjective by nature. 
2- The study was only observed in one NHS Trust in the UK; more studies in other 
UK hospitals can examine whether the findings might be generalisable across 
the UK. Taking this fact into account; the findings of this study cannot be 
entirely generalised to all hospital sites. 
3-  There was almost a one year gap between the research observation and the staff 
interviews, and that might affect the interviewees’ opinion due to some things 
changing in the administration practice during that year. The interview questions 
extracted general opinions about the cause of different type of errors and were 
not focused on specific causes. 
4- The study sample of the nurses’ interview participants was quite small number 
across the 19 wards (CHWs and PWs). Out of 19 nurses only 8 accepted to be 
interviewed, and there was no response from the other nurses. Also, the 
researcher decided to stop because there was no new data exported after the 
sixth interviewee.    
5- The study sample for interviewing the pharmacists was small and limited. A 
larger sample could have provided more data. However, the sample size was 
enough to acquire their perceptions and did not limit this research as the target 
point was reached.  
6- There might be a chance of bias because of involving the researcher in the study 
as an observer. However, observation is the only method that helped the 
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researcher to collect data on what actually happens in real practice and to gain a 
deep understanding of the phenomenon under the research study.  
7- None of the drug administration mode observed at BHFT was shared across the 
two settings; different modes were confined to either PWs or CHWs. This 
therefore opens the possibility that observed effects could be influenced by 
setting rather than mode of drug administration.  
8- The number of OE observed per ward was variable and included very low 
numbers for some wards. This led to significant variability in event rates even 
within particular modes of administration, which clouds judgement as to 
whether observed effects of mode of drug administration on MAE rates are 
accurate. This might be due to that each medication administration round was 
observed only once.  
9- The link between WTEs and expiry errors and the bedside locker system was 
only seen on 3 out of 5 CHWs which showed that some observed relationships 
were not present on all CHWs using bedside-patient locker mode of 
administration. 
6.4 Contribution to knowledge 
This research study is one of the first to examine the rate and causes of MAEs within a 
mental-health and community hospital Trust in the UK which makes several novel 
contributions to knowledge.  
For the methodological contribution, the methodology used in this research study 
established the applicability to compare mental-health and community hospital wards 
by using direct observation methods by adopting the mixed-methods 
approach. Moreover, in the quantitative inferential statistics, the use of Poisson 
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Regression for modelling the MAEs data proved its usability in this study. This research 
provided a unique contribution by focusing on the concept of MAEs within a healthcare 
domain, the differences between the modes of medication administration rounds, and 
the different research methodologies that have been adopted for recording MAEs.  
The research study further contributed to the body of knowledge by triangulating the 
findings of the pharmacists’ and the nurses’ interviews perceptions with the researcher 
observation opinions for causes of MAEs. The key finding of this study is that patient 
lockers might be not as safe as perceived.  
6.5 Recommendations  
The aim of this study is to produce recommendations for improving medication 
administration practices in this type of setting. In the light of the research findings and 
the literature review, the following recommendations for improve medication 
administration practice and reduce MAEs are to be made for CHWs, PWs or both 
wards.  
1- General recommendations for CHWs and PWs: 
a) One of the recommendations to reduce medication administration errors is to 
improve nurses’ training to learn from their mistakes, and improve the work 
environment by reducing the workload in order to avoid errors. Besides, 
improve the nurses’ education (workshops on different types of medication 
administration errors) e.g. nurses should be aware of the higher risk of errors 
associated with non-psychiatric drugs. This could reduce some MAE causes 
such as situation violation and lapses which is connected to different types of 
error e.g. expiry errors, other reason errors, omissions and blank boxes.  
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b) Regarding work priority; the organisation could help to make the work more 
manageable for the current staff or to allocate adequate staff levels to support 
the work volume. For example, some nurses could have more training courses 
to enhance their skills and knowledge to be able to manage their work 
priorities which could reduce the issue of work pressure. The education 
training interventions and their relation in reducing MAEs have been 
examined by (Keers et al., 2014) which illustrated the advantages of the 
nurses training in different wards. Also, Dawson (2014) showed how training 
decreased MAE rate in mental-health wards.  
c) Another recommendation is to increase nurses’ skills of double-checking the 
drug chart by themselves in order to make sure that every drug is given and 
signed during the medication administration rounds and this could reduce 
some MAE e.g. (omission and blank boxes) which were caused by lapses. 
d) Double-checking by two nurses would increase the accuracy of the 
medication practice which is recommended to administer the medications 
safely and reduce the error rate of MAEs. Also, it could improve the nurses 
work pressure and their concentration on drug charts during the 
administration, and could reduce different types of errors such as omission, 
blank boxes, wrong dose and other reason errors. The relation between 
double-checking and reduce the errors have been investigated by Alsulami et 
al. (2012) which showed a positive impact, however, this needs more 
examinations due to low evidence. In addition, Alsulami et al. (2014) showed 
the nurses lack of awareness of double-checking and stated that double-
checking training could improve the nurses’ knowledge and patient safety. 
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e) The electronic prescribing medication administration system (EPMA) was 
launched in September 2017 in the BHFT. It is recommended that the use of 
technology such as electronic prescriptions could help to reduce the MAEs 
e.g. wrong dose, wrong drug and omission. It also might improve some 
contributing factors such as the written miss-communication. However, 
further study is needed to compare the impact of EPMA on MAEs in BHFT. 
The benefit of using electronic prescribing in reducing MAE rates was also 
mentioned in previous literature in general hospital site (Franklin et al., 2007). 
On the other hand, Keers et al. (2014) showed the effect of other technology 
intervention in minimising of MAEs, and Cottney (2014) illustrated how the 
automated dispensing cabinet reduced the MAE rate and WTE in a psychiatric 
ward setting.  
f) ‘Staff workload’ is considered to be the main contributory factors of different 
active failure; to make sure nurses are not interrupted or distracted during the 
medication administration, it is recommended on the wards to use verbal 
announcements for patients and visitors besides the ‘do not disturb’ sign 
which is already applied during the drug round in some BHFT wards. This 
might reduce most of MAE types. Raban and Westbrook (2013) showed the 
evidence of the interventions efficiency in decreasing the interruptions rate 
and different types of interventions to reduce the interruptions such as 
noticeable quiet zones for medication preparation and sign asking to not be 
interrupted when the nurses are administering medications etc.  
g)  Regarding to the safety culture issues, this can be enhanced by adapting the 
recommendations above e.g. training program, etc. as it is the organisation’s 
responsibility to provide continuing education to the nurses. On the other 
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hand, nurses also have a responsibility to increase their own sense of the 
safety by learning about the different type of MAEs and the reason behind 
these errors, and trying to reduce or not to be involved in these errors. Also, 
nurses should take responsibility to learn the importance of organising their 
work priority by focusing only on drug administration rounds, and following 
the administration procedure by e.g. reporting any MAEs detected during the 
administration round which could help in reducing different type of errors. 
This might occur by motivating the nurses as shown in a study by Cottney 
(2015) where the ward missing the fewest doses received a prize. In addition, 
re-auditing the wards regularly by observing MAEs could encourage the 
nurses to enhance their safety culture and reduce the MAEs rate as illustrated 
in a study by Dawson (2014).     
The above recommendations can be applicable for both wards CHWs and PWs as it 
needs similar suggestions for most error types which were also reflected from the study 
results. Moreover, some of the interventions that were mentioned in the participants’ 
interviews, for example, training, double-checking and reducing the interruption and 
distraction are considered to be an important recommendation to take into account in 
this research study.  
2- Specific recommendations:  
a) Relating to the modes of administration in CHWs; using the drug trolley 
administration mode is highly recommended and it is more effective with the 
less risk of errors compared to the other mode. This might minimise the 
workload pressure which is responsible for most of the active failure 
condition.  
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b) Relating to the modes of administration in PWs; continuing to use the 
queueing administration mode is recommended. Also, it is more effective with 
the less risk of errors compared to the other modes. Drug trolley mode of 
administration is recommended to use in the older adult and learning disability 
wards than using bedside-prepared in clinic room mode due to the nurse 
difficulty dealing with patients’ queueing. In addition, reducing or/and 
terminating mixed between two modes could also decrease the risk of errors. 
This could show the advantage of reducing the workload that is responsible 
for most of the active failures. 
c) To reduce the WTEs in the 08:00 rounds for both sites (CHWs and PWs), it is 
recommended that the medication which the patient takes it once daily not to 
be given this time unless it is necessary. This could be achieved by arranging 
between the prescribers and the administered nurses in order to decrease the 
time taken to administer a lot of medications.  
d) One other recommendation for both sites is to slightly shift the 12:00 
administration round so that it is not exactly at the same time as lunch as this 
study showed that all of 12:00 observations were busy with other activity 
(patient lunchtime), and so a reasonable change might be achieved by 
administer medications after the lunchtime. This could reduce the risk of 
clinical errors such as omissions. 
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6.6 Future research work 
According to the presented research study findings; it is apparent that there is a need for 
further research into the causes of MAEs. Similar research in other countries could 
enable comparative studies in the area with similar research objectives and adopting the 
same methodology which would gather more findings and perceptions.  
The following are suggestion for further research which would be an interesting avenue 
to explore in future work:  
1- This study sample was in one NHS Trust, further research to observe MAEs on 
other UK hospitals is needed, where it could help to present more and different 
findings and perceptions.  
2- Future work could have more quantitative data e.g. (questionnaire) to study the 
nurses’ participant satisfaction and other views about the mode of administration 
in a ‘standardised’ way. 
3- It could be advised in future work to interview a larger sample of nurses and 
pharmacists in order to gather more in-depth data by asking more specific 
questions. For example, questions about the reason behind the active failure that 
caused different type of errors.  
4- As the EPMA is launched in September 2017 at the BHFT, future work could 
observe the use of technology e.g. electronic prescriptions in medication 
administration process as well as its effect on MAEs and compare the results with 
the current study data.   
5- Future work could be directed to use interventions which could be adapted from 
these research recommendations, and study the post-interventions to measure the 
impact of these recommendations. For example, observe the MAEs in both 
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hospital sites after launching a nurse’s training program and workshops which 
include awareness about different type of errors as well as managing the work 
priorities skills and knowledge, and comparing the results with the current study 
data. Also, observing MAEs after adapting a double-checking 
awareness/implementation intervention would be useful. Another example would 
be to observe the interruptions and the MAEs after developing an intervention for 
reducing interruptions and comparing the overall data.  
6- Further investigations are also needed in terms of how to encourage nurses to 
strengthen their belief in the safety culture and testing its effect on MAEs. 
7- A quantitative data collection (e.g. using a survey) could be completed as future 
work in both hospital sites to measure the nurses’ extent of knowledge about 
different types of errors, e.g. the agreement of specific behaviours as types of 
errors which help to map the training program.   
8- Future research could also be completed by observing the MAEs focusing in 
specific PWs and CHWs. For instance, selecting wards that had the highest MAEs 
rate from both hospital sites and observing the four administration rounds for each 
ward not only once. For example, by comparing the MAEs results at 8:00 
administration round in all wards. This will provide more opportunity to collect 
data in each selected ward over a shorter time. 
9- Future research could also be completed by observing the MAEs in CHWs using 
the patient locker mode of administration to seek the relationship between WTEs 
and the bedside-patient locker mode of administration. If it is still shows similar 
results, more future work is needed to implement drug trolleys in these wards and 
again observe the MAEs.   
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10- Future work can also be completed on MAEs observation study after 
implementing the drug trolley administration mode in older adult PWs and 
learning disability wards and comparing it with current study results. 
11- Future work can also be completed after decided the appropriate decision on 
delivering the not necessary once daily medication from 8:00 administration time 
to other administration time by comparing the MAEs observation results with the 
current results.  
12- Observing the MAEs after postponing the 12:00 administration round and 
comparing the overall results can be as future work.                                                                                                                                                                           
13- Future work plan after the PhD, include publication by separating out data from 
community and psychiatric hospitals to recognise clearly the differences between 
these sectors, as well as deeply analysing the data recorded on patient level 
information such as prescribed medications, gender and age.  
6.7 Future career work  
As I am one of the clinical pharmacists’ team working at King Fahad Armed Forces 
Hospital in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, it is very important to consider the work plan 
following my PhD study into this hospital. King Fahad Armed Forces Hospital is a 
secondary care hospital included different general wards such as (surgical, medical, 
cardiac etc.). One of the future work plans is to implement similar study methodology 
in these wards taking precautions to avoid the limitations found. This could help to 
test the medication administration practice in the hospital that has not been tested until 
now, besides the results might help to increase the medication safety awareness in this 
setting.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Process of the medication administration  
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Appendix 2 BHFT SOP around administration of critical 
medicines 
 
 
 
List of Critical Medicines 
 
NPSA‎alert‎from‎2010‎‘Reducing‎harm‎from‎omitted‎and‎delayed‎medicines’‎
(http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resources/type/alerts/?entryid45=66720&p=1) (1) 
 
This states that we need to identify a list of critical medicines where timeliness of 
administration is crucial. Critical medicines are those where the omission or delay is likely to 
cause the most harm. This is usually defined as needing to be administered within 2 hours of the 
prescribed time.   
This list should include anti-infectives, anticoagulants, insulin, resuscitation medicines and 
medicines for Parkinson’s disease, and other medicines identified locally; 
‘A national list of critical medicines was not recommended. This was because medicines 
considered critical in one hospital (for example a children’s hospital) may differ significantly 
from another hospital, such as a cancer hospital or mental health hospital. The answer was to 
provide flexibility for NHS organisations to identify a list of critical medicines that address 
local risks and add these to the list proposed by the NPSA.’ 
This list has been adapted from the original approved list (unreferenced) in MRSOP 4008 using 
the NPSA guidance and critical medicines lists from other NHS Trusts (2,3,4) 
 
Medication Possible consequence of omission or 
delay 
Commonly used examples of 
these drugs 
Analgesics Loss of pain control Codeine, ibuprofen, diclofenac, 
naproxen, oxycodone, morphine 
Anti-cancer drugs  Treatment failure  See BNF 
Anticoagulants (e.g. warfarin, 
heparin, low molecular weight 
heparins) 
INR reduced, resulting in increased blood 
clotting e.g. DVT or PE 
Warfarin, rivaroxaban, dabigatran, 
tinazaparin, dalteparin, enoxaparin, 
heparin 
Anticonvulsants for use in 
epilepsy 
Loss of seizure control Sodium valproate, carbamazepine, 
lamotrigine, phenytoin, topiramate, 
gabapentin, levetiracetam 
Antidepressants (specifically 
Paroxetine, venlafaxine, 
tranylcypromine) 
Withdrawal symptoms Paroxetine, venlafaxine, 
tranylcypromine 
Anti-infectives (antibiotics, 
antifungals and antivirals) 
Treatment failure and/or development of 
resistance 
Amoxycillin, flucloxacillin, 
ciprofloxacin, fluconazole, 
trimethoprim, tenofovir, stavudine, 
nelfinavir, ritonavir 
Drugs used in substance misuse Withdrawal symptoms Buprenorphine, Chlordiazepoxide, 
lofexidine,  
Clozapine Loss of symptom control; if omitted for 
more than 48 hours dose must be re-
titrated from 12.5mg to avoid serious 
adverse effects e.g. hypotension, seizures. 
Clozapine 
Glaucoma eye drops  Increased intra-ocular pressure – possible Cartelol, timolol, latanoprost, 
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blindness  dorzolamide, pilocarpine,  
Insulin and oral hypoglycaemic 
agents 
Hyperglycaemia - problems may be 
avoided by implementing practical 
solutions (e.g. for Insulin, link 
administration to when food will be 
actually eaten). Promote self 
administration if safe and appropriate to 
do so. 
Insulins - all 
Parkinsons disease Loss of symptom control Co-carbidopa, co-careldopa, 
madopar, sinemet. Pramipexole, 
pergolide, cabergoline 
Lithium Loss of symptom control, invalid test 
results 
lithium 
Oxygen  Increased risk of harm from prolonged 
hypoxia  
oxygen 
Resus/emergency medication 
including 
Rapid tranquilisation medicine 
Increased mortality or increased risk of 
harm to patient, fellow patients and staff 
Resus medication, Hypostop, 
glucagon, glucose, Flumazenil, 
Calcium resonium, glucose/ insulin, 
naloxone 
Doses pre therapeutic drug 
monitoring  
In order for the results of TDM tests to be 
meaningful the timing of the last dose 
must be accurate.  
Lithium, clozapine, digoxin, 
carbamazepine, warfarin 
Other drugs deemed critical by the 
Pharmacist (in conjunction with 
the MDT) and annotated as such 
on the prescription chart 
 May include: 
Anti-hypertensives 
Anti-arrhythmic – cardiac drugs 
Digoxin 
Corticosteroids 
Immunosuppressants 
Nebulised bronchodilator therapy 
Regular benzodiazepines (short-
acting) 
Methylphenidate immediate release 
 
1. NPSA alert from 2010 ‘Reducing harm from omitted and delayed medicines’ 
(http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resources/type/alerts/?entryid45=66720&p=1)  
2. Surrey and Borders Partnership Trust, Appendix 4 RRR Omitted and delayed medicines 
3. Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust, Delayed and Omitted medicines procedure 
version 1.2, February 2013 (accessed via google 09.10.14) 
4. Devon Partnership NHS Trust, Medicines Management Briefing 11-005 9 (July 2013) 
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Appendix 3 Observations rota  
Schedule for observations of medication administration rounds–– please display this chart in a 
visible area (Contact: p.donyai@reading.ac.uk / 0118 378 4704) 
Wards Day and time 
Daisy Monday 6th July 
6pm 
Friday 31st July 
10pm 
Thursday 27th Aug 
Noon  
Thursday 24th Sept. 
8am 
Rose  Tuesday 7th July 
8am 
Monday 3rd Aug. 
6pm 
Friday 28th Aug. 
10pm 
 Friday 25th Sept. 
Noon 
Bluebell  Wednesday 8th July 
Noon  
Tuesday 4th Aug. 
8am 
Tuesday 1st Sept. 
6pm 
Monday 28th Sept. 
10pm 
Rowan Thursday 9th July 
10pm 
Wednesday 5th Aug. 
Noon  
Wednesday 2nd Sept. 
8am 
Tuesday 29th Sept. 
6pm 
Orchid  Friday 10th July 
6pm 
Thursday 6th Aug. 
10pm 
Thursday 3rd Sept. 
Noon 
Wednesday 30th Sept. 
8am 
Campion Monday 13th July 
8am 
Friday 7th Aug. 
6pm 
Friday 4th Sept. 
10pm 
Thursday 1st Oct. 
Noon 
Sorrell Tuesday 14th July 
Noon  
Monday 10th Aug. 
8am 
Monday 7th Sept. 
6pm 
Friday 2nd Oct. 
10pm 
Snowdrop Wednesday 15th July 
10pm  
Tuesday 11th Aug. 
Noon 
Tuesday 8th Sept. 
8am 
Monday 5th Oct. 
6pm 
Oakwood Beech Thursday 16th July 
6pm 
Wednesday 12th 
Aug. 
10pm 
Wednesday 9th Sept. 
Noon 
Tuesday 6th Oct. 
8am 
Oakwood Elm Friday 17th July 
8am 
Thursday 13th Aug. 
6pm 
Thursday 10th Sept. 
10pm 
Wednesday 7th Oct. 
Noon 
Oakwood 
Willow 
Monday 20th July 
Noon  
Friday 14th Aug. 
8am 
Friday 11th Sept. 
6pm 
Thursday 8th Oct. 
10pm 
Ascot Tuesday 21st July 
10pm 
Monday 17th Aug. 
Noon  
Monday 14th Sept. 
8am 
Friday 9th Oct. 
6pm 
Windsor  Wednesday 22nd 
July 
6pm  
Tuesday 18th Aug. 
10pm 
Tuesday 15th Sept. 
Noon 
Monday 12th Oct. 
8am 
Donnington  Thursday 23rd July 
8am 
Wednesday 19th 
Aug. 
6pm 
Wednesday 16th Sept. 
10pm 
Tuesday 13th Oct. 
Noon 
Highclere  Friday 24th July 
Noon  
Thursday 20th Aug. 
8am 
Thursday 17th Sept. 
6pm 
Wednesday 14th Oct. 
10pm 
Henry Tudor Monday 27th July 
10pm 
Friday 21st Aug. 
Noon  
Friday 18th Sept. 
8am 
Thursday 15th Oct. 
6pm 
Jubilee  Tuesday 28th July 
6pm 
Monday 24th Aug. 
10pm 
Monday 21st Sept. 
Noon 
Friday 16th Oct. 
8am 
Little House   Wednesday 
29th July 
8am 
Tuesday 25th Aug. 
6pm 
Tuesday 22nd Sept. 
10pm 
Monday 19th Oct. 
Noon  
BAU Thursday 30th July 
Noon  
Wednesday 26th 
Aug. 
8am  
Wednesday 23rd Sept. 
6pm 
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Appendix 4 Standing operating procedure 
Medication Administration Errors (MAEs) 
The medicine administration is considered to be associated with a significant proportion 
of identified errors, for example 44% of overall medication errors are thought to be 
related to administration errors (Leape et al., 1995). The NPSA (NPSA, 2010) reported 
that 27 deaths, 68 severe harms and nearly 21,000 other patient safety incidents were 
associated with omissions or delays in medicines administration within three years.  
 
A medication administration error (MAE) can be defined as: “Any deviation between 
the medication prescribed and that administered”, in line with previous studies where 
medication prescribed is defined as: “Medication currently on the patient’s regular 
(repeat) list, plus any changes and acute medication recently prescribed” (Barber et al., 
2009). Therefore, MAE considered as any dose of drug administered or omitted that 
regress from the patient’s recent prescriptions (Barber et al., 2009). 
 
Opportunity for error (OE) is counted as any dose of medication that is observed either 
being administered or omitted, which could be classified as being either correct or 
incorrect (Taxis and Barber, 2003). 
 
Observation of Medication Administration  
The plan:  
I will observe 170 medication administration rounds (two each day during the working 
week, for each ward. Four drug rounds normally take place each day on all but the 
adolescent wards at the Trust. The data will be collected prospectively by observing 
nurses during medication administration rounds. I would like to observe a sufficient 
number of ward rounds to enable me to effectively pick up any medication 
administration errors and practice deviations that might occur.  
 
The reason:   
The study will examine medication administration errors and staff perceptions. These 
will enable me to make recommendations about ways of improving medication 
administration practices across the Trust. 
 
Before the drug round 
 I will take everything I need i.e. identification (hospital ID badge), data 
collection forms, pens, spare paper, BNF and consent forms, personal alarm.  
 I will arrive on the ward before the time that the round is likely to begin that 
would give me the opportunity to check through the drug trolley before 
observing the drug round; to note what will administered to the patients. Doing 
this on the same day as the observation will be best but if this is not possible, it 
can be done the previous day. 
 I will introduce myself to the ward manager or the nurse in charge and wait at 
the nursing station for the drug round to begin. 
 I will explain that I am a researcher, and what I would like to do (ensure that the 
nurse understand what I intend to do even if they have already consented).  
 Remind staff that the purpose of this study is to observe medication 
administration rounds in order to identify adherence (or non-adherence) to 
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prescribed medication – i.e. to see whether medicines are given exactly 
according to the prescription in all instances and what reasons exist when there 
are deviations. After the observation phase, I would then like to explore the 
views of health professionals (nursing staff) about practice deviations.  
 I will ask if they would mind to accompany on this drug round. 
If the nurse is happy to be observed, I will explain what I will do. For example:  
“I will shadow you from when you start the round; I will make notes relating to which 
medicines have been prescribed for each patient and which medicines have been 
administered by you. You don’t need to do anything different to your normal practice, 
other than allow me to observe what you normally do during a medication round. The 
only purpose is to make a comparison across different wards. All results will be 
anonymous, and it will not be possible to identify individual members of nursing staff 
from the results.”  
If a nurse does not want to be observed I will document this and try and come back 
another time to observe another round. 
 
During the drug round: 
 I will shadow the nurse administering medication during the drug round. If the 
nurse is called away for any reason from the trolley I will stay with the drug 
trolley as I should be able to collect all of the applicable data. 
 I will try to be friendly to the nurses. However, if they asked for advice about 
drug administration, I will explain that I am a researcher, so I cannot assist with 
patient care. (If I feel that the patient’s might suffer harm if I do not give an 
advice, then I will go ahead and give whatever advice is necessary). 
 During the drug round I will record all doses that I observe to be given (or 
should be given but was not) by using the data collection form. MAE will 
documented and any accompanying details will also be recorded happen i.e. if 
MAE is prevented by myself or by a patient.    
 It is known that the administration rounds move very quickly, so I will use 
abbreviations during the round to catch everything then I will clarify any details 
afterwards.    
“When a dose is omitted during the drug round but the drug chart is signed to indicate 
that it has been administered, count this as an omission as we will assume that the dose 
is never given. However if a dose is omitted and the drug chart left blank, I should ask 
the nurse at the end of the round whether the drug was intentionally omitted. If the 
omission was unintentional, again, this should be included as an OE and an omission 
error.” (Barber et al., 2009). 
 
After the drug round: 
After the drug round is over, I will thank the nurse. Then I will check different things 
that I could need such as; check that the drug chart and dispensing label agree, check 
whether or not the medicines have been signed for by ticking in the proper column, 
check for the expiry dates on medicines. (Barber et al., 2009). 
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Form for recording observations of medication administration rounds  
 
 
Date: Time – circle Medication round start 
time: 
Medication round finish 
time: 
Observation number: 
AM Noon 6pm Night 
Ward name:  
 
Day of week:    
Patient 
initials 
Error or 
near-
miss? 
(Yes/No) 
 
Medication name, strength, 
form, dose 
Error type  
Storage 
 
Interruption type 
(patient, staff, 
other activities) 
O* AE EDs WD UD DI FE RE DD WTE Other 
e.g. 
A.M 
e.g. Yes               
                
                
                
                
                
                
O*: if the box left blank it will consider as omission error (no sign or codes as follows): A = Absent without leave, C = Covert administration of medicine, 
E = Omitted prior to ECT, L = On leave, N = No stock, P = patient managing their own medicines, R = Refused, S = Sleeping, AS = Self administration, X 
= Prescribed omission, O = Omitted for another reason, or T = On another ward/ at another hospital, which must be recorded in the patient’s notes 
 
Other ward activity? (meal/ward meeting/ 
ward round/ tea break/other) 
 
Staff members down?  
Mode of administration – bedside/queue?  
Permanent or bank?  
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Appendix 5 Interview questions  
 
The main purpose of this questionnaire is to find out 
- Whether the nurses agree that a particular type of activity coded as an MAE is 
actually a medication administration error? 
- How the nurses judge the impact of the different types of MAE. 
- What the nurses believe are contributing factors to the different types of MAEs 
- Whether the nurses have any opinions about the types of interventions that can reduce 
MAEs 
Brief chat: 
My name is Hesham and I am a PhD pharmacy practice student at the University of Reading. 
From the email that the ward manager sent, you indicated your interest to be interviewed 
regarding nurses opinions about the reasons behind medication administration errors within 
the Trust. Thank you for agreeing to participate. Hopefully this interview will take not more 
than 20-30 minutes of your time.  
During my observational visit on the psychiatric and community hospital wards I made a 
number of observations for which I wanted to seek some clarity, especially around why and if 
certain decisions were made because I was not able to form an opinion on what I found.  
 
 One of the most frequently encountered situations that I found was potentially relating to 
the omission of medication. According to my own notes, I observed 49 cases where the 
medication was, to me, not given and the drug chart was also not signed either. However, 
I must stress that these were my observations and that the whole purpose of these 
interviews is to see if there could be some other practice or explanation of what I think I 
found. If I count what I observed as an omission then these are considered to be ‘blank 
boxes’ on the drug charts so it’s important for me to get a sense of whether my 
observations are likely to have been accurately interpreted or not.  
Confirm whether the participant needs to read the “participant information sheet” again.  
 
 
Request permission from the participant to audio-record the interview. 
 
 
Inform the participant that all the information that will be recorded in the interview will be 
treated confidentially. 
 
 
Ask the participant to complete the consent form and give the participant a copy. 
 
 
Check whether the participant has any further questions or needs any further information 
before starting the interview. 
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Some of the products were topical such as E45 cream, fucidin cream, clotrimazole cream 
and epaderm cream, bactroban nasal ointment and diprobase cream and some were oral 
products such as vitamin B compound, procal shot, flucloxacillin, diazepam, 
paracetamolas well as metformin. 
1) Do you agree in principle that forgetting to give the medication and not signing the 
drug chart should be coded as a medication administration error? 
2) What do you think a blank box is? (Nurse forgot to give or nurse gave but forgot to 
sign? Have you come across similar examples in the past? 
3) Some omitted topical as well as oral medication (E45, paracetamol).  Why do you 
think that such omissions happen? 
4) Following your answer, do you think that there is ever any priority for giving some 
medications more than others? 
5) During my observation, I found that some medication such as fucidin cream or 
flucloxacillin were forgotten to be given on more than one occasion during my 
observation. To what extent do you think this could harm the patient?  Another 
common error was with vitamin B compound or thiamine – what about this type of 
medication? 
6) What might help reduce the occurrence of this type of medication administration 
error? 
 
 Another example, I found 19 cases where the medication appeared to me not given 
however, the drug chart was actually signed to say that it was given. Most of these 
instances involved topical products.   
1) Therefore it seemed to me that the nurses involved signed the drug chart without 
giving the medication to the patient. Could this happen?  
2) Do you agree in principle that forgetting to give the medication and signing the drug 
chart to say that it has been given should be coded as a medication administration 
error? 
3) Why do you think this sort of error could happen? 
4) What would be the impact on the patient?  
5) What would help reduce the occurrence of this type of medication administration 
error? 
 
 In another 19 cases the medication was at first not going to be given unless I intervened to 
remind the nurse. 
1) For example: in some cases the nurses involved giving all the patients’ medications 
but  they forget to give one or two items then I intervened to remind them, in your 
view is it possible that this could happen? 
2)  Other example: the nurses involved did not give the medication due to the patients 
were not in their room and the nurse decided to return back to patient to give the 
medication but it seemed to me that they forgot then after my intervention they return 
to give medication to the patient   in your view it’s possible that this could happen?  
3) Do you agree in principle that forgetting to give the medication from the first time 
should be coded as a medication administration error? 
4) Why do you think this sort of error could happen? 
5) What would be the impact on the patient?  
6) What would help reduce the occurrence of this type of medication administration 
error? 
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 During my observation there were 18 cases where the medication was given but the nurse 
possibly forgot to sing the drug chart, which is considered to be a ‘blank box’ on the drug 
chart. 
1) Therefore it seemed to me that the nurses did not sign the drug chart but did give the 
medication to the patient. Could this happen?  
2) Do you agree in principle that giving the medication but not signing the drug chart to 
say that it has been given should be coded as a medication administration error? 
3) Why do you think this sort of error could happen? 
4) What would be the impact on the patient?  
5) What would help reduce the occurrence of this type of medication administration 
error? 
 
 According to the Trust policy that opening date should be labeled for some drugs 
formulations such as (liquid, eye drops and insulin) due to different half-life and expiry 
dates to these medications (liquid up to 3 months and eye drops and insulin 28 days from 
opining date. 118 cases were the medication appear to me with no opening and expiry 
date label.   
1) Therefore it seemed to me that the nurses could possibly forget to write the opening 
date for this medication, Why do you think this might happen? (By mistake or on 
purpose?) 
2) In some cases I found that tablet given from the strip that did not include the expiry 
date, do you think that matters? 
3) Do you agree in principle that giving the medication from container did not have label 
to show the opining or expiry date should be coded as a medication administration 
error? 
4) Why do you think this sort of error could happen? 
5) If you find an expired medication given by a nurse.  What would be the impact on the 
patient?  
6) What might help reduce the occurrence of this type of medication administration 
error? 
 
 In addition, there were other cases found potentially relating to MAE’s such as 57 cases 
(other reason error), 47 cases (wrong time error) and 24 cases (wrong dose).  
1) Rinse mouth after using some corticosteroid inhalers were the most error detected for 
other reason. Therefore it seemed to me that the nurses might forget to tell the patients 
to rinse their mouth after using the inhaler. Could this happen? 
2)  Do you agree in principle that did not rinse the patients mouth after giving the 
corticosteroid inhalers should be coded as a medication administration error? 
3) Why do you think this sort of error could happen? 
4) What would be the impact on the patient?  
5) What would help reduce the occurrence of this type of medication administration 
error? How could we raise the profile of this type of error with the nursing staff? 
6) Regarding the time of administration round, from your experience, could some 
administration round take more than 2 hours?  
7) Do you agree in principle that giving medication after 2 hours should be coded as a 
medication administration error? (For example paracetamol 1 gm 4 times daily) 
8) Why do you think this sort of error could happen? 
9) What would be the impact on the patient?  
10) What would help reduce the occurrence of this type of medication administration 
error? 
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11) One of the most concerning situations I found that some nurses were attempting to 
give heparin 5000 units 0.25ml instead of 0.2ml? It is written on the box that 5000 
units = 0.2ml. This was observed on more than one occasion but do you think this. 
Could this happen?  
12) Do you agree in principle that giving the wrong dose of medication should be coded 
as a medication administration error?  
13) Why do you think this sort of error could happen? 
14) What would be the impact on the patient?  
15) What would help reduce the occurrence of this type of medication administration 
error? 
 
 During the observation, I noticed some wards were very busy with other activity such as 
(ward meeting, Dr round and other). 
1) From your point of view, what is your priority during the drug administration round? 
And why? 
2)  I found some nurses priority were other activity (Dr round)? Why? 
 
 During my drug administration round, one of the nurses told me that the drug 
administration is routine work, and that they are fed up of drug administration. 
1) In what extent do you agree with them? And why?   
 
 From the observation data collection the rate of error found was 16%, do you think that 
rate could be minimised and how? 
 
Thank you very much for your valuable time and information. 
 
Give the participant the amazon voucher 
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Appendix 6 The‎University‎of‎Reading’s‎Research‎Ethics‎
Committee‎and‎the‎Trust’s‎Clinical‎Audit‎Department Approval 
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Appendix 7 Notice about presence of PhD researcher on the ward 
Notice about presence of 
PhD researcher on the ward 
 
There is a PhD researcher from 
the University of Reading on 
this ward observing normal 
practices, including giving out 
medicines. If you wish for the 
researcher to not look at your 
medicine chart then please let 
one of the nurses know. 
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Appendix 8 Letters of information for consent to participate in 
observations and interviews 
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Reading School of Pharmacy 
Food Biosciences building 
Whiteknights, PO Box 226  
Reading  RG6 6AP 
UK 
phone +44 (0)118 378 4637 
fax +44 (0)118 378 4703 
email pharmacy@reading.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
Letter of information for consent to participate in observations 
Title of Study: An audit of medication administration rounds at Berkshire Healthcare 
NHS Foundation Trust using observational methods  
Invitation 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide I would like you 
to understand why the research is being carried out and what it would involve. If you need 
any clarification after reading this Information Sheet, I can arrange to meet and go through 
the information sheet with you in order to answer any questions you have – please see the 
header of this Information Sheet for my contact details. I expect that this information sheet 
should take about 5 to 10 minutes to read through 
Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen if you take part.  
Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study.  
Please feel free to contact me if there is anything that is not clear.  
Part 1 of the information sheet 
What is the purpose of the study? 
I am conducting an audit of medication administration rounds across all wards at BHFT. I 
would like to establish practices against national standards. The purpose of this study is to 
observe medication administration rounds in order to identify adherence (or non-adherence) 
to prescribed medication – i.e. to see whether medicines are given exactly according to the 
prescription in all instances and what reasons exist when there are deviations. After the audit, 
I would then like to explore the views of health professionals (nursing staff) in relation to 
medication administration rounds and deviations from prescriptions. We will contact you 
separately about that in due course. For now, this information letter relates to observation of 
medication administration rounds. 
 
This study has come about because although an audit of ‘blank boxes’ was conducted 
recently, there is still room to investigate all practices associated with medication 
administration rounds. There is currently no formal measure of medication administration 
practices across the Trust using objective outcome measures. 
 
Therefore the principle aim of this study is to audit medication administration practices.  The 
study is not about apportioning blame to any individual who deviates from normal practice 
but about establishing an understanding of practices and how we can learn from these 
findings. This study will form the basis of me Mr Hesham Abduldaeem.  I am studying under 
the supervision of pharmacists Dr Parastou Donyai at the School of Pharmacy, University of 
Reading. 
 
Why have you been invited?  
Doctoral student 
Mr Hesham Abduldaeem BSC, MSC 
h.a.a.abduldaeem@student.reading.ac.uk 
Lecturer, Pharmacy Practice 
Dr Nilesh Patel PHD, BPHARM, PGCAP, MRPHARMS, FHEA 
+44 (0)118 378 4639 
Nilesh.Patel@reading.ac.uk 
Associate Professor, Pharmacy Practice 
Dr Parastou Donyai MRPHARMS, PHD, BPHARM(HONS), PGDPRM, PGCERT LTHE 
+44 (0)118 378 4704 
p.donyai@reading.ac.uk 
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You are being invited to take part in the project because we would like to observe a series of 
medication administration rounds on every ward at the Trust.  We are hoping to observe at 
least 2 medication rounds per working day for a 5-day period. If you are reading this as a 
nurse, it is likely that your ward manager has identified you as someone who will be taking a 
lead in medication administration during my study period. 
 
Do you have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide to join the study.  I can arrange to meet with you in order to describe 
the study further and go through this information sheet if necessary.  If you agree to take part, 
I will then ask you to sign a consent form before I observe your round.  You are free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving a reason.  A copy of this information sheet and a signed 
consent form will be given to you to keep. 
 
What will happen to you if you take part? 
Before starting your involvement in the study you will be asked to sign a consent form.  If 
you agree to participate in observation of your medication administration rounds, I (the 
researcher) will shadow you from when you start the round; I will make notes relating to 
which medicines have been prescribed for each patient and which medicines have been 
administered by you. You don’t need to do anything different to your normal practice, other 
than allow me to observe what you normally do during a medication round. If I think that you 
might be about to make a minor error when you administer the medication, then I will make a 
note of this (keeping your identity anonymous) and we will collate such examples to provide 
feedback on areas of practice that can be improved at the end of the study. In practice, it 
would be very difficult for anyone to judge an error as having no potential for harm. If I think 
you are about to make an error (or are about to make an error) that I judge as being 
potentially harmful to the patient, then I will ask for you to read out the prescribed 
medication to me for our clarity (e.g. drug name and dose) and then if I still think that a 
potentially harmful administration error is about to be made, then I will ask to speak with you 
privately away from the patient to seek further clarity and alert you to the situation that there 
might be a potential for an error being made that could harm the patient. If we agree about 
this, then it would then be up to you to report the error or near-miss (depending on the 
situation) using your standard ward reporting systems. The pharmacist Mrs Kate Masters can 
be contacted in any cases where these is ambiguity.  
 
Expenses and payments  
I will not be in a position to offer any payment for observing your ward rounds for ethical 
reasons since this is a normal part of your job.   
 
What will you have to do? 
If you are interested in participating in this study by being observed, please tell your ward 
manager. I will liaise with the ward manager to schedule specific medication administration 
rounds to observe during my data collection weeks.  
 
 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
This study is designed with minimal potential risks to all participants.  During the observation 
of your medication administration rounds, I will note down any errors observed. If I judge 
these to be of no impact to patients, then I will not interfere with your normal practice. 
Instead I will collate details of all errors and then provide general feedback in relation to 
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areas that can be improved once the study is complete. However, if I observe an error or a 
potential error that I judge to have the potential to harm, or if I am not sure, then I will ask to 
speak with you privately, away from the patient, so that we can avoid any risk to patients. It 
would then be your professional responsibility to either seek further information about the 
reporting of the error or near-miss from your line manager, or Mrs Kate Masters (BHFT 
pharmacist involve in this study) or to go ahead and report the incident using the normal ward 
processes. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
I cannot promise the study will help you in any specific way but you may find participating 
and reflecting on the topic helpful to your own practice and of course the information we get 
from this study might help improve the care of patients at the Trust. This is because we will 
identify and quantify medication administration practices and variations, which we will report 
back to the Trust. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any possible harm 
you might suffer will be addressed. How to deal with this is given in Part2. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes. We will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will be handled 
in confidence. The details are included in Part 2. 
If you are considering participation, please read the additional information in Part 2 
before making any decision. 
Part 2 of the information sheet 
What‎will‎happen‎if‎you‎don’t‎carry‎on‎with‎the‎study? 
If you do not wish to carry on with this study, for example you wish to pull out of the 
observation having arranged it in advance you can withdraw at any time without giving a 
reason. In order to withdraw from the study, please contact me (Hesham) in the first place or 
otherwise please contact my supervisor whose contact details appear at the head of this letter. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have any complaints about the way you have been dealt with during the study, this can 
be addressed by contacting my research supervisor by email or by phone. For contact details, 
please see the header of this Information Sheet. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Confidentiality will be ensured for all participants, and all data collected from the 
observations will be used only for scientific research purposes. Observations of medication 
administration rounds will be recorded on paper in an anonymised fashion so that your name 
is not specifically identifiable. All information will be anonymised to prevent association of 
participants to defined observations – non-identifiable codes will be used and other 
identifiable information will be altered. This is critical to ensure your anonymity and 
confidentiality throughout the write up of the results. You might want to see the outcome of 
the observation of your own specific medication administration rounds but as we will be 
anonymising these so it will not be possible to give you any specific feedback.  
 
What will happen to the result of the study? 
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The results of the study will be used in my PhD thesis. The outcomes may be presented at 
academic and professional conferences and in academic journals. The detail of all 
participants will be kept confidential and you will not be identifiable from any research paper 
or other publications. The data relating to observations will also be destroyed when the 
research is complete. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This study is being conducted with the University of Reading acting as the academic 
institution for my PhD.  In addition, my research is supported by a full-time scholarship 
provided by the Saudi Government. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been reviewed by the University of Reading Research Ethics Committee. 
Thank you for taking the trouble to read about my study 
Mr Hesham Abduldaeem 
 
Doctoral student 
Reading School of Pharmacy 
Food Biosciences building 
Whiteknights, PO Box 226  
Reading RG6 6AP 
h.a.a.abduldaeem@pgr.reading.ac.uk 
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Reading School of Pharmacy 
Food Biosciences building 
Whiteknights, PO Box 226  
Reading  RG6 6AP 
UK 
phone +44 (0)118 378 4637 
fax +44 (0)118 378 4703 
email pharmacy@reading.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Letter of information for consent to participate in interviews 
Title of Study: An audit of medication administration rounds at Berkshire Healthcare 
NHS Foundation Trust – gathering‎nurses’‎views 
Invitation 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide I would like you 
to understand why the research is being carried out and what it would involve. If you need 
any clarification after reading this Information Sheet, I can arrange to meet and go through 
the information sheet with you in order to answer any questions you have – please see the 
header of this Information Sheet for my contact details. I expect that this information sheet 
should take about 5 to 10 minutes to read through. 
Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen if you take part.  
Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study.  
Please feel free to contact me if there is anything that is not clear.  
Part 1 of the information sheet 
What is the purpose of the study? 
I have been conducting an audit of medication administration rounds across all wards at 
BHFT and last year took part in a series of observations. My purpose is to establish practices 
against national standards. This letter relates to interviews I hope to conduct following the 
observations.  
 
I would like to explore the views of nurses in relation to medication administration rounds 
and deviations from prescriptions.  
 
Although I am still writing up my report of the observations, I did find some examples 
relating to missed doses, blank boxes, etc which I would like to explore with nurses who 
complete medication administration rounds. The views and opinions of nursing staff across 
the wards at BHFT have not been formally collected but it is important that my quantitative 
study explores these views as part of my PhD. 
 
Therefore the principle aim of this element of my study is to seek the opinions of nurses 
about the potential errors which I observed.  The study is not about apportioning blame to any 
individual who deviates from normal practice but about establishing an understanding of 
practices and how we can learn from these findings. This study will form the basis of my (Mr 
Hesham Abduldaeem’s) PhD.  I am studying under the supervision of pharmacists Dr 
Parastou Donyai at the School of Pharmacy, University of Reading. 
 
Why have you been invited?  
Doctoral student 
Mr Hesham Abduldaeem BSC, MSC 
h.a.a.abduldaeem@student.reading.ac.uk 
Lecturer, Pharmacy Practice 
Dr Nilesh Patel PHD, BPHARM, PGCAP, MRPHARMS, FHEA 
+44 (0)118 378 4639 
Nilesh.Patel@reading.ac.uk 
Associate Professor, Pharmacy Practice 
Dr Parastou Donyai MRPHARMS, PHD, BPHARM(HONS), PGDPRM, PGCERT LTHE 
+44 (0)118 378 4704 
p.donyai@reading.ac.uk 
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You are being invited to take part in the project because I would like to interview nurses who 
are working at BHFT.  In total I will aim to interview a minimum of 10 nurses to obtain a 
broad range of possible perceptions towards medication administration rounds and practice 
variations. Ideally I would like to interview one nurse form each ward. 
 
Do you have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide to join the study.  I can arrange to meet with you in order to describe 
the study further and go through this information sheet if necessary.  If you agree to take part, 
I will then ask you to sign a consent form before I interview you.  You are free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving a reason.  In order to withdraw from the study, please contact me 
(Hesham) in the first place or otherwise please contact my supervisor whose contact details 
appear at the head of this letter. A copy of this information sheet and a signed consent form 
will be given to you to keep. 
 
What will happen to you if you take part? 
Before starting your involvement in the study you will be asked to sign a consent form.  If 
you decide to take part, I will arrange to conduct a single interview with you at your place of 
work at a convenient date and time to you – I hope you would be able to help me find a 
private space for the interview to take place. This interview is expected to last about 30 
minutes but could take longer depending on your availability and interest in the work.  There 
will be no further obligation on your part.  With your permission, the interview will be audio-
recorded to make sure I obtain an accurate account of the discussions.   
 
Expenses and payments  
I will be able to compensate for your time by offering a £10 Amazon voucher for the 
interview.  In order to do that, I would obtain your email address and arrange for an 
electronic voucher to be sent to you after the interview.  
 
What will you have to do? 
If you are interested in participating in this study by being interviewed, please contact me by 
e-mail h.a.a.abduldaeem@pgr.reading.ac.uk.  On receiving your email, I will contact you to 
arrange one face-to-face semi-structured interview with you at your workplace at a time and 
date convenient to you.  The interview will be based on an interview schedule related to the 
medication administration observations which I have completed.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
This study is designed with minimal potential risks to all participants.  I will aim not to ask 
you about any personal or sensitive issues and will avoid unnecessary intrusion. You have a 
right to not answer any questions that may result in some form of unease. In the unlikely 
event that you get upset during the interview or topics arise that cause you distress, I will stop 
the interview or give you the chance to talk freely, as you wish. The contact details of my 
supervisor are provided at the top of this sheet and they will be available to talk to you if you 
require additional support. 
 
 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
I cannot promise the study will help you in any specific way but you may find participating 
and reflecting on the topic helpful to your own practice and of course the information we get 
from this study might help improve the care of patients at the Trust. 
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What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any possible harm 
you might suffer will be addressed. How to deal with this is given in Part2. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes. We will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will be handled 
in confidence. The details are included in Part 2. 
If you are considering participation, please read the additional information in Part 2 
before making any decision. 
Part 2 of the information sheet 
 
What‎will‎happen‎if‎you‎don’t‎carry‎on‎with‎the‎study? 
If you do not wish to carry on with this study, for example you wish to pull out of the 
interview having arranged it in advance you can withdraw at any time without giving a 
reason. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have any complaints about the way you have been dealt with during the study, this can 
be addressed by contacting my research supervisors by email or by phone. For contact details, 
please see the header of this Information Sheet. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Confidentiality will be ensured for all participants, and all data collected from the interviews 
will be used only for scientific research purposes. Interviews will be recorded with your 
permission using a digital audio-recorder. For the interviews, all recordings made will be 
removed from the audio-recorder and transferred to a secure memory stick as soon as 
possible.  This memory stick will then be stored in a locked filing cabinet in a secure office. 
The recordings will then be transcribed into a word document and no names or any other 
details that might identify the participant will be included in the transcripts. All information 
will be anonymised to prevent association of participants to defined quotations – non-
identifiable codes will be used and other identifiable information will be altered. This is 
critical to ensure your anonymity and confidentiality throughout the write up of the results. If 
requested, you will be given the access to the transcript of your own interview, and you will 
have the opportunity to review this before it is finalised and used in the research. At the 
conclusion of the study the digital recordings will be completely deleted.  
 
What will happen to the result of the study? 
The results of the study will be used in my PhD thesis. The outcomes may be presented at 
academic and professional conferences and in academic journals. The detail of all 
participants will be kept confidential and you will not be identifiable from any research paper 
or other publications. The transcript from your interview will be destroyed when the research 
is completed. The confidential data relating to observations will also be destroyed when the 
research is complete. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This study is being conducted with the University of Reading acting as the academic 
institution for my PhD.  In addition, my research is supported by a full-time scholarship 
provided by the Saudi Government. 
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Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been reviewed by the University of Reading Research Ethics Committee. 
Thank you for taking the trouble to read about my study 
Mr Hesham Abduldaeem 
 
Doctoral student 
Reading School of Pharmacy 
Food Biosciences building 
Whiteknights, PO Box 226  
Reading  RG6 6AP 
h.a.a.abduldaeem@pgr.reading.ac.uk 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Expression of Interest  
Please e-mail me (h.a.a.abduldaeem@pgr.reading.ac.uk) to confirm your interest in 
being interviewed. 
To: Mr. Hesham Abduldaeem 
I am interested to take part in your study titled: An audit of medication administration 
rounds at Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust 
Name: ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Contact telephone No:  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
E-mail:  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 9 Consent form for observations and interviews 
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Reading School of Pharmacy 
Food Biosciences building 
Whiteknights, PO Box 226  
Reading  RG6 6AP 
UK 
phone +44 (0)118 378 4637 
fax +44 (0)118 378 4703 
email pharmacy@reading.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
Consent form for observations 
Title of Project:  An audit of medication administration rounds at Berkshire 
Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust using observational methods  
Name of Researcher: Hesham Abduldaeem  
I have read the accompanying Information Sheet relating to the project entitled above 
and it has been explained to me by the researcher 
The purposes of the project and what will be required of me have been discussed with 
me, and any questions I had have been answered to my satisfaction.  I agree to the 
arrangements described in the Information Sheet in so far as they relate to my 
participation. 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the study. I have 
had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and these have been 
answered satisfactorily. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time without giving any reason. 
3. I understand that my participation in this element of the study involves being 
observed by a researcher from the University of Reading who will shadow me on my 
medication administration round.  I give my permission to the researcher to make 
observations and to alert me to any serious error before it takes place if this is identified 
by them.  
4 Nonetheless, I understand that I feel uncomfortable in any way during the observation 
of my medication administration round, I have the right to end the observation.  
5. I understand that this project has been subject to ethical review, according to the 
procedures specified by the University Research Ethics Committee, and approval has 
been granted. 
6. I understand that my confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure 
and that the notes relating to my medication administration round will not contain my 
name.  
7. I have been given a copy of this consent form and the accompanying information 
letter. 
 
Doctoral student 
Mr Hesham Abduldaeem BSC, MSC 
h.a.a.abduldaeem@student.reading.ac.uk 
Lecturer, Pharmacy Practice 
Dr Nilesh Patel PHD, BPHARM, PGCAP, MRPHARMS, FHEA 
+44 (0)118 378 4639 
Nilesh.Patel@reading.ac.uk 
Associate Professor, Pharmacy Practice 
Dr Parastou Donyai MRPHARMS, PHD, BPHARM(HONS), PGDPRM, PGCERT LTHE 
+44 (0)118 378 4704 
p.donyai@reading.ac.uk 
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8. I would like to receive a summary of the results once the study is complete and the 
data analysed. For that purpose alone I give my contact details below: 
_____________________________________ 
_____________________________________ 
_____________________________________ 
_____________________________________ 
 
9. I agree to take part in the above study. 
Name…………………………………………………………… 
Signed…………………………………………………………. 
Date…………………………………………………………….. 
Witnessed by 
Name………………………………………………………….. 
Signature……………………………………………………… 
Date……………………………………………………………… 
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Reading School of Pharmacy 
Food Biosciences building 
Whiteknights, PO Box 226  
Reading  RG6 6AP 
UK 
phone +44 (0)118 378 4637 
fax +44 (0)118 378 4703 
email pharmacy@reading.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consent form for interviews  
Title of Project:  An audit of medication administration rounds at Berkshire 
Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust – gathering‎nurses’‎views 
Name of Researcher: Hesham Abduldaeem  
I have read the accompanying Information Sheet relating to the project entitled above 
and it has been explained to me by the researcher 
The purposes of the project and what will be required of me have been discussed with 
me and any questions I had have been answered to my satisfaction.  I agree to the 
arrangements described in the Information Sheet in so far as they relate to my 
participation. 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the study. I have 
had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these 
answered satisfactorily. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time without giving any reason. 
3. I understand that while most interviewees will find the discussion interesting and 
thought-provoking, if nonetheless I feel uncomfortable in any way during the interview 
session, I have the right to decline to answer any question or to end the interview. 
4. I understand that my participation in this study involves being interviewed by a 
researcher from University of Reading and the interview will last approximately 30 
minutes and will be audio-recorded.  I give my permission to the researcher to audio-
record the interview by using a digital voice recorder.  
5. This project has been subject to ethical review, according to the procedures specified 
by the University Research Ethics Committee, and approval has been granted 
6. I understand that my confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure 
and that the transcript of my interview will not contain my name.  
7. I have been given a copy of this consent form and the accompanying information 
letter. 
8. I wish to receive a summary of the results once the study is complete and the data 
analysed, for that purpose alone I give my contact details below: 
 
 
Doctoral student 
Mr Hesham Abduldaeem BSC, MSC 
h.a.a.abduldaeem@student.reading.ac.uk 
Lecturer, Pharmacy Practice 
Dr Nilesh Patel PHD, BPHARM, PGCAP, MRPHARMS, FHEA 
+44 (0)118 378 4639 
Nilesh.Patel@reading.ac.uk 
Associate Professor, Pharmacy Practice 
Dr Parastou Donyai MRPHARMS, PHD, BPHARM(HONS), PGDPRM, PGCERT LTHE 
+44 (0)118 378 4704 
p.donyai@reading.ac.uk 
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_____________________________________ 
_____________________________________ 
_____________________________________ 
_____________________________________ 
 
9. I agree to take part in the above study. 
Name…………………………………………………………… 
Signed…………………………………………………………. 
Date…………………………………………………………….. 
Witnessed by 
Name………………………………………………………….. 
Signature……………………………………………………… 
Date……………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix 10 Ward managers letter  
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Appendix 11 Observational note example   
1. Rowan ward:  
Psychiatric ward - more than 20 patients (older adults with dementia). The ward was attended around 1-2 hours earlier before starting the 
observation (which I did for all wards), to check the drug chart and to write each medication that will be given at this time of administration. 
The drug charts as all psychiatric ward are messy (the doctors cross the order and re-order many times) 
The clinic room was secured and contains one bed, two chairs, cupboard for stock drug, fridge to store the fridge items, and two non-movable 
trolley and cupboards to store the patient drugs and fast move medication (For male and female). 
The nurse came to check the patient drug charts about 15 minutes before starting the administration (ordering the drug charts to be ready 
prepare the drug for the patients and administered to them in their room/place one by one). Bedside-prepared in clinic room mode of 
administration 
The clinic room was very big and the drug chart was well-ordered. The patient medication container is organised but still (the patient name 
was written by hand and there is no other information e.g. medical number, age etc.). At the time of administration; the nurse checked the 
patient’s name by asking and confirmation their name, and there was no any other identity check.  
This ward was a bit difficult to deal with the patients due to elderly (dementia patients). Some patients refused to take their drugs and the 
nurse placed it in their meal (Covert). 
(The morning 8:00 round observation the administered nurse signed first then give the drug). 
(The evening 18:00 round observation the administered nurse was not checking the expiry at all). 
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Appendix 12 Observational and interviews analysis example   
 
1. Observation notes  
Ward  Mode of 
administration 
Expiry Error 
  Example of notes recorded  Active failure category – i.e. slips, 
lapses, violation, mistake etc. 
Error-producing 
condition 
Latent condition 
PW8 Bedside- 
prepared in 
clinic room  
“The nurse obtained the medication from the clinic room cupboard and gave 
it to the patient. This is because the patient regularly takes this medication 
and had their own supply stored in clinic room. When I checked to see if there 
was a label on the bottle to indicate when it has been opened and therefore 
when it might expire, I did not find this label. I think this error happens 
because some nurses maybe think that the medication might be used up before 
it expires.” 
Situational violation Staff workload  
 
Safety culture and 
priorities  
CHW1 Bedside- 
patient locker 
“The nurse obtained the medication from the patient locker and gave it to the 
patient. This is because the patient regularly takes this medication and had 
their own supply stored in the patient’s locker. When I checked to see if there 
was a label on the bottle to indicate when it has been opened and therefore 
when it might expire, I did not find this label I think this error happens 
because some nurses maybe think that the medication might be used up before 
it expires.” 
Situational violation Staff workload Safety culture and 
priorities 
CHW5 Bedside-
trolley 
“The nurse obtained the medication from the trolley and gave it to the patient. 
This is because the patient regularly takes this medication and had their own 
supply stored in the trolley. When I checked to see if there was a label on the 
bottle to indicate when it has been opened and therefore when it might expire, 
I did not find this label. I think this error happens because some nurses noted 
expiry while I was on ward.” 
Situational violation Staff workload Safety culture and 
priorities 
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2. Nurses’‎interview‎ 
Interview Expiry Error 
 Quote Active failure category – i.e. slips, 
lapses, violation, mistake etc. 
Error-producing condition Latent condition 
CN1 “It’s not by mistake, I think when, it’s not, maybe not, everybody not aware of that you 
need to write the date in there, that one because usually the pharmacist asking that 
when did it open.  Not maybe everybody remember to write that one.  That, I think that 
one, it was, it’s probably Gaviscon bottle, it’s a full big bottle, when you’re opening 
that one you asking, patient is asking for ten ml Gaviscon, you’re getting that one and 
giving it straight to the patients and you’re not staying there to write the date and time 
on there at the time so then you forget.  That’s what happens.” 
 
“This is just not remembering, not aware it is necessary to do these things because 
there its valid date is from 28 days and they know that, but they don’t remember or 
they don’t think that they need to write that date in there.” 
Lapse – omission  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge-based mistake 
 
 
Staff workload 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lack of knowledge 
 
Safety culture 
and priorities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PN1 “Yeah, I guess it’s whoever’s opened its responsibility to do that.  I guess, just 
forgetting I suppose.  Perhaps maybe not a good enough knowledge about what kind of 
medications need, I think most people would know the eye drops need to be 28 days.  
But I think a lot of the topical, like the creams and stuff, I think people could perhaps 
just not realise that that needs to be done.  Yeah.” 
 
[In relation to insulin] 
“Yeah.  Well, people should know that.  But, yeah, no.  I think just forgetting possibly.” 
 
“I think that’s not talked about often enough, about those little things like expiry dates 
and writing when things have been opened.  I think that’s not talked about enough, so 
it’s not pressed in to people’s minds that that’s something you need to be doing on a 
regular basis, whenever you open anything new.  I think we don’t, probably don’t 
discuss that enough in terms of medicines management.” 
Lapse – omission  
 
Knowledge-based mistake 
 
 
 
 
Lapse – omission  
 
 
 
 
 
Lack of knowledge 
 
Safety culture 
and priorities  
 
PN2 “We just forget.  We just get the medications and open it to dispense it.   
I don’t know. I think, yeah, just generally you just go to the cupboard, you open it up, 
you dispense. Yeah, I suppose you just, some people just forget.”  
Lapse – omission 
 
 
 
 Staff workload Safety culture 
and priorities 
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3. Pharmacists interview  
Interview Expiry Error 
 Quote Active failure category – i.e. slips, 
lapses, violation, mistake etc. 
Error-producing condition Latent condition 
PH3 Because I don’t think the nurses are familiar with the process, they’re not familiar about 
putting the expiry date on when they’re opening up liquid medicines; they’re not familiar 
at all.  So they’re not aware of it, I would say, yeah 
 
Yeah, so the nurses should be, need to be educated, this needs to be reinforced, from 
training to making sure that they are aware, that they know about this, yeah. 
Knowledge-based mistake Lack of knowledge Safety culture and 
priorities 
PH4 They don’t know that they’ve got to do it for that medicine.  Because it’s not for every 
medicine they don’t know which ones they do have to do it to and they don’t remember to 
do it.  you can train them to get it better, you can improve things but it’s constant, 
constant training and constant nagging but you need to put tools in place to support 
them to know, insulin, write the date on it so put a label on the shelf when they get it out 
the fridge to write the date on it.  You actually have to put visual reminders to remind 
people to do it because they won’t remember because they have thousands of other bits 
of information to remember and trying to remember everything is impossible so you have 
to put processes in place to, and reminders, visual reminders for people to remember 
that’s the drug you’ve got to put the opening date on.  
 
I think you need posters, training sessions, reminders, but something has to be at the 
product level where the nurses are using it to remind them to do it.  So, you would have a 
blank sticker on it that says, date opened, expiry date, which they then fill in because it’s 
a visual reminder on the packet for them to do it.  And that’s labour intensive to do 
because it doesn’t come from the manufacturer, not always, but, and you have to put 
posters up, maybe labels on the shelf where they get it out of the cupboard, saying 
reminder, put the dates on for these products.  And if it’s constantly there in multiple 
places you might then improve it.  But if you leave it, if you don’t do those sorts of things 
you’re never going to, a nurse is never going to remember which products need it and 
which ones don’t.   
Knowledge-based mistake 
 
Lapse – omission 
Lack of knowledge 
 
Staff workload  
Safety culture and 
priorities 
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Appendix 13 Tables of other quantitative results  
 
Table 1: The medication involved in MAEs across all wards including whether these in critical 
list medications or not 
Main medication MAEs  Critical list 
Clonazepam 4 No  
Codeine phosphate 4 No 
Ensure  7 No 
Flucloxacillin 4 No 
Heparin 4 Yes  
Quetiapine EC 4 No 
Sodium valproate 200mg/5ml 4 No 
Trazodone 50mg/5ml 4 No 
Viscotears 4 No 
Vitamin B compound 4 No 
Gaviscon 5 No 
Senna 5 No 
Omeprazole 5 No 
Insulin 14 Yes  
Salbutamol 6 No 
Laxido/Movicol sachet 8 No 
Diprobase cream 12 No 
Aspirin 14 No 
Paracetamol 22 No 
Beclometasone 17 No 
Procal shot 28 No 
Lactulose 10g/15ml 24 No 
 
Table 2: The number MAEs on route of administration observed  
Route of administration No. of MAEs 
Ear Drop 2 
Eye Drop 25 
Eye Ointment 2 
Inhaler 31 
Intramuscular 1 
Mouth Wash 1 
Nasal Spray 2 
Nebuliser 1 
Oral 247 
Rectal 1 
Subcutaneous 19 
Topical 35 
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Table 3: the types of potential harm that were found 
Types of potential harm Explanation of potential harm 
No date and time of administration in drug chart 
1-  Patient could get over dose  
Was attempting to give at wrong time 
Was attempting to give high dose 
Given but Blank box 
Was attempting to give two medications contain 
same generic ingredient  
Was attempting to give low dose  2- Patient might not get enough dose 
Missed dose  
3- Patient might have complication of 
not taking the medication  
No opening and expiry date of eye drop  
4- Patient might have complication 
from bacteria  
Did not dissolve aspirin 5- Patient might has drug irritation  
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Appendix 14 Publications and presentations related to this 
thesis 
 
Published Abstracts  
 
Abduldaeem, H., Masters, K., Patel, N. & Donyai P. 2016. A direct observation study 
of medication administration errors in a mental health inpatient setting. International 
Journal of Pharmacy Practice, 1, 4–29. 
 
Abduldaeem, H., Donyai P. & Patel, N. 2016. Using the Observational Method to 
Capture Medication Administration Practices: Errors and Contributing Factors. 9
th
 
Saudi Student Conference in UK.  
 
Oral Presentations  
 
A direct observation study of medication administration errors in a mental health 
inpatient setting, HSRPP Conference, 7
th 
- 8
th
 April 2016, Reading, UK. 
 
Medication Administration Errors in Psychiatric and Community Hospital Wards: A 
Direct observation method, Pharmacy Practice Research Showcase, 14
th
 April 2016, 
Reading, UK. 
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Appendix 15 Reading Researcher Development Programme 
RRDP 
Scientific Writing Lecture Dr. Bakhle 26
th
 Nov 2013 12pm 
Academic Writing Skills for Non-native Speakers Dr. Sarah Brewer 15
th
 January 2014         
11:00 – 13:00 
Basic Statistics Refresher Member of the Statistical Services 
Centre 
28
th
 January 2014                  
14:00 – 17:30 
Quality Data for Good Research Member of the Statistical Services 
Centre 
4
th
 February 2014                
09:00 – 17:00 
Managing your research project Dr. Andrew Charlton-Perez 19
th
 February 2014 
10:00 – 12:00 
Sourcing Information for a Literature Review – 
information retrieval 
Melvin Morbey 25
th
 February 2014 
11:00 – 13:00 
Preparing posters - Theory (Part 1) & Practical 
(Part 2) - one day session 
Laura Bennetto 10
th
 March 2014 
11:00 – 16:00 
How to write a thesis Dr. Anna Macready 27
th
 January 2015 
14:00-16:00 
Academic writing skills for non-native speakers - 
workshop 
Dr. Sarah Brewer 2
nd
 March 2015 
14:00-16:00 
Writing up your data analysis  4
th
 March 2015 
14:00-17:30 
Understanding and using images: theory and 
practice 
Laura Bennetto 24
th
 March 2015 
14:00-16:00 
Doctoral research conference  18
th
 June 2015 
How to write a paper  27
th
 Jan 2016 
How to get published  23
rd
 Feb 2016 
Self-management: Managing academic pressure  10
th
 May 2016 
Doing Thematic Analysis workshop   Dr. Cath Sullivan  5
th
 July 2016 
Qualitative interviewing: Individual interview, 
Focus group and Beyond 
Prof. Adrian Coyle 6
th
 July 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
